John Kenny King

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

AN AMERICAN QVARTERLY REVIEW

OCTOBER
1954

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The Editors.

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FOREIGN AFFAIRS

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THE WORLD SINCE THE WAR: THE THIRD PHASE

By Sir Roger Makins

IT WAS apparent early this year that postwar international relations had entered a new phase. An interpretation of how this came about and of its significance for the future now becomes possible. It is of course a personal British interpretation.

A glance back over the postwar international scene from 1945 until the end of 1952 suggests that it divides into two principal phases. During the first phase the Western Powers attempted to keep together the consortium of Great Powers which had been established during the war. France resumed her moral position as a Great Power with some difficulty, geography and the confidence of her allies making good her initial military and economic weakness in the international equation. But in China, political and economic realities had irrevocably undermined the wartime façade of authority of Chiang Kai-shek's régime in world affairs, and China was tacitly dropped except for her formal position on the Security Council of the United Nations. This phase stretches from the Potsdam Conference, through the conclusion of the lesser peace treaties, down to the final breakdown of four-Power arrangements at the London Conference at the end of 1947. Though Western statesmen were becoming increasingly disillusioned about the possibility of any sort of real collaboration with Stalin, they continued to try to preserve such remnants of coöperation as they could. The Palais Rose meeting in Paris in 1949, which failed to produce even an agenda for a four-Power meeting, marked the last abortive effort of importance.

II

The second phase may be described as that of the consolidation of the West and the building up of Western strength against the threat of Soviet aggression. It was a phase in which the at-

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tention of the West was concentrated on Europe rather than Asia. In effect it opened in June 1947 with the launching of the Marshall Plan. But it should be noted that it was heralded a year earlier by the speech of Sir Winston Churchill at Fulton, Missouri, in which he had formulated bluntly and clearly the truths which Western statesmen were now beginning to realize.

While the distinction between these phases is clear enough, nevertheless they overlapped to some extent in time. For instance, a form of four-Power control continues in Austria to this day. Yet the year that followed the announcement of the Marshall Plan marked a sharp break between the Western and the Communist worlds both in the political and in the economic spheres.

As this second phase developed, shifts began to take place in the balance of power within the West itself, affecting particularly the Anglo-American partnership on which, in the last analysis, the stability of the free world is based. For instance, the transfer of primarily British responsibility for protecting Greece and Turkey to the United States announced in the "Truman Doctrine," and symbolized by the stationing of a powerful American fleet in the Mediterranean, was a striking but by no means a unique example of the extension of American and the contraction of British overseas commitments. However, even after these adjustments had been made, Britain still made a military and economic contribution to opposing Soviet ambitions out of proportion to her economic strength. Britain continued to bear the predominant responsibility in the Middle East; maintained large forces in Malaya, Hong Kong and Far Eastern waters; played a worthy part in Korea.

During this time, Europe was regarded as the place where "the mortal danger" lay. If Russia, at that time so much more powerful militarily than the West, could enlist, or even dominate, the strategic potential of Germany and France, she would have established a position which the remainder of the free world might not be able to match. The main effort was therefore devoted to reviving European strength, first economically and then militarily, through successive steps culminating in the North Atlantic Treaty and the creation of a coördinated Western military structure under SHAPE. These were the days when the danger seemed so imminent that the West concentrated on building up military forces as rapidly as possible, working to specific dates;

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and this was therefore the period in which the conception of political and economic integration for Europe was naturally in the forefront of Western political thought.

This great effort was successful. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization came into being and SHAPE took over. Western Europe was saved, and the line was stabilized, for the time being, along the present Iron Curtain. But while positions of strength were being built up in Europe, great changes were taking place in Asia. In India, the transfer of authority was successfully accomplished with the maintenance of the British connection; and the British Commonwealth gave outstanding evidence all over the world of its cohesion and adaptability, notwithstanding internal strains. But Asian nationalism was on the march throughout the continent. In 1947 Zhdanov made a speech in Warsaw calling on colonial peoples to rise and expel their oppressors. In 1948 there was intensified Communist activity in the Far East leading in that year to open resort to force and violence in Burma, Indonesia, Indo-China and Malaya. Later came Korea. And it is now all too clear, as some people pointed out at the time, that the real Communist effort was being made in the Far East rather than in Europe.

III

I think it is now evident that since the death of Stalin at the beginning of 1953, postwar international relations have entered a new phase. Again this phase was heralded by another famous speech by Sir Winston Churchill—the speech delivered in the House of Commons on May 11 of that year.

We can also now see, I think, that this third phase was induced not simply by the death of the utterly unyielding dictator in the Kremlin, or by the development on both sides of nuclear weapons, but also by the successful rallying of Western resolution and strength.

Some of the characteristics of this third phase have become apparent. There have been an easing on the surface of Soviet relations with other countries; a series of concessions on minor matters; a softening of restrictions on the travel of foreigners in and to the Soviet Union; greater cordiality in intercouse with foreign representatives; and energetic competition in international sporting events, exemplified by the successful participation in the Henley Regatta last July.

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The Soviet Government in the course of this year has joined UNESCO, rejoined the I.L.O., and generally shown renewed interest in international social and economic activities. Greater flexibility has also been evident in diplomatic methods. At the Conferences of Berlin and Geneva, the endless argument about the agenda was abandoned. The Soviet representatives adopted a conciliatory attitude on procedural matters, and both conferences were able to get down to the substance of their work without delay.

Again, this third phase began before the previous phase was completed. There was a strong indication of it before Stalin's death. And the objective of the West in the second phase, namely the building up of positions of strength, has still not been fully worked out. Thus two of the four major industrial Powers in the free world, Germany in the West and Japan in the East, had not been integrated into the defense system of the free world. And while a considerable measure of political and economic stability has been attained in Europe, it remains to be seen whether an effective halt has yet been called to Communist encroachment in Asia.

How shall we estimate what the approach of the new Soviet leaders to the world's problems means, and in what relation it stands to the policies of Communist China?

There is no evidence to suggest that the present régime in the Kremlin does not continue to subscribe both in theory and action to the Marxist-Leninist ideology. In all its essentials the régime continues. The apparatus of power based on the Communist Party appears to be as firmly in control as ever. The Beria episode, and such present conflicts as we can now dimly discern, are struggles for domination within the system rather than a revolt against it. Perhaps the most significant change is that power is no longer concentrated in the hands of one man, but that the Soviet Empire is at present ruled by a Junta or Committee, in fact by a Soviet. It is easier for counsels of moderation to be heard in a Committee than under a personal autocracy. Indeed, whatever the reality, the present rulers of Russia are at least trying to give the impression of dissociating themselves, externally as well as internally, from the more extreme aspects of Stalin's police state. The status of the security police has been reduced; the new agricultural and consumer goods programs show an anxiety to correct some of the consequences of Stalin's

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excessive concentration on heavy industrial development; and in various fields including foreign affairs there has been a less inflexible hand on the helm and a greater appreciation of realities in setting the course.

Externally the Soviet leaders are pursuing the same aims. But they are pursuing them with rather greater suppleness and skill. They have authorized no reduction in the size and efficiency of the huge Soviet armed forces, to which the whole economic machinery of the U.S.S.R. is geared; on the contrary, the Soviet Union is being equipped with the latest thermonuclear and ballistic weapons. They continue to insist and to teach that there is no possibility of any genuine or lasting settlement with the West. Their policy at the Berlin Conference in January and February made it plain that, underneath the polite words, what they have they are determined to hold. For the present they find it expedient to seek a period of what they call "peaceful coexistence."

It is also significant that they have recognized as their main enemy the United States: the most powerful of the Western Powers. One of the principal aims of Communist activity in this phase is to isolate the United States: in Europe, by seducing and cajoling the other Western Powers away from her—by trying, in effect, to widen and deepen the Atlantic; and in Asia by playing on every difference, real or imaginary, between the British and the American approach to our common problems in this sensitive area.

In Europe the substance of Soviet policy has not changed. Its principal aim remains to maintain Soviet control over Eastern Europe, to disrupt NATO, and to extend Soviet influence westwards. Its purpose is to prevent the political association of the German Federal Republic with the West and a German military contribution to Western defense through the E.D.C. The proposal for a purely European "security system" is clearly designed to produce this result. It may well be that while adhering to these aims the Communist bloc will remain on the defensive in Europe, and exploit the seemingly better prospects which offer in Asia and in underdeveloped territories generally.

In the Far East, however, the Kremlin is no longer in a position to play a lone hand, owing to the emergent power of Communist China. During the years between the wars, the Kremlin gave the Chinese Communists little support, because it was chiefly concerned to block the expansion of Japan and felt that

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the Nationalist Government of China represented the best means of doing this. Not until the defeat of Japan in 1945 did Russia actively aid Chinese Communism, and then with a special eye to Manchuria and other key areas in the north. Perhaps Stalin hoped for a prolonged struggle, or even partition, in China, with the Communists ever more dependent on him. However that may be, Mao Tse-tung's unexpectedly rapid conquest of the Chinese mainland led to the formation of an independent Communist government; something quite different from an ordinary Soviet satellite. It follows that just as in the Soviet Union the Marxist-Leninist doctrine became compounded with traditional forms of Russian imperialism, so the possibility exists of Chinese Communism assuming a distinctively Chinese pattern, both internally and in its aims abroad. For the moment there is no doubt of the close collaboration between Moscow and Peking, and the two Powers are closely dependent on each other. But divergent interests can already be discerned; and certainly time and contacts with the West will not impede their development. The Chinese have long memories. But we must also bear in mind that in this third phase Moscow seems anxious to mark time on the basis of its gains to date, while the rulers in Peking are still in the flush of expansion and consolidation.

The third phase was characterized from the outset by the resumption of negotiations between East and West on matters of substance. The negotiations for an armistice in Korea which had opened on July 10, 1951, were brought to a conclusion July 27, 1953, some four months after the death of Stalin. Another frustrating negotiation developed over the calling of the political conference on Korea. Eventually, the Berlin Conference, though it made no progress on the European matters which it was called to discuss, nevertheless set up the political conference foreseen in the Korean armistice and added Indo-China to the agenda. The Geneva Conference which followed made no progress on the Korean question but nevertheless brought about an armistice in Indo-China. This armistice was hailed by many, with cheerful disregard of the historical facts, as a Far Eastern Munich, but it was in reality the same type of operation as Panmunjom. And so, within 18 months after the opening of the third phase, fighting in the Far East, apart from the guerrillas in Malaya and incidents in the Formosa Straits, has been brought to a close for the first time in nearly 20 years.

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Of course this cessation of fighting is not equivalent to the conclusion of peace. We are left at present with little better than uneasy armistices, and with a continuing state of tension already marked and likely to be further marked by incidents not unlike those which occurred in Europe, particularly Germany, in 1947 and 1948 before the establishment of NATO.

And there is therefore a caveat to be entered in regard to the adaptation of British and Allied policy to this third phase. We cannot tell how long it will last. Its two predecessors, if I have analyzed them correctly as such, occupied no more than eight years. Only 18 months of the latest phase have yet passed, and the conditions which I have described as characterizing it might change—if not overnight, at least abruptly. If we have misinterpreted either the intention or the seriousness of the Communists' various moves toward a detente, we may be compelled to drastic revision of our own policies. And we can none of us overlook the possibility that, in one or other of the highly explosive areas of contact between the Western and the Communist worlds, some unguarded spark, or some careless firecracker, could precipitate overnight a conflagration which neither side could immediately control. A fourth or even more disagreeable phase may, for all we know, be just in the offing.

IV

The hallmark of the third phase is a superficial relaxation of tension between the Communist world and the free world. What particular problems does this development pose for the West? First of all, it will be more difficult to hold the Western nations together now that the extreme pressure of rigid Stalinism has been somewhat abated. The strains are greatest in the Far East, and for two reasons. Actual fighting has been taking place in the area of the direct Chinese urge for expansion. Secondly, the attitudes of the Western Powers are here less closely aligned and their policies therefore less closely coördinated than elsewhere.

Then in many parts of the world we see the reëmergence of old patterns which were submerged by the armed struggle against the Fascist Powers and later by the rallying of the free world against Communism. This can be broadly described as a tendency of nationalism and neutralism to reassert themselves. This is perhaps most marked in Europe. The movement towards European integration has been weakened; and this has been notably

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exemplified by the unwillingness of France to commit herself to the E.D.C. At the same time there has been a tendency to focus attention not on the problem of security but on territorial problems of secular interest though lesser importance, such as the Saar and Trieste. Underneath the postwar democratic régimes in Germany, in Italy, in Japan, there are trends, not yet perhaps of great proportion, back to old political forms and habits; and this has stimulated the opposite trends in other Western countries in relation, for example, to the rearmament of Germany. In the United States there are indications, if not of isolationism, at least of disenchantment with allies and with collective action, as well as of strong opposition to liberal trade policies. An observer could no doubt discern similar tendencies in the United Kingdom.

It would be going too far to ascribe the recrudescence of these patterns of political thought and behavior, national and international, to the change in Soviet diplomatic tactics. They correspond to deep-seated emotional attitudes, and would no doubt have been present in any case. But their reëmergence may well have been stimulated and accelerated by the relaxation of international tension, and since they make for dissension between us, they are an ever-present danger to the cohesion of the West.

In this third phase of postwar international relations, the aim of British foreign policy is what it has long been: peace through strength. We stand for international coöperation, for the rule of law, and for minimizing the use of force. For this reason we stand behind the United Nations; not because we believe it to be a perfect instrument, but because we believe it has shown itself capable of developing effective machinery for international cooperation and the settlement of disputes. And if its enforcement-functions may be temporarily inhibited by the breakdown of Great Power coöperation, it always retains its value as a forum in which the views of East and West can be brought together and debated, and to which recourse can be had on the failure or in the absence of other methods of peaceful settlement of disputes. Since we believe in peace and prosperity we are anxious to reduce the burden and the threat of armaments, and particularly of atomic weapons, by any means which ensures adequate international control, and does not leave the democracies at the mercy of a secret totalitarian conspiracy.

A major aim of British foreign policy must be economic viability for our islands, which are a densely-populated power house

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that has to import most of its food and raw materials and pay for them with exports. It is for this reason that we in Britain believe in the importance of the economic factor in international relations; in the need for the free nations to place their economies and their relations on a structurally sound basis. Napoleon did not mean to be complimentary when he called us a nation of shopkeepers; but the gibe had an element of truth which was more exactly expressed in the words of Sir Eyre Crowe in his famous Memorandum written in 1907: "Second only to the ideal of independence, nations have always cherished the right of free intercourse and trade in the world's markets and in proportion as England champions the principle of the largest measure of general freedom of commerce, she undoubtedly strengthens her hold on the interested friendship of other nations . . ." Britain, as the center of the sterling area, is acutely conscious of the global as opposed to the regional aspects of international trade and financial relations; and this relates to trade between East and West as well as to the trade of the free world.

Early in 1952 the members of the British Commonwealth of Nations launched a determined attempt to place the economies of the free Western World both individually and collectively on a sounder basis: at home, by pursuing the correct internal policies, and abroad, by getting the trading pattern right and thus moving towards a system of freer trade and currencies. Action has to be taken simultaneously by debtors and by creditors in the fields of trade and finance; and much depends on the assurance that the external economic policy of the United States, as the world's main creditor, will move in a liberal direction. The hopes which had been raised of American action in this crucial area have not yet been realized. It is important that the momentum which has been attained should not be lost.

There are two reasons why, in this third postwar phase, I lay special stress on the economic factor.

The first is defense. It is a truism that a democratic country cannot have an adequate defense without a sound economy, and, conversely, that it is unsound to build up the armed forces to a point where it is beyond the capacity of the economy to maintain them over a long period. Or to put it in another way, a defense program which overburdens the economy of the country is an unstable defense program. It is perhaps no accident that the introduction of new defense policies popularly called the

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"New Look," and designed for the "long haul," coincided with the opening of the third phase in postwar international relations. These terms have been over-dramatized—they are simply the outcome of the normal governmental process of keeping defense requirements under review in the light of the presumed imminence of war, the economic possibilities and the development of new weapons and new methods of warfare. Each country, and the collective defense organization of NATO, has the responsibility of making this combined political, economic and strategic judgment on the size and shape of the defense forces that are needed. In the third phase it has seemed that the imminence of war has receded, but that the West must remain strong and vigilant over a long period. British defense policy is evolving methodically to fit in with the changing international environment.

Secondly, the consolidation of the economic strength of the Western Powers will enable them to pursue a stronger policy in the development of underdeveloped countries, whether dependent or independent. In the third phase the struggle against the spread of Communism will be determined in many cases by the estimates of people in underdeveloped countries as to whether they have a better chance, while satisfying their national aspirations, of raising their own standard of life through the adoption of the Western or the Communist ideas of organizing society; by the acceptance of Western or Communist help. Many countries, again, though independent and capable of a sound economy in a peaceful world, find themselves with inadequate technical and financial resources to build up the defenses necessary in the world as they find it today. I believe that ways must be devised, differing widely according to local circumstances, of furnishing aid to such countries in such a form that it is acceptable to the recipients as well as something that can reasonably be asked of the more highly developed countries. It is fortunate that the United States, with its much greater resources, is willing to play the major rôle in providing the wide range of loans, grants, investments, training facilities and technical supplies of all kinds, both military and civilian, which are required. We are playing our part too. Though the United States has taken over primary responsibility for supporting Greece and Turkey, now happily members of NATO, we play a vital rôle, in conjunction now with the United States, the Netherlands and France, in helping Iran produce such wealth as her soil permits; and in the Arab

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world it is we who are still mainly responsible for both such defense and such development as exist in that underdeveloped and vulnerable area. We in Britain can point with some satisfaction to the solution within two short weeks at the end of July of long-standing disputes with Egypt, with Saudi Arabia, and with Iran; and we acknowledge the support which American diplomacy gave to the accomplishment of these results. These settlements will, we hope, enable the West to consolidate its position in the Middle East on a basis of greater goodwill on the part of its peoples, and permit Britain to reconstitute a mobile reserve and so give her greater freedom of manœuvre elsewhere.

The British Isles are, of course, only the center of the British scheme of things. Our destiny, our economy and our sentiments are closely linked with the other sovereign members of the Commonwealth, which provides a unique system of collaboration between Britain, largely British communities round the world, and the new nations into which the ancient civilizations of the great sub-continent of India have formed themselves. We shall continue to devote all the thought, effort and money we can afford to the process of helping towards self-government the remaining dependent countries of the Empire and of assisting their development.

It is in this connection that the issue of colonialism is so often raised to cloud the real problems, which are those of the political and economic evolution of peoples to the point at which they are able to hold their own in the contemporary world. Americans are still inclined to look at colonialism in the light of their school primers and half-remembered pictures of redcoats; or else they think of the economic exploitation of colonial territories in the latter part of the nineteenth century. Yet this is all in the past. No one can now fairly accuse Great Britain of lack of boldness in the development of self-government in the British colonies; on the contrary, we have in recent years been thought by some people to have moved too fast. We believe, certainly, that the responsibility for bringing dependent peoples to the level where they can manage for themselves the growing complexities of a modern state is a task to which we have set our hand and which we must continue to discharge. It is hardly necessary to mention the swift evolution in the Gold Coast and in Nigeria, plans for federation in the West Indies, and notwithstanding unsettled conditions in Malaya and Kenya, constitutional advances there.

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But there is still a good deal of loose talk about "colonialism" in other areas; for example, the Middle East. Since the Communist Powers are likely to intensify their attacks on the alleged colonialism and imperialism of the West, it is important to be clear what we mean, and not use language which tends to undermine our own position. It is obvious that in modern conditions many countries are not viable militarily or economically without external assistance, and that these countries cannot be assisted unless they are willing to provide some facilities through which this assistance can be extended. This assistance is given by the United States (and the United Kingdom) with the absolute minimum of interference with national life and aspirations of the countries concerned. It is given by the Soviet Union and would no doubt be given by China with the maximum of centralized control, oppression and discipline.

V

About British policy in Europe, I shall here say little. It consists in encouraging gradual integration by mutual consent. Europe is still the decisive area of the world, and is again passing through a testing period. It is a source of great satisfaction that British and United States policies in this whole key region are so closely and harmoniously aligned.

And yet the real test of Western diplomacy may still lie in the Far East. Here the essential problem is how to create in free Asia a willingness and ability to stand up to Chinese Communist imperialism with the help and support of the West. For the West cannot discharge this huge and unending task by itself, with most of free Asia indifferent, or even hostile. The two key Powers are India, which is both the largest and most influential country in free Asia, and Japan, with her large industrial and technical potential. But every nation in South and East Asia has a part to play. We must, I believe, so conduct ourselves in the Far East that the Asian peoples believe in our good intentions and accept us as allies in what is essentially their own struggle against Communist imperialism disguised behind the specious appeal of "Asia for the Asians." The outcome will be determined by whether our deeds and our behavior convince, or fail to convince, the uncommitted peoples of Asia that they have a better chance of satisfying their national aspirations and raising their standards of life and well-being by association with the West. For this reason, we in Britain

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believe that the West must not be identified with a policy of destruction in Asia by war or blockade, nor of denying to any Asian Power those things which Asians consider are rightfully theirs. For this reason, too, we pay what some Americans consider exaggerated attention to the views of the so-called "Colombo Powers:" it is those Powers that we must carry with us. Of course we must resist aggression where it occurs. But the real problem is how to encourage resistance to the penetration and subversion which are likely to be the preferred techniques of Communist expansion in Asia in the next few years. Our main aim must be patiently to redress the balance of power in Asia itself, now upset by China. This involves mobilizing every potential source of strength. It involves the assumption of responsibility by India; and India, first in Korea and later in Indo-China, has progressively come forward and shouldered the burden.

If we can achieve something like an equilibrium in the areas threatened by China, as we have done in those threatened by Russia, the threat of Communist expansion by force of arms will have been diminished. It will then be up to us to deal with subversion and infiltration by providing a better alternative on our side of the line. We shall have to set a steady pace of economic and social advance.

Perhaps the crucial question is that of the possibility of "peaceful coexistence" between the Communist and non-Communist worlds. Though its use is now fully established, I am not much enamored of the expression, which has a technical meaning in the Soviet thesaurus, and which therefore has a different significance for the Western and for the Eastern mind. For the Russians it signifies a temporary detente during which they can build up Communist strength and sap the will of the free world, a state of what has been called provisional nonbelligerency. I prefer to state our own objective as the establishment of a *modus vivendi* between East and West. This expression, since it enjoys the decent obscurity of a dead tongue, perhaps has less risk of becoming a popular catchword, and expresses more nearly the idea of a balance resting on peace through strength than any alternative synonym.

There is undoubtedly quite a marked difference of popular view between Britain (and Europe in general) on the one hand and the United States on the other as to whether the establishment of a *modus vivendi* is either desirable or an attainable ob-

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jective. And in an equation which involves both the Soviet Union and China, it seems that the American preoccupation with China decisively influences American policy in this respect. There is a firm refusal to recognize the significance or at least the permanency of the Communist régime in Peking. Yet is there a practical policy between that of President Syngman Rhee and that of the British Government in relation to the Peking régime? Is there in the longer term a third course between fighting China and dealing with China? It is perhaps less the course of American policy than anxiety that it is falling into an impasse which evokes comment in Europe.

It is not simply a question of whether Communist China should sit in the Chinese seat in the United Nations "this year, next year, sometime, never." It goes much deeper than a decision on this single act of policy, which must obviously be influenced by Chinese behavior. It is axiomatic that Western democracies cannot embark on aggressive policies, since these are contrary to their fundamental beliefs. Therefore they must, in our view, be willing to negotiate. But here popular prejudice intervenes. Negotiation is thought to be synonymous with "appeasement;" with weakness, with Munich, with Yalta; with historical events whose full significance is but dimly remembered by most people. We are told that you cannot negotiate with Communist countries, that they are unreliable, untruthful and so forth. Maybe they are; if so, we are forewarned and forearmed. But we must have a policy; Sir Winston Churchill says that "Jaw is better than war;" that is his policy. President Syngman Rhee believes that "War is better than jaw," and that at least is an intelligible policy, whatever one may think of it. But "No jaw and no war," if it is a policy at all, is certainly not an effective one. Of course negotiation can be successfully pursued only from strength; it can rest only on a firm and united will backed by well-organized economic and military resources. A *modus vivendi* with the Communist Powers will be achieved only by the maintenance of adequate physical and moral force.

VI

I have said that in the last resort the maintenance of the Anglo-American partnership, used in the widest sense of British Commonwealth and United States, will be the decisive factor. And since we seem inclined to magnify, and glory in, our differ-

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ences and to ignore our identity of views, I must say a few words about Anglo-American relations. Without denying the differing popular, and perhaps also official, attitudes in the two countries towards what for short I may perhaps call the three C's—China, Colonialism and Coexistence—it remains true that the much publicized "rifts" in 1954 have in fact been concerned almost entirely with timing. It seems that, in relation to foreign affairs, Americans are not merely impatient of negotiations as such, they are impatient for results; they think in terms of time limits, and short ones at that. The ebb and flow of opinion—and I am not speaking of administrative policy—is much faster than in other countries: it is apt to be intervention on Monday and isolation on Monday week. By contrast the movement of opinion in Britain is apt to be slower, the popular patience longer. And patience is necessary. After all, it took eight years to settle the problem of the Suez base. It took four years from the evacuation of Abadan to restore the situation in Persia. How long, therefore, must be allowed for the far more intractable problems of the Far East? It is generally true that, while the British and the Americans are almost always travelling the same path, they are moving at different speeds. It is only at the moment when they are level with each other that there is complete harmony. We must try to understand this.

We must also try to stop the creation of myths about each other. One hears a good deal in the United States on the theme that the British are moved by expediency while the Americans adhere only to purest principles of morality in their foreign relations. In Britain we are told that while the Americans may have the power, they are unfortunately naïve and inexperienced in diplomacy, and should be guided by the superior wisdom of the somewhat impoverished but sage and experienced British. In this third postwar phase of international relations, when we are faced by a subtle and increasingly flexible opponent whose primary aim is to draw us apart, we really cannot afford to indulge in these self-laudatory comparisons which tend to obscure the recognition of our true objectives. Our first objective must be to keep together, otherwise we shall not be able to keep ahead of the Communist world in strategic and economic development. The free world must maintain the military strength and organization which is essential to keep the equilibrium between the two worlds. We need NATO, a MEDO, a SEADO—organizations

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which it is the Communist desire to disrupt or prevent. We shall not be able to dispense with watching the ramparts. Nor should we cease to proclaim our hope and conviction that in the long run freedom will prevail, and that, in the words of the Washington Declaration of June 29, 1954, we "should refuse to be a party to any arrangement or treaty which would confirm or prolong the unwilling subordination of sovereign states now in bondage." But to deny the possibility of reaching and sustaining a *modus vivendi* is to ignore the possibility of evolution and change in human society. History, after all, has shown that totalitarian tyrannies carry within them the seeds of their own destruction. Mr. Dulles is surely right in his faith in the powerful workings of "time and the fundamentals;" and I cannot think that the Soviet system is so perfectly attuned to the psychology of man and the laws of economics that it will not either stultify itself or evolve in the long run, if we but maintain our strength and our faith in our ideals. "Unity, fidelity, vigilance," have been Sir Winston Churchill's watchwords; and we shall all do well to remember them.

My belief that this is the course which we must and will take, in this third phase of which I have spoken, is based largely on the fact that it is really the only tolerable one. It is not the world we hoped for, this sullen and vigilant coexistence. But it is a world in which we can command enough resources and energy, and enough security, to get on with the main purposes of life. The alternative courses, on the other hand, are both intolerable, because they amount to abandoning these purposes, and indeed to self-destruction. One such course is to refuse all compromise, to abandon all hope of peace, and drift gradually but inexorably into a total war, a holocaust from thermonuclear weapons and whatever worse means of extermination may by then have been evolved. We should end up victorious, perhaps, those of us that survived; but victorious on a heap of ruins. The other course would be to abandon our unity, our fidelity, our vigilance, and to pursue each his own immediate self-advantage, until one by one we find ourselves swallowed by expanding Communism—a fate as horrible, to free men, as total war itself, since it involves not merely destruction but dishonor.

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POSTSCRIPT TO E. D. C.

By Hamilton Fish Armstrong

THE Communist military offensive in the Far East has given hard blows this year to the anti-Communist coalition in the West, and the Communist political offensive in the West greatly damaged the anti-Communist coalition in the Far East. As a result, the grand alliance formed in the West after the last war and strengthened by constructive measures for defense like the Marshall Plan and NATO is no longer what it was. It has not been so much broken as changed in substance, from something hard into something soft. When pressure is applied at one point, that point tends to yield; when attractions are offered at another point, that point tends to respond.

Granted that things which are hard are often brittle also and that there is danger they may break when the strain becomes too great. If the grand alliance as it was had been subjected to the strain of a direct Soviet attack it might have held or it might have broken; probably it would have held, and the probability deterred its enemies from trying. But what is soft lacks strength even as a deterrent. Does the alliance as it is now taking shape, soft but nevertheless still adherent in many of its parts, have enough tensile strength to continue to exist and even become in time the matrix in which new and effective agreements among some of the non-Communist Powers can crystallize?

Politically, the free world stood at its strongest at the start of the Korean war in June 1950. The Security Council of the United Nations voted that there had been an "armed attack" on South Korea and followed this by recommending that members furnish assistance to repel it. The greatest postwar emergency since the decision to break the Berlin blockade found the three chief Western nations together.

Militarily, the free world was probably at its strongest in the months immediately following, even though the forces of the individual nations were not fully developed. This was because its will to fight was at the peak. The nations which voted to stop North Korea and its backers by force did so reluctantly; but they believed not only that they were in the right but that they were risking less in stopping aggression then and there than in temporizing until it became more formidable.

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The decline from that peak has been continuous and in the last year precipitate. Drastic alterations have occurred in the relative strategic positions of the Allied and the Soviet blocs; in the psychology of the Western peoples and the policies of their leaders; and in the declared attitudes of the so-called "uncommitted nations," meaning those that from temperament more than reasons of geography or inherent strength hope to remain neutral in a future war and meanwhile refrain from detecting legal or moral differences in the position of the Communist and non-Communist sides, whether in particular disputes or in the large.

The downward spiral started with the divergencies inside the free world caused by the entry of Communist China into the Korean war, the long retreat of the U.N. forces and the misgivings aroused by American talk about blockading and bombing China—with the vista thus opened of a major war on the continent of Asia and the likelihood of this spreading into a general conflagration.

The speed of the spiral was accelerated after Stalin's death. The passing of the Russian despot became the convenient excuse for the Kremlin to imply that it had changed its purposes and not merely its tactics for gaining them. And it was seized on by elements in every country which thought, or hoped or wished to hope (or simply guessed that it would be popular to say they hoped), that the Soviet objectives had indeed been modified.

The evolution was hastened by alarmingly able and successful Soviet diplomacy and propaganda—a demonstration in itself that the new group rule in the Kremlin was not less formidable than the old autocrat had been, indeed quite the reverse. The results even in the United States were considerable; everybody in authority warned that the Communist menace continued intact and almost everybody was loath to match the fact by the continuance intact of taxes and of appropriations for military programs, foreign military aid, foreign technical assistance or our own Foreign Service and information programs. With some of our allies and in the so-called uncommitted nations the results were still more disruptive.

II

When the French National Assembly let the European Defense Community treaty die, refusing it even the dignity of decent burial, Premier Mendès-France remarked that 18 months

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earlier a majority for it might have been found. What had happened meanwhile? Counting back, we come to February 1953. The next month Stalin died and the Kremlin's new "soft strategy" began. It cannot have been a coincidence that the French Premier who negotiated the French abdication in Indo-China should have felt that the subsequent French rejection of the European Army was linked to the new Soviet strategy. For the two actions were quite plainly linked together.

At Geneva M. Mendès-France gained much more favorable terms than the actual situation of the French forces in Indo-China warranted. He must have known that the relaxation of Communist pressure in Asia was in preparation for the final push of the Soviet political offensive in Europe to destroy the Western defense community. We need not suppose that Mr. Molotov's entourage at Geneva whispered with the entourage of M. Mendès-France about the fruits of a possible Soviet-French accommodation. There are indications nonetheless that both sides tacitly recognized the logic of the situation. One was the announcement by M. Mendès-France that he had the power to ratify the contractual agreements restoring German sovereignty, followed by his promise not to use it. Another was his proclaimed neutrality in the E.D.C. debate in parliament. By these two decisions the French Premier made sure that he could not *do* anything.

If M. Mendès-France supposed for a moment that it was the superiority of his arguments that persuaded Mr. Molotov to give him a personal triumph at Geneva in the midst of a national disaster he was promptly disillusioned. The true meaning and direction of Soviet efforts was made evident when Poland, 24 hours before the scheduled beginning of the debate on the European Army, offered France a treaty of alliance and mutual assistance and warned that the formation of a European Army would lead to a third world war.

At almost any other time, perhaps, the offer of an alliance by Soviet-administered Poland would have been such a transparent propaganda dodge that it would have boomeranged and wounded its authors, accompanied by a sharp shower of Gallic witticisms. Frenchmen would have recalled the circumstances in which their last treaty with Poland was signed after the First World War, and its history. It had followed the abandonment of France by the United States and Britain—the first step toward the Second World War. We had refused to ratify the Versailles Treaty, the

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League of Nations Covenant or—the most important of all in French minds—the Tripartite Treaty agreed to by Wilson and Lloyd George guaranteeing France against a new German attack. The British had refused to underwrite the commitment separately from the United States. France was left terrifyingly exposed, and she did all that was left for her to do—she began to form a network of mutual assistance pacts with the "new" countries of Eastern Europe.

After the failure of the Geneva Protocol in 1925 the French position became even more precarious, for this marked the explicit reversal of British policy toward the Continent that followed the arrival of the Baldwin Government in power. Rejection of the move to make the obligations of collective security more precise ended all hope that the League of Nations might be effective in preventing or defeating aggression. The Treaty of Locarno was the substitute for the Geneva Protocol. In it Britain with fine impartiality guaranteed France against attack by Germany and Germany against attack by France. Eastern Europe was left uncovered. And that was where war eventually came.

Meanwhile France was left increasingly isolated by the British rapprochement with Germany, which continued even after Hitler's advent to power and was particularly emphasized by the Anglo-German Naval Treaty of 1935. France was paralyzed when the Nazis occupied the Rhineland the year following. At Munich the French and British retreated together, and again when Hitler occupied Prague in contravention of Munich. Then at last Britain perceived that the prevention of aggression in Eastern Europe did indeed lie within the range of her immediate interests, and Chamberlain gave his pledge to Poland. But that pledge gained no credence in Hitler's mind; he knew nothing about the British character and the significance of a promise to fight. Both Britain and France redeemed their bond when Hitler invaded Poland. Two years and three months later Japan brought the United States to their aid.

Communist Poland's offer of a treaty on the eve of the E.D.C. debate which was never held seems not to have made French opponents of a European Army conscious of the difference between their country's situation now and in 1920. American troops are still in Europe, nine years after the end of hostilities, and President Eisenhower promised on April 16, 1954, that they would be kept there in sufficient numbers to enable the United States to do

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its "fair share" in defending the Atlantic area so long as the threat to that area continues. Foreign Secretary Eden made a similar announcement that Britain would keep enough forces on the Continent to make up her "fair share" of the same defense effort, and a treaty between Britain and the E.D.C. Powers detailed arrangements to "ensure the integration of British with E.D.C. forces within NATO." All this supplemented the tripartite declaration of a year earlier by which Britain and the United States undertook to regard a threat to E.D.C. as a threat to themselves.

Thus France received from the United States the substance of what 25 years ago she sought in vain. As for Britain, she held to her traditional insistence that she is more than a Continental Power—she is "of" Europe but not "in" it—but she offered what the London *Times* following Mr. Eden's speech called "as complete and binding a partnership as is possible." For the majority of members of the French National Assembly the commitments were not enough to offset the risks that they saw in special ties with such a powerful military and economic competitor as Germany. They did not see why, even with American and British underwriting, France should enter a relationship with West Germany which Britain would not, and which did not touch the problem of what would happen if Germany were reunited. Still under the emotional shock of two German invasions in a generation, they could not face the fact that their choice lay between two things neither of which they liked—controlled rearmament of West Germany and uncontrolled rearmament of West Germany. Nor could they raise their eyes far enough from the German danger to see the Soviet danger beyond and calculate the differences between them. Apart from intrinsic differences, the two dangers differ for France in this stubborn respect: Britain and the United States view them differently than France does and will determine their attitude toward her largely by the attitude she takes toward them.

It would be a chilling and bitter result if the breakdown of E.D.C. were left as the final upshot of nearly a decade of effort by France and Germany to adjust themselves to their close neighborhood and of friendly help by other nations to make it easier for them to behave as good neighbors in a West European community. The great sections of public opinion in both countries which looked forward to a new era of understanding must

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be relied on principally in this crisis to see that no irretrievable steps are taken on either side. We shall not help by attributing the breakdown solely to French nationalism, by reproaching the Germans for showing new nationalist tendencies in their disappointment or by denouncing all nationalism as "narrow" and "bad." Nationalism is by definition the basis of any international agreement. Most adjectives are subjective. We did not call the spirit of nationalism that saved Free France from Pétain bad; we are not sorry that it has kept France and Italy clear of domination by international Communism or that it took Jugoslavia out of the Soviet orbit; we count on it to continue to fight Soviet puppet rule in East Germany; we hope it will be as vigorous in South Asia now that the colonial era is ending as it was while the struggle for independence was against Western Powers rather than domination by Communist dictatorship; we shall rejoice when it one day redeems Eastern Europe.

As the E.D.C. debate in Europe moved through its successive phases the only aim of the American Government was to be as helpful as possible to the forces working for West European friendship and defense. The Eisenhower commitment just mentioned was only one in a long line of friendly statements and encouraging actions. But we have tended to bear down too hard on the logic of a situation which was only one part logic and three parts feeling. We had gone to such really great lengths to help make E.D.C. possible that we could not believe that even so it might be impossible, and we had used such persuasive arguments in its favor that we had persuaded ourselves that no substitute would serve. Neither did we fully understand the importance attached by M. Mendès-France to strengthening the backward French economy before linking it more closely with the vigorous and expanding German economy, and his determination not to force the pace toward economic integration by political and military integration. Urged on by some of its most indiscreet supporters in the Senate, the Administration pressed what was a French scheme for utilizing German forces in the defense of Western Europe to the point where it was a French scheme no longer; suddenly it seemed not the child of MM. Schuman and Pleven so much as an American machination, the *sine qua non* of continuing American support of France, not for the benefit of the two countries jointly or of Europe as a whole so much as to serve American interests.

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Our present business is not to continue arguing those differences but to learn from our experience. We begin again. We start building up from the bottom toward the achievement of as much of the program for a Western defense community as practicable, instead of trying to water down the E.D.C. to a point where it might be acceptable to its French opponents. Positions on E.D.C. had hardened to the point where they could not be chipped away. Now the stark choices confronting France may become more clear. Some who were sure they were right in rejecting E.D.C. in the last days of August may hesitate to accept some of the logical alternatives.

One course would be for France to try desperately to prevent any and all German rearmament. This would be the equivalent of opposing something that will indubitably take place regardless of French opposition or approval, namely the achievement of West German sovereignty. M. Mendès-France himself has approved that and it will be accomplished in one way or another at an early date. Chancellor Adenauer worked to avoid an independent German army, but there will be one unless there is a German army coördinated with the other armies of Western Europe at the same time West Germany becomes sovereign.

Another alternative would be to make a treaty with Soviet Russia "over Germany's back," as a former Socialist Premier of France described it to the writer. There are many voices in France urging that attempts be made again and again to reach an "understanding" on Germany with the Soviets. Some connect this with a project for general disarmament, including the abolition of nuclear weapons. Do they actually hope for Soviet agreement to any scheme for unifying Germany by democratic processes, one that does not end by turning the country over to the Communists, or to any scheme for disarmament that provides for either side to ascertain whether the other is doing what it promised to do? Would anything less really be acceptable to most Frenchmen?

Even those who mistrust Germany the most must recognize that the Bonn Government showed discipline and restraint in the past year in the face of disappointments abroad and growing restlessness at home. Several of Chancellor Adenauer's domestic critics long out of sight suddenly reappeared on the political scene to demonstrate how little they had forgotten and how little learnt since Hitler took over. He also had to overcome the inevit-

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able efforts of German reactionaries to exploit the difficulties of a reconciliation with Germany's traditional foe and moderate the ambitions of German businessmen looking for trade openings in the East. Against him, too, were the neutralists of all colors. Neutralism does not appeal simply to humanitarians who fear the Russians and think only of ways to keep Germany out of another war; it also attracts nationalists who hold conceited ideas about Germany's ability to act as middleman between Soviet Russia and the West—a short step from thinking she can blackmail first one and then the other. The refugees and expellees from the Eastern zone have criticized Chancellor Adenauer for postponing demands for reunification (which for them means a return home) in favor of integrating Western Germany with Western Europe. They are only one element making up the general longing for unity and independence, channelled more recently into discontent that those who promised independence to Western Germany have withheld it so long.

None of these tendencies was unexpected, nor, unfortunately, was it unexpected that they should have been tremendously strengthened by the French refusal to collaborate in E.D.C. The aim of identifying German needs and hopes with some larger cause than Germany herself has received a severe check—among the broad masses of the people who followed Chancellor Adenauer and with him himself, as his bitter comment showed. Nationalism is a powerful force in Germany just as it is in France; yet as Meyer Handler advised in one of his dispatches from Bonn, we must distinguish between nationalism and nationalists. The German nationalists are there, and the job is to keep them from the saddle; this will not be done by neglecting to consider the national interests of Germany but by trying to satisfy them in as broad a framework of coöperation as possible. What we seek is the most practicable assurance that German nationalists will not once again menace the world, and we wish in particular to try to make sure that they will not menace the world following a marriage of convenience with the Soviets. It was the omission of this factor in the whole E.D.C. debate in France which people outside France found the greatest difficulty in understanding.

III

The situation we face is the typical Clausewitz-Leninist concept of unified war in which political and military weapons are

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used interchangeably to divide and destroy us. Our object is to prevent our enemies from succeeding—a much harder program than theirs because it depends on will power and restraint, not on manœuvre and small military aggressions as part of a continuing political offensive. To succeed, we must be willing to remain indefinitely on a war footing without setting our minds on war. Our own strengths for this are not so overwhelming that we can slough off hesitant allies except after the longest and most persistent effort to show them the community of our interest and persuade them to enlist as effectively as possible to defend it.

Europe feels that she is more in danger in the "front line" in case of an atomic war than we in the "rear." This estimate omits to note that it might not be logical for the Soviets to make an initial attack on the front line. In a war in which the opening phase could be decisive their first aim would be to cripple the essential power of their enemy. Where does that reside? In the United States, which alone possesses the power to counter a blow in Europe by a blow at the Soviet heartland plus the power in a long war to out-produce and out-fight the Soviet armies. In view of this, there is a natural American preoccupation which so far seems not to have been taken into account in Europe: the first attack may be without warning; it may be on the United States; it may be coupled with a Soviet threat to Europe and an offer to let Europe off the horrors befalling the United States if she will at once declare her neutrality or at least "wait and see." Faced with such alternatives, would every European government choose the risk of immediate devastation rather than the risk of Communist domination? Europeans, then, are not alone in wondering about the solidity of their alliances in times of mortal danger.

Such speculations do not merely bring back to us once more the absolute necessity of collective defense planning and effort (dispersal of forces, alternate series of bases, extension of warning systems, mobile task forces for special missions, ready forces to deter aggression in Western Europe, and so forth); they also emphasize the need of maintaining a functioning collective security system. The United States must stand firm for collective security and watch very sharply to see that the mechanisms for supporting it are not weakened anywhere. In the United Nations, in particular, the chance for collective action afforded by the "Uniting for Peace" Resolution must be kept alive. The United Nations is too important for good or ill to be neutral in a crisis. If

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members faithful to its purposes do not expect and plan to rally it against aggression, waverers will seize on its peacemaking functions to excuse a policy of wait and see—ending perhaps in mediating between the aggressor and the corpse of his victim, as some seriously proposed at the low point of the Korean war.

At Geneva M. Mendès-France seemed to respond to Communist pressure in Asia by accepting the demise of the European Defense Community—a great victory for the Soviet Union, as *Pravda* put it, the greatest defeat for the West in a long series of defeats, as M. Spaak put it. Still, that victory and that defeat were not final. One more Communist push was needed, and Peking and Moscow made ready to give it. Foreign Minister Chou En-lai announced the determination to take Formosa; the Quemoy islands were bombarded; and Soviet jets shot down a U. S. naval plane in the Sea of Japan. This threatening talk and action might have been planned with the incidental hope of making some of the conferees at Manila more cautious about committing their countries to an effective defense system in Southeast Asia. But the timing was much more with an eye to Europe, where the Soviet strategy of alternately frightening people away from strong measures by strong measures and attracting them by soft talk of "peaceful coexistence" was due for a showdown. The final test of the efficacy of Soviet diplomacy and propaganda in the current phase of the cold war will be whether or not they prevent any compromise that restores the possibility of Franco-German collaboration and brings German resources into the preparations to meet a possible Soviet attack.

The British Government was as distressed as the United States to see E.D.C. destroyed. But it too is under pressure in Asia—Communist pressure exercised via New Delhi, ably supported by left-wing British Labor. It is finding among other things that regional alliances which it trusted to avoid the difficulties raised by plans for direct collective action through U.N. can have the same drawbacks for a far-flung Commonwealth. Indeed, those difficulties were presented in an extreme form by India's violent opposition to any defense pact in Southeast Asia which implied that the Communists might not have halted their pressure for good when they signed the cease-fire in Indo-China.

Prime Minister Nehru is fully entitled, of course, to hope that a new era opened in the relations of the Communist and non-Communist worlds with that event and to base his country's

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policy on his personal confidence that this hope will prove justified. But the thesis that any effort to establish a basis for joint action in the future against possible aggression is an affront to the Communists, and hence is to be deplored and if possible thwarted, raises difficult questions for other nations. No matter how respectful they may be of the Gandhian inheritance of nonresistance, or how aware of the sensitivity of India's colonial scars, or how sympathetic toward the efforts of India's new leaders to raise her economic and social levels and remedy her chronic weakness, other nations must wonder how far they can adapt their policies to suit those who completely disbelieve in what seem to be the realities of present international life. The horns of the dilemma are particularly sharp for Britain. Unfortunately, a strong house cannot be built on one wall of a foundation. One wall is Europe, the other is Asia.

Containment in its valid sense—the sense in which we originally understood it—is not in conflict with what we call coexistence; but it is in conflict with what we think the Communists mean by coexistence. We want to establish a system of containment—coexistence in our sense—offering the best security that further Communist aggression, intervention and infiltration are not to end in the loss of independence by any more free countries anywhere, East or West. That is the objective of the defense pact for Southeast Asia and of any new program which the NATO Powers, or some of them, undertake in Europe.

The slogan of one of the great parties entering this fall's campaign is "Peace, progress and prosperity." Amen. But not in the sense of the slogan of Wilson's campaign managers in 1916 that he had "kept us out of war," or of Roosevelt's 1940 campaign argument that lend-lease would be enough ("I have said this before, but I shall say it again and again and again: Your boys are not going to be sent into any foreign wars." Boston, October 30, 1940.) In both cases the enemy thought our Presidents meant it, as in a way, of course, they did; the enemy imagined that peace in itself was all that the American people wanted and required. That understanding encouraged him to present us with situations in which we did, in fact, have to fight. It is not easy to avoid frightening our partners into thinking us too reckless to be trusted while showing our antagonists that we are to be feared. But that is the mean we have to find and hold.

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YOUNG MEN AND THE FOREIGN SERVICE

By Henry M. Wriston

A NATION'S foreign service is an amalgam of two traditions, one international, the other domestic. The basic pattern is determined by international habits; the spirit of diplomacy is informed by national characteristics.

That the forms of foreign service should be set by international custom is inevitable. Without tacit agreement to have ambassadors, ministers and consuls there would be such a chaos of functions and titles as to make the ordinary conduct of business difficult, or even impossible. Historically this has been demonstrated again and again. When other Far Eastern nations sought to have no foreign service at all the situation became intolerable; hermit nations were forced to conform to the general pattern.

We are likely to forget that the United States once thought it need take little part in international relations. Under the Confederation there had been a Department of Foreign Affairs. When the Constitution was adopted and the new government organized, the first department to be established was that of foreign affairs. After the Treasury and War Departments were set up, it was suggested that there should be a Home Department. Instead the duties were combined with foreign affairs and the Department of State was founded in the belief that duties of an international character would diminish into insignificance as soon as "perpetual" treaties of commerce and friendship were made with enough nations. In the words of one Representative, "a time would come when the United States would be disengaged from the necessity of supporting a Secretary of Foreign Affairs." The small number of permanent diplomatic missions abroad, the neutrality policy of 1793, and the tone of Washington's Farewell Address were all evidence of the conviction that foreign affairs would "wither away," or at least decline greatly in significance.

If it had been possible for a nation to resist adapting itself to the international pattern the United States was by location, character and desire in the best position to do so. Nonetheless, the attempt failed; except for a temporary suspension of some legations and consulates the growth of our representation abroad proceeded, albeit slowly. As if to emphasize our recognition of the

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dominance of the established international pattern, we ultimately took the initiative in forcing Japan to adjust her habits to that norm.

Our own slow accommodation to international practice was reflected in the tardiness of legislative provision for a foreign service. The statute setting up the Department of State was the shortest for any department, and the most general in its terms. There was some legislative definition of consular duties in the first days under the Constitution; thereafter Congress neglected the "organization" of foreign affairs until 1855, and no further basic legislation was passed until this century. Not until after the First World War did the Rogers Act of 1924 give a really solid statutory basis for the Foreign Service, uniting the diplomatic and consular branches, providing for recruitment, tenure, promotion and other essentials of a career service. It was the final and definitive evidence that the idea of withdrawal, dominant at the outset of our government, had been abandoned.

When attention is shifted from the fabric of foreign relations to the spirit in which diplomacy is conducted, domestic forces have much freer play. In the beginning the United States regarded diplomacy as vital. This was a revolutionary nation in a world hostile to the revolutionary ideal. The United States was considered not only a newcomer but a dangerous upstart. To meet this adverse situation talents of a high order were required. Benjamin Franklin, John Quincy Adams and others well deserved to be called professional diplomats. The seriousness with which Washington viewed the problem was revealed by the fact that he read all the previous diplomatic correspondence, making notes in the margins; it is reflected in his appointments, such as that of Chief Justice Jay to negotiate with Great Britain, and of Thomas Jefferson as Secretary of State. Only first-class brains, sturdy character and great deftness, combined with dignity, could win essential recognition of our place in the world.

That era of intense diplomatic activity was recognized as a transient phase; in such an atmosphere no concept of a permanent diplomatic service could develop. However able the early practitioners of the art, the belief in the temporary nature of important international relations offered no incentive for a man to choose diplomacy as a career; there was even less reason for Congress to make elaborate provision for such a service. With the advent of Jacksonian concepts and dogmas, the last rem-

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nants of professional diplomacy disappeared; foreign appointments became part of the "spoils of office." They were sought by the socially ambitious, by some who wanted to live abroad for literary or other purposes, or by mere placemen.

Occasionally during the spoils era a real diplomat appeared, such as Charles Francis Adams during the Civil War. Even in that instance President Lincoln regarded the appointment as political and shocked his new envoy upon their first meeting by making virtually no reference to his mission; the President plunged into a discussion with Seward regarding a postmastership.

Until the United States conceived of itself as a World Power and was accepted as such by other nations no adequate basis for a professional foreign service was available. The years immediately before and after the turn of the century proved decisive in that respect. The War with Spain, the annexation of Hawaii, the control of the Philippines and Guam, the enunciation of the Open Door and Integrity of China policies, the partition of Samoa, and the reversal of the tradition of animosity to Great Britain were compressed within those few years.

As the nation entered more actively into world affairs, a professional foreign service began to form. In so far as this beginning was officially recognized or assisted, the initiative was taken by the President through executive orders in 1895, 1905, 1906 and 1909. Not until 1915 did Congress accept the merit principle and give it statutory sanction. One favorable circumstance for the growth of a professional service was the fact that for a long period, from 1897 to 1913, one party remained in power; thus there was no partisan occasion to "turn the rascals out" to make place for political "friends."

When a change in party control occurred there arose an inevitable threat to the career principle. Secretary Bryan wanted appointments for "deserving Democrats;" in one instance the tradition of shirtsleeve diplomacy was carried a layer deeper—an envoy extraordinary to a Caribbean nation received callers in a red flannel undershirt. This episode and one or two other shoddy experiences helped rouse appreciation of the need for a truly professional service. Two world wars reënforced the concept. Nevertheless, after 20 years of control of patronage by one party, change again brought demands for "new faces." The legacies of isolation and the spoils system are hard to extirpate.

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During its early period the Foreign Service "just growed" like Topsy. Moreover, it emerged not as one service, but two; soon after the end of the First World War the élite corps of diplomatists numbered over 100; the much less highly esteemed consular service had expanded to over 500. Clearly the time had come for comprehensive statutory recognition and organization. That was achieved by the Rogers Act of 1924, an extraordinarily successful piece of legislation which survived without vital change until replaced by the Foreign Service Act of 1946.

The Rogers Act reflected a desire for a career service as fully professional in spirit as the Army and Navy. Like the armed forces, the Foreign Service was to have its own management, but the Secretary of State was to have effective ultimate control. The Foreign Service Act of 1946 was drafted by Foreign Service Officers; it so emphasized supervision of its own affairs by the Service as seriously to impair the Secretary's control. In 1949 an amendment, proposed by the Hoover Commission, sought to restore his managerial dominance.

Before Congress got around to legislative action, however, some tendencies had already hardened into tradition. The best development was a strong esprit de corps, which proved tough enough to accommodate itself to all subsequent changes—legislative, administrative and political. When the Rogers Act amalgamated the diplomatic and consular branches, many feared that this strong esprit de corps, which had been dominantly the possession of the diplomatic branch, would be weakened or destroyed. When the foreign services of the Departments of Commerce and Agriculture were absorbed in 1939, the same fear reappeared. Again, after the Second World War, when the Manpower Act provided for "lateral" recruitment to the higher grades, the same concern was expressed. In each instance the resiliency of the esprit de corps was remanifested. It is a sound tradition and seems likely to survive further reforms.

The second tradition, which also dates from the informal beginnings of the Foreign Service, was as unhappy as the development of esprit was fortunate: it was a reputation for snobbism. The stereotype of the diplomatic officer as a social butterfly has lingered in the public mind, and public prejudice is proving exceedingly difficult to eradicate.

The origin of the idea is obvious. Congress made niggardly provision for diplomatic and consular officers and most of the

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nation was indifferent to the plight of those who went abroad: out of sight, out of mind. As a consequence recruits lacking private means could not look forward to a career in diplomacy. Often a young man of "good family" got his start as "private secretary" to a family friend who had been appointed ambassador; several such apprentices stayed in the service and became professionals. This was not a novel mode of introduction to diplomacy; John Quincy Adams had begun that same way. The custom had been followed sporadically, and it simply became more common as preoccupation with foreign affairs increased.

Some who gained tenure had more social grace than political insight. Ambassador Hugh Gibson, testifying in 1925 before a congressional committee, said: "There are now in the service a 'noisy minority' of trouble makers: that is, 'boys with white spats, tea drinkers, and cookie pushers,' who are a reproach to the American Foreign Service, and because it is almost impossible to get rid of these undesirables it is a very difficult matter to maintain the discipline necessary to make the Service the all around efficient machine it should be."

Anyone then well acquainted with the Service would have had to agree with his comment, but even at that time the number of such specimens was relatively small. Many influences have operated since then toward further democratization both socially and economically. Moreover, the new methods of appointment and the "selection out" process have eliminated such officers.

Candor, however, compels the observation that we still have some distance to go to achieve a genuinely representative, democratically oriented Service. If he is capable, industrious, and socially deft any young man who enters the Service may look forward to becoming a career minister through merit; he may take heart in the fact that all the consuls-general and two-thirds of the chiefs of mission are career officers, appointed to their high positions without any political influence. Nonetheless, unless he has private means, the ambassadorial posts in London, Paris, Rome are virtually closed to him. Until Congress takes a different view of salaries, "representation allowances" and other inescapable costs, that will continue to be the case. It ought to be a matter of chagrin to Americans that the British Government could send a person without a private fortune like Sir Oliver Franks to represent a kingdom with orders of nobility while this democratic republic could not "afford" to send to London a per-

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son with like background and resources. For years France has been represented in Washington by M. Henri Bonnet, an intellectual of great distinction; it would be impossible to send an American of like financial status to Paris.

Most nations have made more rapid strides in this respect than we have. There is no reason to discriminate against men of independent means, but to make wealth a *sine qua non* for some posts is an anachronism. Barriers to the ambition of attaining the highest posts of our Diplomatic Service are utterly wrong; public sentiment should compel Congress to clear the path to the top. It would furnish a marked incentive both for the recruitment of strong candidates and for their development in service.

The United States lags in another important respect—the integration of service at home and abroad. For a century our diplomatic duties were performed primarily by people only transiently in office. The Department of State, on the other hand, developed considerable stability. Three men—Hunter, Adee and Carr, each of whom occupied significant administrative posts—together held office well over a century. Reform of the Civil Service, to which Department of State employees belonged, moved more rapidly than progress toward a merit system for service afield. Thus the two arms of diplomacy, the center in Washington and the missions and consulates abroad, grew separately and their patterns hardened in different forms.

It should not need elaborate argument to make clear why an interplay of personnel between the two arms of diplomacy, the domestic and the foreign, would prove of value to both. Every other Great Power has completed their integration; the need has long been recognized in the United States. Nearly 40 years ago the Act of 1915 provided that members of the diplomatic corps and the consular service should have periods of service in the Department of State. The idea was a time for "re-Americanization," an expression acutely distasteful to the Foreign Service. There were also other objectives, such as acquaintanceship with the way in which policy is formed and instructions decided upon, and familiarity with departmental procedures. It was hoped to produce greater harmony of effort.

The Rogers Act and the Foreign Service Act of 1946 gave renewed sanction to the practice. Moreover, an "exchange program" was devised which made the plan reciprocal by sending departmental officers to missions abroad for periods of experi-

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ence. It was recognized that if it is unwise to have officers abroad who are ill informed of departmental methods and procedures, it is equally anomalous to have instructions to men on the spot drafted by departmental officers who have no first-hand knowledge or recent contact with the foreign nation involved. But like the assignment of Foreign Service Officers to the Department, the exchange program has withered on the vine.

Why did not successive attempts at integration during the last 40 years result in a union of domestic and foreign diplomatic services? Certainly it was not for lack of reasonable argument. As much as 30 years ago former Secretary of State Robert Lansing criticized the Rogers Act for not having completed the union. Successive study groups within the Department and from outside, distributed over many years, repeatedly proposed that the idea be carried to its logical outcome. The reasons for failure lay in feeble administrative practices; poor personnel policies, or more properly the absence of any; bureaucratic rigidities; differences in pay scales, terms of service, and retirement benefits; and other matters of a detailed character.

There was some natural emotional resistance to change. Some officers of the Foreign Service have always felt that anything approaching full integration might impair or destroy the "élite" principle. Departmental personnel acquired homes and other ties in Washington which it would be expensive or inconvenient to alter. To sum it up in a nutshell, personal preferences, a host of troublesome details, and weak administration have held back a reform that is complete elsewhere and long overdue here.

The result would have been achieved best by a long-run policy which effectuated it gradually but with consistency over 10 or 15 years. The long period in office of a single political party offered an almost unique opportunity for the reform; it was frittered away by extraordinarily unstable administrative management. Able men who might have achieved sound results found themselves enmeshed in day-to-day operations, and further hamstrung by brief and often frustrating terms of office.

It is time to realize that determination of "high policy" with which the top officers have been wont to occupy themselves would be greatly facilitated by better structural arrangements. Policy is not formed in a vacuum, or just by good men thinking hard. It is dependent upon shrewd political insights and perceptive reporting by men in the field; it requires close coördi-

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nation between them and Washington. These ends can be attained only if all participants understand each other's functions and methods. Without integration that goal is unattainable.

One ambassador, in private conversation, expressed himself with vigor regarding the results of this failure. Young men, not long out of college, are sent abroad and kept there. Many have had no active practical experience in any phase of American life; often they have not traveled as much in their own nation as they do in countries abroad. They have had no contact with the immensity of our land, the infinite diversity of its terrain and its industry; they know little at first hand of the various regional points of view, and how grass-roots opinion is formed. As Americans they are provincial. Their "indoctrination" in the Department of State has been brief and formal; they have no real knowledge of domestic governmental operation. This, the ambassador felt, was quite wrong. There is something inherently absurd in keeping a man out of the country, save for very brief visits, for 10 or 20 years while expecting him to interpret the current mood and situation of the United States to foreigners.

All this should be perfectly obvious. Therefore the Act of 1946 required that every Foreign Service Officer should be assigned to Washington for three out of his first fifteen years in the Service. Yet no real beginning has been made to carry out that mandate. Indeed "progress" has been backward, rather than forward; there are fewer Foreign Service Officers in the Department now than a few years ago, and no system has been developed to reverse the trend. Actually there are not enough posts available in the Department to make obedience to the law practicable unless vigorous, not to say drastic, action is taken. However, Congress is certain to take a very dim view of failure to conform to the statute; and time is running short.

We may as well face the fact that there is no painless way to effect this essential reform. Every delay, every postponement has exacerbated the problem and made it more intractable. What could have been done with relative ease through consistent gradual action must now be done a harder way. Bureaucratic incrustations will have to be broken, not merely scraped. But we shall have to make the effort, and endure the pain; the urgency is too great for continued attempts to fend off the inevitable.

Still another anomaly in the situation as it has been allowed to develop makes integration needlessly difficult. Admission to

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the Foreign Service is a very rigorous procedure. Whatever deficiencies there may be in the methods employed, no one can contend that entrance upon the career is made too easy. It involves written, oral, language, security and physical examinations. Pay is low at the start and advances come slowly. Early duties are apt to be such dull routine as to be discouraging.

By contrast, admission to the departmental service is simple. Neither the intellectual, nor physical, nor personality requirements are nearly so rigorous. If pay at the start is no better than in the Foreign Service, it tends to advance more rapidly. Moreover, the assigned tasks are less routine; the departmental junior officer progresses more quickly toward obviously important work.

As a consequence of these differences there is a natural resistance on the part of some Foreign Service Officers to the "lateral entry" of departmental personnel into their select circle; they feel that they have come up the hard way while applicants for lateral entry have advanced by a smoother—and shorter—path. They see "younger" men, because of more rapid advancement in the Civil Service, coming in "over the heads" of men who have served long abroad. They see men who have been able, in some degree at least, to choose their work preferred over themselves who have been obligated to serve anywhere in the world, often in hardship posts, at whatever duties were assigned.

The reluctances are not all on one side. The departmental officer applying for "lateral entry" into the Foreign Service usually has to pay out a cash lump sum, often considerable, because of differences in the retirement systems. Moreover, until now, a quirk in the Foreign Service Act of 1946 has required the lateral entrant, in practice, to take a painful cut in compensation at the moment of his transfer.

These difficulties illustrate the consequences of failure to deal with the problem while it was in a more plastic state and when fewer individuals were involved. Vigor and determination must, therefore, be balanced by wisdom and humane considerations. Reform will work hardship upon many loyal public servants. That is no argument against reform but evidence that skill will need to equal energy in effectuating essential changes. Whatever the present difficulties, longer postponement will only make them worse.

Impairment of Foreign Service morale has been exaggerated, but difficulties on this score are real. The causes, however, are

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far more complex than those usually exploited. After a period of notable success, typified by the Marshall Plan and NATO, Western diplomacy has suffered a series of setbacks. Successive reverses are not conducive to high morale; they have affected adversely the diplomatic professionals among our allies also.

The great majority of Foreign Service Officers have had all their experience during two decades under a single party. A shift in control was bound to raise questions regarding political vulnerability, particularly in the light of the prominence of foreign issues in the election campaign.

Economies, a severe reduction in force, accelerated "selection out" and forced retirements, a halt in promotions, altered rules regarding leaves—all combined to dislocate plans and frustrate expectations. On top of these came the stringent revised security program, which was committed to political appointees whose words and acts justified doubts as to their judicial impartiality. The new screening approaches completion and that storm is abating. Fundamental improvement of morale, however, is dependent upon diplomatic successes.

Both in Washington and abroad there are thousands of able, devoted and industrious public servants; there are others much less able, and still others not adequately industrious. Unhappily ability, devotion and industry are not indissolubly linked; indeed the union of all three in a single individual is unusual. No system, of course, will infallibly identify these traits; on the other hand, lack of system will continue to conceal them and to confuse administration. This is particularly true since none of the qualities—nor others such as ambition, initiative, readiness to accept responsibility—is a fixed attribute. Many a man who has made a brilliant start fails in maturity to fulfill the promise of his youth; many a slow starter gains by experience and determination characteristics valuable for diplomacy.

One of our greatest needs, therefore, is an administration of the Department and of the missions abroad which will evoke the best that is in their personnel. Nearly all who enter the Foreign Service are able, at least so far as tests can determine ability. But much that is done to them after they begin tends to offset or neutralize the effectiveness of that essential asset.

Even the induction policy is not well adapted to current circumstances. College graduates, particularly able ones, have been living in a period of saturated employment. Any young man ca-

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pable of meeting the standards required for admission to the Foreign Service can start promptly in industry upon a job "with a future" at a salary better than the Government will pay. These are formidable handicaps to be overcome; both thought and action are needed to do so. Instead, much is done to repel the eager, the ambitious, the energetic. The protracted process of examination, the long time taken for security clearance, and the rigorous physical check-up require from one to two years; then the successful candidate may wait as much as two years for an appointment. In defending this leisurely pace a Class One Foreign Service Officer reminded me that he had waited four years—but his appointment was during the depth of the depression: and he could not claim the long delay had done him any good.

Under current circumstances it is a severely negative incentive to force a sterile period of two or three years upon a young man while his fellows are finding their way in the world. It is precisely the kind of procedure which has given bureaucracy a bad name. Any employer knows that the most careful screening does not eliminate all who may prove to lack qualifications. More speed in appointment combined with more rigor in subsequent discipline and appraisal would pay better dividends.

Both these matters—discipline and appraisal after appointment—are better handled in the Foreign Service than in the Department. There is a marked tendency to give all civil servants a "satisfactory" endorsement on the personnel record, and never "superior" or "unsatisfactory." The Foreign Service, on the contrary, does grade its members both through the chiefs of mission and the inspection system; and the "selection out" process is well established. That is the negative side of appraisal; positive incentives, however, are not as well developed.

For 30 years, at least, the law has provided for accelerated promotion for "extraordinarily meritorious service." Since the passage of the Foreign Service Act of 1946, however, not a single such promotion has been made. The law of averages alone would suggest that in a period of eight years, with all that has transpired in the world, there must have been many instances worthy of special consideration. There is also direct, first-hand evidence: men who have held high positions during the period state frankly that several cases of conspicuous service have come to their personal attention. It is puzzling why such a positive incentive, long shown to be valuable in the armed services and well tested ear-

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lier in the Foreign Service itself, should have been carelessly abandoned.

We certainly do not want as members of the Foreign Service men who will stand docilely in line and edge up as their seniors die or retire. It is essential to restore dramatic recognition of skill and insight, of courage, moral or physical. Today discrimination in the pace of promotions is governed only by the boards of review; they look at the record of each officer in regular rotation, recommend promotions for some and not for others. But the instances which mark a man as worthy of special promotion have not, as a rule, been even endorsed upon his record so that they would be drawn to the attention of the selection board.

Members of the Foreign Service need to exhibit courage in several ways. Many find themselves in actual physical danger. Numerous revolutions in Latin America directly involved the safety of American citizens and required the members of the embassies, legations and consulates to work in physical hazard. Such episodes are not confined to this hemisphere; they have occurred in periods of disorder throughout the world—the Boxer Rebellion, the Russian Revolution, unrest in the Near and Middle East. Members of the permanent diplomatic corps have acquitted themselves well; occasionally an ambassador has found it more agreeable to set up his base of operations over the border of a near-by country rather than stay in the capital of the country of his appointment, while the professional Foreign Service Officer has remained at the post of danger.

Moral stamina is even more important because it needs to be summoned more often. It requires courage to report a situation as a man sees it, and then to take the consequences. However, the formation of sound policy is dependent more upon penetration than mere formal accuracy of reporting. Like any other person doing research in the archives, I have seen many dispatches marked "secret" which were neither so up-to-date, so comprehensive, so accurate, nor so interpretive as newspaper dispatches published the morning before the diplomatic dispatch arrived. This problem of perceptive reporting is very old; seeking to avoid responsibility for taking a position on a difficult or delicate point is no new development in diplomacy. In tense times such as these, when partisanship is so sharp, the temptation to be a trimmer is greater than usual. Consequently there is more reason to be alert in weeding out moral cowards, and even more

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urgent occasion to reward promptly and conspicuously those who perform exceptionally well.

Among the positive stimulants to effectiveness none is more important, and none has been more neglected, than wise assignments. The operative theory has been that every man should be a "generalist" not only willing but able to practise the delicate art of diplomacy anywhere, at any time. Even if that concept were valid under current conditions, it has a most unfortunate collateral effect: it has retarded the orderly development of careers. The "generalist" philosophy has made the "slots and bodies" method of assignment seem rational by asserting that wherever a man was sent he was gathering "experience." The inference was that the sequence of such an accumulation made little difference. However, any careful review of assignments over the last decade shows clearly that this system—or rather deliberate lack of system—is hostile to real growth during a career.

There was a time when there were very few sensitive areas where American diplomacy was critically important. If a man knew French, "the language of diplomacy," he was linguistically equipped. Two decisive changes have altered that situation. In the first place, the number of sensitive spots is no longer small, it is legion, and in most of them the United States now has vital interests whereas in earlier times its responsibilities were marginal.

The second change is even more important: the growth of nationalism has made every people culturally sensitive to an unprecedented degree. French is no longer the language of diplomacy; everyone wants his own language spoken. Switzerland has recognized Romansch as an official language, though it is spoken by only some 50,000 persons; that change is symptomatic of what is happening the world around. For diplomatic purposes knowledge of the local language has an importance today that it never had before. Many individuals are conspicuously competent even in some of the least known languages, but our over-all linguistic deficiency is notorious.

We have one mission of considerable size in the capital of one of the most sensitive spots in the world in which not a single officer speaks or can understand the native language; it is quite different in the Russian embassy to that nation. In one of Russia's largest satellites, only one member of the American embassy staff speaks the language; he is a military attaché. We

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have fewer learning the Far Eastern languages in the Foreign Service now than a decade or two ago.

There are a number of reasons for this appalling deficiency, but one of them is the helter-skelter manner in which young men are twitched from one area to another. When one knows that such irrational transfers are common practice, the incentive to master the language of the current assignment is sharply reduced. The best stimulus to learning a language is the knowledge that it will be used; awareness that about the time mastery is within reach a new appointment will make current progress of little value constitutes a negative incentive that should be eliminated. Moreover, there should be salary and promotion incentives to mastery of languages and knowledge of native cultures. The costs would be trivial compared with the benefits.

Language is only a symbol of familiarity with the traditions and temper of a nation, the genius of its people. Such a grasp cannot be acquired in a three or four year assignment. One who knows only the temper of official Paris, for instance, may be sharply deficient in his understanding of the national situation. Without first-hand knowledge of the provinces, their great variety of tradition and tempo, and the contrasts between their modes of thought and action and those of Paris, the officer is handicapped. What is true of France is equally applicable to many other nations and regions.

A young Foreign Service Officer might well have tours of duty in a series of consulates in the same nation, then in the embassy or the "country desk" in the Department. Such a pattern would give him wide and deep acquaintance with the nation, its language, its politics, its modes of thought. It is not necessary that each should be kept in a single nation, but successive assignments could be in one geographic area followed by a Washington assignment to that geographical division of the Department. Of course, it does not follow that a man should make his whole career in Latin America, or Asia or any other single region. Between overspecialization and the current scatter-and-spatter assignments there is a broad zone of intelligent action which should be fully exploited.

Professional growth should be stimulated also by more formal methods. The armed forces have learned that lesson well; the State Department has failed to take advantage of their example and has developed nothing comparable to the Naval War Col-

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lege, for example. The day-to-day duties of any career officer are engrossing; details tend to absorb his full energy. As he progresses toward posts of high responsibility, such as deputy chief of mission, he should be given an opportunity to think more systematically, more broadly about problems of policy than daily preoccupation with current issues will permit.

Assignment for a year to the Foreign Service Institute or the National War College supplies that need. In such environments he can relate what he already knows to its broader context, he can think in longer range terms, he can face issues with more reflective calm and less pressure than in the field. No man should be promoted to Class One without this experience, without such testing of his capacity to generalize and develop rational solutions. There is, of course, no substitute for practical experience; there is likewise no substitute for systematic study.

There is no reason to be either defeatist about the current situation or utopian about the future of our diplomatic establishment. The Foreign Service has served us well, but it is the product of the twentieth century, and a great institution does not reach full maturity in so short a period. It has never had adequate attention or support. The Foreign Service Act of 1946 was shepherded through the House by three men, two Democrats and one Republican; they deserve great credit, but a broader interest and participation would have been desirable. The Act passed the Senate without hearings, virtually without debate, almost in a moment of inadvertence. For a great many years salaries went without readjustment; congressional prejudice against adequate expense accounts is still stubborn. Diplomacy is our first line of defense against war; in the light of this reality support for it has been niggardly. All this can be changed. Strong leadership by a few broad-minded and statesmanlike Senators and Representatives on strategic committees could bring marked advances.

Consistent administration is a primary need of the Department of State for a period of years. Its assets are human; it is the height of folly not to exploit those assets to the full. It will require stability, a humane approach and a few modern ideas. That is all. If foreign policy had lagged as far behind the times as personnel policy, we would be in a very bad way. Secretary Dulles realizes that better management will facilitate decision and make action more effective. He has taken a stand for reform that should draw universal support.

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AIR POWER AND WORLD STRATEGY

By Air Marshal Sir John Slessor

THERE is an old military axiom that the weapons of war change but the great principles of war remain unchanged. Up to a point that is still true; but it must be supplemented, if we are to think realistically about world strategy today, by recognition of a fact of enormous significance—the fact of the revolution in human affairs which has been brought about by the rise of air power and the development of the atomic and thermonuclear weapon. Hitherto the weapons of war have been used and the principles of war have been applied upon the battlefield. Quite recently—within the lifetime of our children not yet of university age—we have seen the battlefield begin to lose its significance; or perhaps it would be more accurate to say that we have seen whole countries become a battlefield. We have actually seen in the green fields of England and the industrial cities of Germany and Japan that "ghastly dew from the nations' airy navies battling in the central blue" that Tennyson imagined in Queen Victoria's reign. We have felt the impact of a new portent, the robot pilotless aircraft or guided missile, the V1 and V2 that fell upon England ten years ago. And now we have reached the consummation of the new revolution, in the atomic and the hydrogen bombs.

This great turning point in history has been reached surprisingly quickly, as history is measured. It is only just over 50 years since a man first hoisted himself off the ground in a powered machine. Like most revolutionary inventions, this one had a rough passage to begin with. The British Admiralty was offered Wright's patents in 1907: "I regret to have to tell you," wrote the First Lord, "after the careful consideration of my Board, that the Admiralty while thanking you for so kindly bringing the proposals to their notice, are of opinion that they would not be of any practical value to the Naval Service." Said a well-known American general less than 40 years ago, "I see no reason why the range of a military aeroplane should ever exceed three days' march by the infantry." This attitude of skepticism persisted, though in diminishing degree, over many years. It was nourished by the extent to which some early airmen went to the other extreme and overcalled their hands—though of that it was also to

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some extent the cause. In the closing years of World War II the achievements of air power surpassed the claims of all but the few extreme protagonists in earlier days. Today, paradoxically enough, only 50 years after Wright's first venture in controlled flight, the popular tendency against which we should be on our guard is to expect too much of air power—to regard it as a panacea, a short cut to world peace and security. But another paradox is that its terrible ultimate development need not lead to the destruction of civilization, but holds out a message of hope—the hope that, in President Eisenhower's words, "the miraculous inventiveness of man shall not be dedicated to his death but consecrated to his life." Sir Winston Churchill has said "it is to the universality of potential destruction that we may look with hope and even with confidence."

II

To speak of the ultimate development of air power is not to make the absurd claim that aircraft, with or without human crews, have reached the peak of their performance. The modern jet-propelled bombers may perhaps be the last of their line; but they will be replaced by the pilotless bomber—the long-range controlled missile of tomorrow. No doubt bigger and more destructive weapons could be designed than the hydrogen bombs we now have. But it seems doubtful that they need be made. That which we have is big enough and its effect on the issues of war and peace decisive. We have in fact reached the practical ultimate instrument of mutual destruction. We have at last arrived at the point when war—in the sense of total world war as we have known it in our generation—has abolished itself as a practical instrument of policy.

There is nothing new about total war—it was not new in the days of Jenghiz Khan or Attila. But in our day we have seen science and technology reduce the world to the size of a Hellenic city state. And where in the dawn of history the innocent victims of total war were numbered in hundreds, in the late war they were numbered in millions. Another time they might be numbered in hundreds of millions—and everybody knows it, the men in the Kremlin as well as anybody else.

This is on the assumption—which must surely be accepted—that the weapon of mass destruction would certainly be used in any great war between major Powers. That assumption will

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scarcely be questioned in the United States—indeed it forms the basis of its military policy. The British Government in its "Statement of Defence" of last February says that "it must be assumed that atomic weapons would be employed by both sides" in another global war. The Leader of the Opposition, Mr. Attlee, said in a broadcast this June, "The fact is that once there is war, absolute war, in the modern age, and if the existence of a nation is at stake, any weapon will be used in the last resort." It is hardly necessary to say that this issue is far from simple or straightforward, particularly for Great Britain in her exposed position, with her teeming cities and the great ports through which her life blood is pumped. If ever we came to the brink of total war, the statesmen of the free world would be faced with an appalling decision. Mr. Attlee's words quoted above pose the problem and may well provide the answer. When is the last resort? It is beyond doubt that ultimately the bomb would be used—no nation would admit defeat with this terrible weapon of retaliation lying unused in its armory. Are we to wait to use it as a rat's dying bite? Are we to hold back and watch our enemy overrun Europe and set up his V-weapon sites again on the Channel coast, and do nothing to stop him except with weapons of his own choosing, against the massed tanks and guns and the hardy, expendable millions of militant Communism? We cannot rely on him solving our problem for us by using the bomb first; it would suit him admirably to fight a war with the weapons in which he would have a decisive advantage—what General Gruenther has called a "war of flesh."

Surely the fact is that the existence of the nation, and indeed of the free world, would be at stake from the moment the men of the Kremlin decided to risk everything on the desperate gamble of total war. They will not do so if we continue to make it unmistakably clear that any major aggression will call down our massive retaliatory power upon their heads. Hitler might have launched the bomb in the final frenzy of the *Götterdämmerung;* he would not have done so in 1939 had he known the result would be instant retaliation in kind. There have been occasions in history on which tyrants have sought to distract their peoples' attention from internal dissensions by creating an external emergency; that stratagem may have had its advantages in the past; it is hardly likely to prove attractive—even if it proved practicable—in an atomic age. The gangster does not shoot to kill if

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he knows the inevitable result is a policeman's bullet in his brain —except in the last resort when he also knows that the alternative is the electric chair.

For us there might be some reason, which no one can define with precision in advance, for allowing the situation to develop before striking the blow. A reason against doing so would be that it would rob us of the last-minute chance—and a real chance—of bringing the enemy to his senses and preventing war at the last moment; a definite and unmistakable warning that we should answer aggression with the bomb might well have that effect. But we need never reach that point—shall never do so if we do not waver in our purpose. Here is a case surely where "Fear and be slain" is the only motto for free men. Russia could not survive the onslaught of Anglo-American air power with the atomic and the hydrogen bombs, and the hardheaded materialists in Moscow know it. We might not survive it either; but that would be cool comfort for the Kremlin. We certainly should not survive a "war of flesh" in which we were precluded for any reason from using the one arm in which we can compete at least on equal, and more than equal, terms with them.

It is true that Russia, with her subservient but unreliable satellites, might not be our only enemy in another world war. Russia and China would be an immensely formidable combination. China is at present less susceptible to atomic power than is the Soviet Union; and her long-suffering people are hardened by centuries of experience to catastrophic disaster by flood and famine. That situation will progressively change as China becomes more industrialized. In spite of her vast potential, moreover, China by the accidents of geography can never be a direct and mortal threat to the free world in the same way or to the same degree as Russia. She can be a grave menace to Southeast Asia and the great Indian Peninsula, and we must be prepared to sustain and support the free nations of Asia against minor military aggression, as we had to in Korea. But Chinese Communism has most to gain from the tactics of the termite; and it is primarily in the political and economic field that we must combine to resist its advances. It is wishful thinking to see in Mao Tse-tung an Asiatic Tito; but neither is China indissolubly bound to the Soviet Union. There are many potential points of friction,[1] and the time

[1] See, for instance, "The Soviet Grip on Sinkiang," by Li Chang, *Foreign Affairs*, April 1954.

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may come when China is more Russia's problem than that of the free world. Whether that time will come—and, if so, when—will depend largely upon our own vision, statesmanship and readiness to adapt our traditional policies to the new realities of Asiatic nationalism. Meanwhile it is the Communist slave drivers of Moscow who are our most deadly actual adversaries in the cold war and potential enemies in a hot one. And until the patient peoples of the U.S.S.R. can free themselves from their yoke, our ultimate goal of universal peace and world government depends for its attainment primarily upon our ability to contain and neutralize the menace of Soviet Communism.

III

For that purpose we must and can rely upon the great deterrent of Anglo-American atomic air power; and the first charge upon our military resources should be the maintenance of our strategic bomber fleets at the highest pitch of efficiency and readiness. The *Pax Atlantica* must rest as surely upon this modern version of the Battle Fleet as did the *Pax Britannica* (and, incidentally, the validity of the Monroe Doctrine) upon the Royal Navy for 100 years after Napoleon. We in Great Britain must assume our necessarily smaller but nonetheless immensely valuable share in the Allied air striking force. One may note with amusement that those sections of political opinion in England which are most vocal about the dangers of American domination are also those which are readiest to suggest that we should leave the whole burden and responsibility of atomic air power to the United States.

It would no doubt have been more comfortable and less expensive for us in the West if we could have retained the monopoly of the terrible secrets of nuclear and thermonuclear power. But that we were never entitled to expect, and the possession of those secrets by our potential enemy does not invalidate the deterrent, though it raises many other problems for us. Nor does it mean that Allied air power must be in vastly superior strength. The size of any force depends on the job it may have to do in war; and that of our air striking force must be determined by a professional military appreciation of what would be required if it became necessary to eliminate Russia's capacity to be any longer a menace to her neighbors. What is vital is that we should not fall behind—indeed it should be well within our ca-

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pacity to retain the lead—not only in the training and aptitude of our crews (about which we need have no anxiety) but in the technical efficiency of our aircraft and equipment. The prime object of our scientific endeavor in the field of military research and development must be to ensure that we can continue to put down the bomb where we want to, if we have to, and without an unacceptable rate of loss. And nothing could be more important than to make quite certain that if the time comes, as well it may, when the manned bomber even at trans-sonic speeds is effectively neutralized by scientific means of defense, we have ready to take its place the unmanned bomber against which it is impossible to visualize any practical defense. Nothing could be more fraught with peril than an interlude in which the manned bomber had met its match and we had nothing to replace it.

There are critics of this policy who have found in it the difficulty that air forces, armed at great cost with atomic bombers, may find themselves excluded even from relatively small local wars on the Korean model. That perhaps is not impossible—though the great bomber can use weapons other than the hydrogen bomb, just as the policeman can discard his pistol for the truncheon; and they may be of great value in small wars, as their forerunners were in Korea. But in any event, that criticism is not a reason for having no atomic bombers—indeed it is the reverse. Between Trafalgar and Jutland the British Battle Fleet was excluded from the "Korea-type" wars of that age, but it kept world peace for 100 years nonetheless. And for generations past we have spent millions on heavy coast artillery guns; the fact that hardly any of them ever fired a shot in anger was no cause for criticism. It was their justification.

Meanwhile, perhaps for a generation or more, the prospect before us is the "long haul"—which, with all respect to Mr. Dulles,[2] was not altogether a new concept when the United States submitted it to the NATO Council in April 1953. Under that concept it will obviously be essential "to hold a careful balance between the demands of defense and other sectors of the economy"—in the words of Her Majesty's Government's "Statement on Defence 1954." But we must guard against a tendency that has already revealed itself to imagine that what has been loosely described as the "New Look" in strategy holds out great possibilities of economy in defense expenditure. This so-called New Look

[2] "Policy for Security and Peace," by John Foster Dulles, *Foreign Affairs*, April 1954.

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is in fact merely a rationalization of tendencies, themselves originating in economic factors, which it had become increasingly obvious since the Lisbon meeting of NATO at the beginning of 1952 would have to be faced sooner than later. It accepts the fact that a concept based on a modernized version of World War I, with vast armies permanently arrayed in Europe and with atomic air power superimposed upon it, is neither economically practicable nor strategically essential. To that extent it represents a saving, in that it gives us a deterrent to aggression and a real measure of security otherwise unattainable except at astronomic cost.

But the existence of the shield and cover of air power will not give us peace on the cheap. NATO remains as essential as ever, though all its members should adjust their minds to the inevitable reality that the essential covering forces on European soil must ultimately become the responsibility of the Europeans—including the Germans. Primary reliance on the power of the counteroffensive does not mean we can ignore the defensive, on land, at sea or in the air. And we dangerously delude ourselves if we imagine that we can safely afford in the long haul to accept substantial reductions in the present fighting strength of our "conventional" forces, particularly of the armies. Savings there must be and can be, particularly in those components of our armed strength which would only be required to sustain a long war—which surely is not a serious possibility in an atomic age. We should review the organization of our military establishments with an unsentimental and ruthlessly critical eye to eliminate nonessentials, and should reconsider the distribution of our defense resources among the different arms to make sure that it accords with the new realities. But our concern should be more with the quite attainable aim of getting more real fighting value out of our existing allocations of manpower and material, before we seek relief from the present burdens of defense expenditure. We are committed to a policy of peace through strength; and if we now cut our real fighting strength, then we shall not have peace —and, in the long run, we shall certainly not have "economy."

We are, alas, all too unlikely during the long haul to enjoy real peace as we knew it before 1914. Experience at Berlin and Geneva should have convinced us, if proof was needed, that the Communist aim of world domination has undergone no change. If it be true that the Communists can no longer hope to achieve

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that aim by the direct assault upon the citadels of Western democracy, they will surely seek to do so by undermining our defenses and picking off our isolated outposts. The existence of the great deterrent to total war means, in effect, not that minor aggressions are less likely than hitherto, but more likely. Our enemies will surely seek to overtax our strength by tactics in which they have the advantage of us, but to which it would clearly not be in our interest to retaliate by "turning every local war into another world war," in Mr. Dulles's words. Only people like Hitler can allow their patience to become exhausted—and it didn't do him much good in the long run. We must in fact expect to be faced with other "Koreas" which it will be in our interest to localize and insulate as unquestionably it was in the real Korea. As the Secretary of State has said, "Massive atomic and thermonuclear retaliation is not the kind of power which could most usefully be evoked in all circumstances . . . the free world must have the means for responding effectively on a selective basis when it chooses."

No one can draw a blueprint in advance to suit every possible hypothesis, and there is a good deal to be said for keeping our enemy guessing. But he must know as well as anybody that we cannot hope to deal with these minor aggressions on the cheap, by air power and sea power alone. These other Koreas, if they occur, will require the participation of land forces, perhaps on a substantial scale, with air cover and support as they had in Korea. It is no doubt an unpleasant thought that in these circumstances our enemy has the advantage of vast masses of expendable manpower, and no qualms about expending it. But in the areas where we may have to meet these local aggressions that is not a decisive advantage; he can be met and held by well-trained professional armies with the support that science can give them. Moreover, we must not assume that American and European armies will always have to bear the main brunt of aggression in Asia. That must be primarily an affair for the free nations of Asia; and our endeavor should be to help them to arrive at a state of political and economic stability and military efficiency, in which they can take their due share in a free defensive partnership. Nevertheless, at least for some time to come, we must be prepared to deploy British and American forces to meet aggression against the frontiers of freedom in Asia. That is only one reason why such a large proportion of our

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best land forces and associated air forces should not be permanently contained on the European front where others could take their place and where, as long as the West has adequate strength and we retain our unity and steadfastness of purpose, aggression is least likely. We must regain freedom of action for our strategic reserves which should be centrally located, endowed with the highest degree of air mobility, and with subsidiary base facilities and training areas where they may be needed.

IV

The hydrogen bomb will have no share in these localized wars, any more than a battle-cruiser squadron had in a scuffle with Yangtse pirates in the 1900's. But this is not to say that the Bomber Force will have no part to play. The atomic weapon may well be used to do what thousands of high explosive bombs were formerly required to do; and the striking force need not necessarily again be restricted by another Yalu. Both will depend upon whether they are to our tactical and strategic advantage rather than to that of the enemy. It has been suggested that all air action at any distance behind an enemy's front line may be ruled out by fear of precipitating massive retaliatory action by the hydrogen bomb. That is perhaps not inconceivable; and, if it means that war of any sort may not be carried by either side far into a neighbor's country, may not be without its advantages; it would certainly make aggression unprofitable. Actually, however, the suggestion appears somewhat farfetched. It might have some force on the European front, but there it is difficult to imagine anything between a relatively trivial frontier incident and the outbreak of total war. Elsewhere it seems hardly likely to be applicable.

Let us imagine—purely for the sake of illustration—that we have to meet a local aggression against northern Persia. Is it the idea that a bomber formation making for, say, a marshalling yard at Grozny or an airfield at Astrakhan would be assumed to be carrying a hydrogen bomb to Moscow, with the result that Soviet hydrogen bombs would instantly be dispatched to London and Washington? It surely requires somewhat of an effort of will to believe anything of the kind. It is worth considering whether in this connection a useful precedent might not be found in the system known as Air Control as practised by the R.A.F. against primitive tribal enemies between the wars; it was com-

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mon practice to notify a clearly-defined geographical area as a "prescribed area" within which any hostile activity was liable to air attack without further warning—it being understood that targets outside the prescribed area would not be attacked without further specific notice.

The idea that superior air power can in some way be a substitute for hard slogging and professional skill on the ground in this sort of war is beguiling but illusory. Air support can be of immense value to an army; it may sometimes be its salvation; Korea was not needed to prove that. But we must have a care not to misread the lessons of Korea, or of the closing years of World War II. The truth that we should take to heart is that armies can fight—and not only defensively—in the face of almost total air superiority. We should have learned that from the Germans—in Italy, in France and on the soil of Germany itself from 1943 to the end. The Chinese proved it again in Korea; and the fact that the Viet Minh had no aircraft did not prevent the fall of Dien Bien Phu. We should take advantage of every aid that science and technology can give us, and they are great, especially in defense. Unlike at sea and in the air, modern scientific developments have favored the defensive on land rather than the attack. But in these minor though gruelling wars nothing can be a substitute for tough, self-reliant infantry and, above all, for the highest degree of battle discipline under war-seasoned officers of high quality.

Oddly enough, the truth is that these small wars call for even higher qualities of leadership than when whole populations are ranged against each other in arms. Unfortunately in such wars a Western army is at a disadvantage as compared to the troops of a totalitarian state—particularly if they are Asians —because we think that maintenance of a relatively high standard of living is indispensable even in war. Our enemies can live and fight on a basis of extreme austerity, and are prepared to live largely on the country, regardless of the welfare of the inhabitants whom they will not hesitate to use as beasts of burden on their line of supply. They are therefore far less dependent than we upon all the paraphernalia of logistic support, on dumps and depots, rest camps and hospitals and great truck convoys on the roads leading to the front—and are consequently less vulnerable than we to air action against their lines of communications and back areas. It was fortunate in Korea that we did not have to

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maintain our forces in the field in the face of enemy air interdiction. We could do it, and we may have to do it; and our training and organization must be such that if necessary we can fight as stubbornly with our supply lines constantly subject to attack as did our enemies in Korea.

All this is cold comfort for anyone who hopes that air power will provide some cheap short cut to victory. We are in World War III now, and war is an expensive business. We cannot carry our reliance upon the counteroffensive to the possibly logical but actually ludicrous extreme of ignoring the defensive at home or at sea. The first requirement for a successful offensive is a secure base, and we cannot leave ourselves wide open. At the same time, we should only cripple ourselves if we aimed at anything like complete over-all protection. If we try to be strong everywhere, we shall be strong enough nowhere. A reasonable measure of protection (including civil defense) against air attack at home, and a sensible insurance against the mine, the submarine and the raider at sea are all part of the deterrent and must be provided. The object is to strike the happy mean between too little and too much. And the one certainty is that it will be expensive—but not so expensive as defeat in the war of the long haul.

We must face the future with acceptance and resolution, and with steady nerves. There is no need for despondency. Our combined organization and equipment for security are incomparably superior to anything we have known before. If there had been anything like it 20 years ago, there would have been no World War II. The one essential, lacking which we are all of us ultimately doomed, is to preserve the unity of the free world, and, above all, of the United States and the British Commonwealth. That unity is as vital, in the long run, to the United States as to its partners.

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A FRESH LOOK AT FREE ASIA

By Chester Bowles

WE HAVE reached a crossroads in Asia, and a sweeping reëvaluation of our policies there is no less than essential. Significantly that part of Asia to which we have paid the least attention may hold the key, not only to our own future, but to that of the democratic world. In the vast crescent-shaped area stretching from the Mediterranean, across the Middle East and the Indian subcontinent, to Southeast Asia and the South China Sea, live one-third of the world's people. Today they are uneasy and uncommitted, suspicious of the Western democracies, but as yet reluctant to cast in their lot with Moscow or Peking.

Soviet policy-makers have long been convinced that the road to world domination runs through Asia, and that once Asia has fallen, Europe will surely follow. Consequently these 700,000,000 free Asians have always had a high priority in Moscow. It is fortunate for the free world that the early astuteness of the Soviet geopoliticians was not matched by the skill of Soviet tacticians. In 1923 the Comintern mission to Sun Yat-sen's China exhibited a fatal ignorance of the stuff of which Asian revolutions are made, and the subsequent clumsiness of the Soviet during the 1920's and 1930's in dealing with the vast, vulnerable colonial territories of South Asia showed that few lessons had been learned.

It is fair to say that the present robust position of Communism in Asia is due, not to the revolutionary genius of the Soviets, but to that of the Chinese. Communist success is due particularly to Mao Tse-tung, whose grasp of Asian revolutionary forces enabled him to capitalize on the defeat of Japan and the default of Chiang, and thus to forge the People's Republic of China. Although it was Mao who gave world Communism its second chance in Asia, the Soviet Union is now equally awake to the opportunity. Communist leaders have learned that pressure applied in Europe tends to increase the unity of the West, while pressure applied in Asia tends to blow it to smithereens, and Molotov and Chou En-lai have teamed up effectively in bringing this pressure to bear.

Wittingly or not we have made their task substantially easier. For America has countered Communism's far-flung appeal pre-

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dominantly with military answers. In situations which are largely political and economic, we have too often responded with a barracks-room mind. To hundreds of millions of frustrated and impoverished peoples we have offered counterrevolutions largely devoid of political or ideological content save the idea of armed, single-track, anti-Communism. The consequences have been no less than devastating. Instead of our "taking the initiative" in rolling back Communism in Asia, as we boasted we were doing a few short months ago, Communism itself has steadily improved its position, while that of the United States has deteriorated.

A sober reëxamination of our Asian policy is certainly needed. But a partisan reëxamination that seeks simply to justify the past policies of either Democratic or Republican administrations will get us nowhere. Only if we come to grips with the great economic, political and psychological forces which are shaping Asian events can we evolve a workable approach. I suggest a reappraisal without agony, but with dispassion and clear-headedness, accompanied by an instructive side-glance at the Monroe Doctrine —a crucial American policy decision made when we, like the free nations of Asia, were young, "neutral" and in danger.

II

A brief review of the geopolitical factors which historically have affected South Asia and the Middle East may help to give us perspective. The Indian subcontinent is a strategic center between two geographic shoulders. Westward is the Middle East, stretching from West Pakistan across Iran, Iraq and Saudi Arabia to Turkey and the Mediterranean. Eastward are the countries of Southeast Asia, from Burma, Thailand and Indo-China through Malaya and Indonesia. For much of the last 300 years these two shoulders have been power vacuums, lacking the indigenous strength to repel invaders.

The history of Chinese aggression into Southeast Asia is sometimes forgotten. Chinese imperial power for centuries exacted tribute from much of what is now Burma and Indo-China, and Chinese Communist maps today include these areas in "greater China." By the seventeenth, eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, however, the recession of Chinese power had rendered this rich area of Southeast Asia politically weak, and British, French and Dutch colonial power gradually filled the vacuum on a mutually tolerable and profitable basis.

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The vacuum of the Middle East, on the other hand, was a continuing source of conflict among the Western Powers. In the late eighteenth century Britain finally won the race for the riches of India. But Britain's position there was under almost constant pressure from Tsarist Russia, whose goal was the establishment of firm, strategic positions on the Mediterranean and the Persian Gulf—and eventually in India itself.

The interests of the Russian Communists have matched those of the Tsars. In November 1940, in their secret negotiations with the Nazis, Soviet leaders stated that their "territorial aspirations centered in the direction of the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf," and since the war their pressure has continued. In both World War I and World War II the Middle East was likewise a major target of German strategists.

For nearly 200 years British imperial policy was designed to counter such pressures and thus assure the security of India and the stability of South Asia. This policy was directed by a series of skilled colonial administrators, one of the ablest of whom was the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston. In 1892 Lord Curzon outlined the British "containment" program in the following blunt terms: "I should regard the concession by any power of a port on the Persian Gulf to Russia as a deliberate insult to Britain, as a wanton rupture of the status quo, and as an intentional provocation to war."

In those days, as now, firm statements were meaningless unless there was power to back them up. British policy was effective because it was backed by the Indian Army and the British fleet. In World War I, Indian troops were the backbone in Allenby's Mesopotamian campaign. In World War II, with the Gurkhas, they played a major rôle in Montgomery's defense of Suez and his defeat of Rommel's Afrika Korps. In 1941 they blocked a Nazi-organized coup d'état in Iraq. The Indian Army was also the principal power factor in Southeast Asia. The garrison of the great British base at Singapore was principally drawn from India. In 1942 Sikhs, Gurkhas and other units of the Indian Army were in the forefront of the fighting against the Japanese, first in Malaya and later in Burma and Assam.

Today the British are gone from India, and with them has gone the combination of diplomatic firmness backed by strong, readily available forces which, for the benefit of the British Empire, had long provided stability in these two historic power vacuums.

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When independence came to India in 1947, the Indian Army—the backbone of British policy in Asia—was neutralized. Indeed, with the partition of India and Pakistan, it was split into two rival forces.

Russian pressure, however, has continued to probe towards the Middle East, and since 1950 Chinese pressure has increased sharply in Southeast Asia. British diplomacy, deprived of the support of the Indian Army, has been unable to meet these threats, and the United States has felt forced to take a more vigorous position.

In 1946, through the United Nations, we took the lead in inducing Russia to withdraw from Iran. In 1947, through the Truman Doctrine, we threw our military and economic support behind Greece and Turkey, which were faced with Soviet pressures towards the Mediterranean in the classic pattern of the Tsars. In the last few years we have established a widely-flung ring of air bases stretching from Japan to Morocco, introduced some economic aid, attempted wherever possible—as in Korea and Thailand—to provide military equipment and training for local armies, given massive material support to the French effort to hold Indo-China, and attempted to devise a series of anti-Communist alliances.

Our strategic air bases have strengthened our military posture in the event of World War III. Our plans to establish and train formidable anti-Communist native armies have been successful on the extreme flanks of the South Asian crescent—in Turkey and Formosa. But little progress has been made in creating a defense line in South Asia itself, and our political position has steadily deteriorated. Whatever its compensating advantages, our military assistance to Pakistan has in fact seriously weakened our relations with India and stimulated increased Soviet probing into Afghanistan, traditionally a buffer state in this strategic area. Our air bases have aroused widespread suspicion and resentment among the very people whom we have sought to protect. Our investment of nearly 3 billion dollars in military aid to the French in Indo-China has failed to avert one of the most humiliating defeats in history.

Much of the difficulty we have faced has stemmed from Asian neutralist attitudes which create understandable wonderment among Westerners to whom the objectives of world Communism long have seemed clear beyond all question. This neutralism

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stems from three sources, and if we are to cope with it successfully it is important that we understand them.

First, most non-Communist Asians are convinced that their greatest danger stems, not from overt aggression from Moscow or Peking, but from Communist subversion feeding on internal economic weaknesses. This leads to extreme concentration on internal affairs.

Second, the free Asians have had a long and bitter experience with Western colonialism, which confuses their relationship with the Western democracies and creates suspicions of Western policy in Asia. Our very efforts to "save" them from Communism lead to resentment against the would-be rescuer.

Third, there is a deep conviction in Asia, as in Europe, that Red China cannot be controlled by Moscow and may eventually develop quite independent policies, *provided the door to the outer world is left open.*

These beliefs may be wrong, but they are deeply held and they will not lightly be abandoned. If we are to deal effectively with the new free Asia we must start to take them into account. Especially must we burn deep into our consciousness the knowledge that we are not all-powerful, that we often do not have the control over situations that we think we have, and that in many parts of the world our policies at best can have no more than a supporting effect in any situation short of total war.

An American-inspired, American-managed, American-dominated defense program for Asia is a political dead-end. If in the next ten years Southeast Asia and the Middle East remain safe from Communist subversion or attack, it will be largely because the people who live there have finally recognized the essential nature of the Communist threat, and because they have started to take the steps which are essential to stop it. If we are to make a meaningful contribution to this development, we must stop our scolding and come to grips with those indigenous forces, which for better or worse will write the history of this vast and complex area in the coming years.

III

Historic parallels are often flimsy things. But the comparison is striking between the present-day viewpoint of "neutralist" Asia and the attitudes which shaped our own foreign policy in the last century.

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The United States, like the newly-independent nations of Asia, was born in a period of revolutionary upheaval. The year our Constitution went into effect—1789—saw the downfall of the French monarchy. During the presidencies of Washington, Adams, Jefferson and Madison, the French Revolution and the Napoleonic Wars were in full swing. From the earliest period of French revolutionary ascendancy in the 1790's, well-financed French and British agents had worked tirelessly to draw the new North American nation closer to one or the other of the two major orbits of power. Many Americans, like many Indians today, developed sharply opposing viewpoints and accused each other of being foreign puppets.

It was against this background of internal and external pulling and hauling that President Washington delivered his farewell address to the American people on September 19, 1796. The plea that Washington made then for an American policy of neutrality and dynamic independence was strikingly similar to that which Nehru advocates for India today. "Observe good faith and justice towards all nations," said Washington. "Cultivate peace and harmony with all. . . . A passionate attachment of one nation for another produces a variety of evils. . . . Tis our true policy to steer clear of permanent alliances with any portion of the foreign world." A century and a half later, this is precisely the language of the spokesmen of the new Asian nations in New Delhi, Rangoon and Djakarta. And America's exasperated reaction in 1954 is remarkably similar to that of the British, as they struggled to keep Napoleon from conquering half the world.

The period from 1800–1820 continued to show some patterns of political alignment remarkably similar to those of the past twenty years. Europe then, like the world today, exhibited a bi-polar split among the leading Powers and a shifting pattern of alliances. Thus Britain, Russia and their allies coöperated to defeat Napoleon's aggression, just as they and we coöperated to defeat Hitler's in our own time. Analogous, too, was the quick shift in power blocs once the common danger was over. Russia, Britain's leading ally in the Napoleonic Wars, took the postwar leadership of the Holy Alliance coalition against Britain, just as Russia with her satellites and China, following the defeat of Hitler, organized a coalition against the West.

Still anxious to remain aloof from "Europe's quarrels," American policy-makers were confronted with a totally new and un-

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expected problem in 1814 after the collapse of Napoleon's armies at Waterloo. The people of South America had taken advantage of the conflict in Europe to throw off the colonial domination of Portugal and Spain and to establish independent nations. The United States, which had only recently fought itself free from Britain, looked on these revolutions with favor and gave them both direct and indirect support.

After peace was established, the Spanish and Portuguese, supported by the Holy Alliance of Russia, Prussia and Austria, sought to reimpose their control over the South American states. The British, who had established extensive trade in South American ports previously denied to them by Portugal and Spain, were strongly opposed.

At this time the United States lacked an army of any consequence, and its navy was small. Its moral influence throughout the world, however, was great, much like that of India's today. And just as both blocs in the cold war now seek Indian friendship, so both the Russian-led Holy Alliance and the British Government sought American approval and support in 1820–23. On July 5, 1820, John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State, wrote to our Minister at St. Petersburg describing recent advances made by the Russian Minister in Washington. His letter suggests a dilemma similar to the current predicament of South Asian leaders like Nehru:

> To stand in firm and cautious independence of all entanglements in the European system [Adams wrote] has become a cardinal point of policy under every administration of government from the peace of 1783 to this day. . . . Yet the difficulties of maintaining our system and the temptations to depart from it increase and multiply. . . . A direct though unofficial application has been made by the present Russian Minister here that the United States should become formal parties to the Holy Alliance. . . .

However, the Tsar's government in 1823 was as offensive to American believers in democracy as its Communist successor is to most of free Asia today. Its proposal was politely but firmly refused, just as the free nations of Asia have thus far declined—*too* politely in Western eyes—to ally themselves with Communism.

British counter efforts to induce the United States to take a strong position in opposition to the encroachments of the Holy Alliance in South America were even more direct and to the point. On August 20, 1823, the British Foreign Minister, George

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Canning, wrote a private and confidential letter to the American Minister in London, Richard Rush. In it Canning disclaimed any British desire to interfere with the newly-won independence of the South American states. Then he added: "We could not see any portion of them transferred to any power with indifference. If these opinions are . . . common to your government, why should we hesitate mutually to convey them to each other and to declare them in the face of the world?"

Canning's proposal met with an immediate response in Washington. After consulting Secretary of State Adams, President Monroe sought the advice of all of his living Presidential predecessors. Thomas Jefferson, no friend of England, promptly replied that an agreement with her offered not only the best hope of keeping South America free from European aggression, but of assuring the fundamental premise of American foreign policy, *i.e.* to keep clear of European wars. John Adams and James Madison agreed.

Monroe and his Secretary of State decided, however, in favor of a *unilateral* American declaration. In the language of John Quincy Adams' diary: "[This was] a suitable and convenient opportunity for us to take our stand against the Holy Alliance and at the same time to decline the overture of Great Britain. It would be more candid, as well as more dignified, to avow our principles explicitly to Russia and France than to come in as a cockboat in the wake of the British man-of-war. . . ."

The scars of British colonialism were as fresh for Americans in 1823 as for Indians now, and there was a similar keen awareness of Britain's position as a leading imperial Power. Under these circumstances Adams knew that an alliance between America and Britain, regardless of its purpose, would have created a political explosion throughout the United States. Although America has no colonizing tradition in South Asia, her present world position and her close relationship with her European allies often make her seem the heir of the Western colonial tradition. Nehru knows well that an Indian-American political agreement would create an explosion in India today.

On December 2, 1823, Monroe proposed his famous doctrine as part of his seventh annual message to Congress: "The political system of the allied powers is essentially different . . . from that of America. . . . It is impossible that the allied powers should extend their political system to any portion of either [American]

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continent without endangering our peace and happiness. . . . It is equally impossible therefore that we should behold such interposition in any form with indifference." The British, although rebuffed in their proposal that Monroe agree to a bilateral statement of policy towards the South American states, accepted the situation as entirely to their advantage, and Foreign Minister Canning limited himself to a casual reference to it in the House of Commons.

Thus early in its history the United States acted upon a basic axiom of world politics, one we often ignored later on: that neutrality and non-alignment are not achieved for the wishing; and that an ounce of timely, constructive, peaceful involvement may save many times that amount of tragic, bloody involvement later.

IV

There are, of course, many obvious differences between India's position today and that of the United States in 1823. There are also some striking similarities.

South America in 1823, like the Middle East and Southeast Asia today, was a power vacuum attracting like a magnet the ambitions of foreign Powers. The essential question for India and free Asia now is the same as it was for the United States in 1823: how to keep the power struggle from exploding into a world war on its front doorstep where military involvement would become a certainty.

India now, like the United States in 1823, considers herself geographically isolated from the major centers of conflict. India, like the United States in 1823, is deeply impressed with the massive economic problems with which she is confronted, and with her own opportunities for development and advancement. India, like the United States in 1823, is supremely suspicious of colonialism and anxious to support the independence of those nations which seek to throw off colonial domination. India, like the United States in 1823, is convinced that her best hope for peace and growing prosperity is to maintain correct relationships with all Powers and to keep her people from becoming emotionally involved in current struggles.

How far will this parallel hold? Is India today, as was the United States in 1823, aware that an independent position can be maintained only by positive, imaginative action and by the

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assumption of some clear responsibilities? This may be the most critical question to be asked and answered in the politics of the next decade.

Monroe and Adams knew that any move of the Russians and the Holy Alliance into South America would be vigorously opposed by Britain, and that this would force the United States to take sides. As long as the present power vacuums continue to exist in the Middle East and Southeast Asia, Communism will be tempted to fill them, and any overt armed aggression by the Moscow-Peking bloc will be met head-on by the United States even at the risk of a Third World War. Does India see that in the event of such a conflict, so disruptive of her essential sea communications, so very near her own borders, it would be utterly impossible to maintain the neutrality which is now the bedrock of her foreign policy?

Assuming, as we must, that present Indian proclivities toward neutralism are firmly rooted, the only way that India, during the next few years, can remain aloof and neutral from the cold war struggle is to take her share of responsibility in the Middle East and Southeast Asia, just as the United States took responsibility in South America 130 years ago. If India and the other free Asian nations miss this crucial point it will be chiefly because the heritage of colonialism muddies the analogy for them. This can be seen by examining two proposals which call for *outside* sponsorship of free Asian action—the alternative sponsors being Red China or the United States.

A major objective of present Chinese policy is to establish a "Monroe Doctrine" of her own which would not only break existing ties between the Western democracies and the free nations of South and Southeast Asia but eventually would exclude the West from all of Asia including Japan. If Asia were once properly sealed off from Western influence, China would be in a position to step up her demands on her weaker neighbors, firmly assert her political and military leadership throughout Asia, and ultimately establish complete control from the Arabian Sea to Alaska.

Chou En-lai has been most persuasive in identifying the first step in this process with the historic anti-colonial attitudes which deeply influence even the most anti-Communist Asians. In his discussions with South Asian leaders such as Nehru and U Nu, there has been no strident appeal for militant action. His em-

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phasis has rather been on coexistence, independence and non-aggression—concepts which reflect familiar Asian overtones of nonviolence and peaceful progress.

But as time goes on Chou's anti-colonial appeal may become less and less pertinent. Colonialism is on its deathbed in Asia, and that fact is becoming obvious even to the most bitter anti-Westerner. The débâcle of Indo-China assured the demise of French colonialism there and in the tiny French city states in India. On the basis of their postwar record in India, Pakistan, Burma and Ceylon, we must assume that the British will be prepared to withdraw from Malaya once the guerrillas are under control and a new constitutional framework is established. Presumably similar steps will eventually be taken for Sarawak and British North Borneo.

Save for the British bases in Singapore and Hong Kong, only a few tidbits of European colonialism will remain in Asia: the Portuguese in Goa, Timor and Macao; and the Dutch in Irian or Dutch West New Guinea. The insignificance of these lingering colonial outposts suggests that a Chinese-inspired "Monroe Doctrine," directed against the fancied menace of Western colonialism, will carry less and less conviction in the coming years. As long as the leadership of South Asia remains democratic, Chou En-lai's efforts to isolate Asia from the West will face formidable obstacles.

Even now it would be a mistake to consider the recent Indian-Chinese agreements in New Delhi as anything like a sweeping Communist victory. The Chou En-lai-Nehru statement issued in July proposed that the recent Indian-Chinese treaty on Tibet serve as a model for all of Asia. The preamble of this treaty lays down five principles for friendly relations: mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty; mutual non-aggression; mutual noninterference in each other's internal affairs; equality and mutual benefit; and peaceful coexistence.

The Indians cannot be unaware that China violated all five of these principles in taking over Tibet in 1951. Nor has anyone suggested that India has ever failed to live up to them in her conduct toward China. If their restatement now by Chou and Nehru means anything, it is a Chinese pledge to start living up to ideals blatantly and recently violated by the Chinese themselves. The Indians on their part are obviously hoping, as we of the West so futilely hoped in the years following the war, that the

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Communist tiger, its appetite satisfied, will settle down to peace and harmony.

Arguments from Western sources, no matter how logical, will have little effect in persuading the skeptical Asians that they are hoping for the impossible. Only hard, bitter experience with broken Communist promises is likely to disillusion them.

For this reason the agreement between Nehru and Chou En-lai, instead of promoting closer Chinese-Indian relations, may prove to do the opposite. In any case it provides a clear test of Chinese intentions. If the Chinese follow the example of the Soviet Union in the 1920's and 1930's, and decide temporarily to relax their pressure and consolidate their revolution, India and other free Asian nations will be given a badly needed breathing spell in which to put their own economic and political houses in order. If, as seems more likely, China disregards her new promises and embarks either directly or indirectly on further expansion, the real nature of Chinese Communism will become obvious to many Asians for the first time.

Such a development, following Chou's commitments in New Delhi and Rangoon, may provide free Asia with the kind of initial, psychological shock that the Communist coup d'état in Czechoslovakia and the death of Jan Masaryk gave the West in 1948. Should that happen, the Communist partnership would have exposed itself for all Asia to see: a new "unholy alliance," seeking to impose its own brand of imperial domination and slavery.

If for these reasons a "Chou En-lai Doctrine" may lack solid, lasting appeal for free Asians, a "Dulles Doctrine" is likely to be equally unappealing. In his address to the House of the People in New Delhi on April 24, 1954, Nehru castigated American "statements which came near to assuming protection, or declaring a kind of Monroe Doctrine, *unilaterally* over the countries of Southeast Asia." As this is written we have yet to see how the eight-Power discussions in Manila may develop, but a defense system in Asia not supported by the Colombo Powers is a limited military expedient carrying obvious political liabilities.

It is possible, however, that India and her non-Communist neighbors may eventually decide to play an *independent* rôle in helping to fill the vacuums of the Middle East and Southeast Asia. Because the Indo-China situation was then at the crisis point, the Ceylon Conference in late April, attended by the

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Prime Ministers of India, Ceylon, Pakistan, Burma and Indonesia, received far less attention in the West than it deserved. During the coming years these five "Colombo Powers," with populations totalling one-fourth of mankind, have three courses of action theoretically open to them:

At one extreme, four of them could follow the example of the other—Pakistan—and abandon their present independent policies, joining the Western democracies in a defense pact frankly supported by Western military power.

At the other extreme, they could associate with Red China in the kind of "Asia-for-the-Asians" coexistence advocated by Chou.

Or, finally, they could adopt a kind of Monroe Doctrine of their own. While refusing to join a Western-supported military pact, they could sense the likelihood of future Chinese pressure, at a time and place of Mao Tse-tung's own choosing, and announce their determination vigorously to oppose any future aggression in South Asia from any source.

In the foreseeable future it would be wishful thinking to assume that the first course of action is a practical possibility. Whether we like it or not, India, for one, is no more willing now to become a "cockboat" in the wake of the American "man of war" than the United States was willing to adopt that relationship to the British in 1823.

If we continue to concentrate on military measures in Asia, and largely to ignore the economic and political forces making history there, the second alternative—the most unpleasant one for us—may become the most likely of the three.

But the third, which in the present complex situation offers the most practical hope for stability in Asia, is by no means out of the question.

The Ceylon conference was a good beginning. After meeting at Colombo and Kandy, the five Prime Ministers affirmed "their faith in democracy and democratic institutions" and declared "their unshakable determination to resist interference in the affairs of their countries by external, Communist, anti-Communist or other agencies." This can scarcely be termed a ringing pledge to oppose Communist aggression at any cost. Some Americans, insistent on all-or-nothing alliances and forgetful of our own early, supersensitive, colonial-conscious days, may also be irritated at the reference to anti-Communist agencies as a potential source of interference. But if the Colombo-Kandy declara-

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tion contains the germ of a future genuine and indigenous Monroe Doctrine we should remember our own history and be reassured.

India, of course, is the key to the situation. How far would she actually go in opposing a clear-cut Communist advance in Asia? As things stand now, no one, probably including the Indians themselves, really knows. India has demonstrated her determination to crush internal Communist subversion. If any enemy, Communist or otherwise, should attack her, India would certainly defend herself. India has left no doubt that she would also defend her neighbor, Nepal, and the tiny Himalayan principalities of Bhutan and Sikkim on her northern boundary. In case of a Chinese Communist attack on Burma, it is almost certain that India would support immediate counteraction through the United Nations.

Would India, together with her neighbors, offer a similar support to Thailand? Would she guarantee the boundaries of a free Laos and Cambodia? In the wake of the Indo-Chinese truce, the answers to these questions remain in doubt. This doubt would have to be removed if the declaration by India and her neighbors of a Monroe Doctrine for Asia were to be meaningful.

In the Middle East, India's position is even more obscure. Two years ago India showed deep, although private, concern about the weakness of the Iranian government in the face of Soviet intrigues through the Tudeh party. India has also been uneasy over growing Soviet activities in Afghanistan. India's eventual position on all these matters may well be decisive. If she remains unwilling to take a clear public position the danger of further Communist aggression may be increased.

The Ceylon Conference made one thing clear. Although President Monroe could act unilaterally, without undue concern for the feelings of his wobbly neighbors in South America, Nehru cannot issue a unilateral "Nehru Doctrine" without risking the resentment of his proud neighbors in South Asia. An indigenous Asian Monroe Doctrine to be effective would have to be worked out on a multilateral basis, and this involves additional questions.

Among these countries the lack of homogeneity and a common background of joint action are all too obvious. Furthermore, there are the delicate relations between India and Pakistan to be considered. Unless these two nations can at least bring their foreign policies into closer alignment, it is difficult to see how an

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effective indigenous South Asia defense program can develop.

Even if this hurdle is surmounted, those who still consider national effectiveness solely in terms of air power and armored divisions will question the military and political impact of a warning to potential intruders by the nations of South Asia. Yet the Indian subcontinent offers a potential source of military manpower which would not be lightly regarded by either Peking or Moscow. It would be clear to Communist policy-makers that in the event of a war growing out of Communist aggression in Asia, a Monroe Doctrine proposed by the free Asian nations would have the support of Western air and naval power, just as our own 1823 policy had the unspoken support of the British fleet.

It would be a grave mistake, moreover, to underestimate the moral weight that newly-independent nations carry among hundreds of millions of uncommitted people in Asia, Africa and South America. A statement by Nehru and his fellow Prime Ministers that further armed aggression in Asia would meet all-out opposition would immeasurably strengthen the forces of democracy throughout the world.

V

We face an inescapable predicament in Asia. We have been lavish with our expenditures of money, military equipment, earnestness and good will. But we have failed to build an effective American-directed, anti-Communist front, and our failure has been greatest in the crucially important crescent of Southeast Asia and the Middle East. The reason for this failure is that our objective lies outside the range of political possibility. The lesson that we should learn is not that the Asians are ingrates or pro-Communist, but that *American direction* of an anti-Communist front is precisely what those countries will not permit. Further efforts along these lines are doomed to fail. With each failure our position and prestige will be gravely weakened, and we shall move closer to self-isolation.

The obstacles to an indigenous Monroe Doctrine for free Asia are clear, numerous and formidable. It would be folly to predict whether, when and how such an approach may come into being. But if there is to be stability, there are no practical alternatives for the long haul, and we may hope that conditions themselves will argue persuasively for timely action. We do know that no such program will spring full-blown from the head of Zeus. Like

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all deep-rooted policies, it will develop out of a culmination of various ingredients of attitude, sympathy, choice, personality and power.

Recognizing this, Americans would do well to submerge their craving for easy answers. There is none in Asia. Our realization of this essential fact has been clouded by the comparative success we have had in Europe with a series of specific measures: the Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan and NATO. Much of our present frustration about Asia stems from the popular belief that our difficulties there must flow from the failure of our statesmen to be patriotic or clever enough to produce similar neatly packaged solutions.

But we delude ourselves if we think that the many-times more manifold problems of free Asia can be forced into a predetermined, European-tested mold. There is nothing simple or short-term about Asia, and the sooner we start to devote some dedicated attention to a longer view, the better will be our chances of contributing to the peace and stability which we so earnestly seek.

The first and most basic essential is that we accommodate ourselves to the mainstream of Asian attitudes, and that we work to establish genuine relationships with Asian peoples that will allow us to talk meaningfully to them, and they to us.

The ultimate objective is the development of free, confident, dynamic new nations between the Mediterranean and the South China Sea. Whether the Communist timetable will allow for such a development is itself open to question despite what many free Asian leaders seem to think. Thus the ability of these nations to develop may in turn depend upon their awareness of their own mutual danger, and a common propulsion to play out the critical rôles assigned them by history—regardless of what they think of America and the West. The United States cannot create these conditions in Asia or anywhere else. They must grow—of themselves and by themselves. The most that we can do is to aid their growth by *friendly* and *unobtrusive* encouragement and support.

Recognition of these facts requires a far-reaching reorientation of our Asian policies. Yet the time is favorable for reorientation, because the disaster of Vietnam has divulged the hopelessness of our recent policies for all the world to see. What are the broad outlines of a new Asian policy that would take these lessons to heart?

We should maintain ample and adaptable military power,

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including orthodox weapons, and we should be prepared to use it against overt aggression. At the same time we should refrain from bomb-rattling, and from reckless public statements that frighten our friends and potential friends but rarely impress our enemies.

We should stand firm in Korea and on Formosa against further Communist encroachment; but at the same time we should recognize that we cannot base our Asian policies on two nations whose combined population of 35,000,000 amounts to less than 3 percent of all Asia. Syngman Rhee and Chiang Kai-shek have resisted Communism bravely, but they are almost totally out of touch with the mood of modern Asia, and most Asians and Europeans as well believe they are itching to start a Third World War.

We should adopt a clear, convincing and responsible position against vestigial colonialism wherever it remains. To continue to sacrifice our moral position for a doubtful strengthening of relations with our European allies is a bad bargain.

We should decisively increase our emphasis on Point Four assistance without strings and with a larger proportion spent through the United Nations. Steady economic progress in free Asia is of the essence.

We should carry through on President Eisenhower's atomic pool proposals, and plan to offer atomic energy to all free, friendly nations, as a peaceful resource for the development of their economies, regardless of Russian policy.

We should encourage, rather than fret over, the tentative steps Asian governments are beginning to take for renewed mutual discussion and benefit—like the recent talks in Ceylon. If an indigenous Asian Monroe Doctrine grows out of such discussions, we should be mature enough to welcome it.

We should be in the forefront supporting Asian nations for positions of responsibility in the U.N. and at important international conferences, rather than appearing to block them at every turn. In the long run we would gain much more in respect than we would lose in votes on particular issues.

We should recognize the fact that a dynamic Japan must soon find a new place in Asia and that the only questions are where and how. Agreements anywhere in Asia that ignore the existence of 80,000,000 hard-working, highly industrialized Japanese may prove to have been built on sand. In Europe we have long since crossed this bridge in our relations with West Germany.

We should anticipate the possible future rivalries between the

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Soviet Union and Red China, and courageously resist domestic political pressures that would make it impossible for us to capitalize on them.

Such an approach to Asia will call for more tact and humility, and fewer doctrinaire assertions, than we have exhibited in recent months. It may come easier if we will recognize that democratic progress in Asia in the next decade will not be made by dramatic and spectacular moves on our part. It will come through the kind of continued steady, indigenous development that India and Burma have had within the last few years.

Once we seek the *success* of these countries as the most promising means to stability in Asia certain other things will at once begin to happen. We will cease our own compulsion to chalk up every incident as plus or minus on the big cold war scoreboard. We will not lose our perspective when Chou pays a state visit to New Delhi or when Nehru plans a trip to Peking. We will at long last be thinking and acting positively, instead of reacting hypnotically to the moves of the Communists. We will once again be in tune with the aspirations of free people everywhere.

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SPOTLIGHT ON THAILAND

By Edwin F. Stanton

THE Communist triumph at Geneva—for I think we should frankly face the unpalatable fact that it was indeed a major triumph for the Communists—turns the spotlight on the rest of Southeast Asia and in particular upon Thailand. Because of her geographical and strategical location Thailand, or Land of the Free (still known to many Westerners as Siam), is the heart and citadel of the region. It is the oldest independent country in South Asia. For centuries the Thai have cherished their freedom, and, from the time of their sojourn in China in the early part of the Christian era down to modern days, have repeatedly fought to preserve their independence.

Thailand is a lush tropical country of some 200,000 square miles. The mountains to the north and along the western frontier bordering on Burma are thick with jungle, majestic teak trees, wild orchids and wild beasts. The capital city of Bangkok is located in the broad central plain, an emerald green carpet of rice fields nourished by the Mother of Waters, as the Chao Phya River is respectfully called by the Thai. Delicious fruits, coconuts, sugar cane, peanuts and other agricultural products, together with an abundance of fish in the seas off her shores, make her a land of plenty. She is the rice bowl of South Asia; the countries of the region, including Japan, which are short of food, count heavily on her surplus of 1,500,000 tons of rice. Her rubber, tin and tungsten find ready markets in the United States and Europe.

The last census, taken in 1950, showed Thailand to have a population of 18,600,000. There are sizeable minority groups—3,000,000 Chinese, who reside principally in Bangkok and the larger towns and cities, 600,000 Malays in southern Thailand bordering Malaya, and 50,000 Vietnamese along the Mekong River, Thailand's eastern frontier with Laos and Cambodia. The Thai are noted for their friendliness, hospitality and tolerance. They are farmers and the rulers, but the Chinese, who are the traders, control much of the country's wealth. The Thai rather resent Chinese dominance in matters of trade, and the fact that the Chinese resist assimilation, even though the majority of them have prospered greatly in Thailand, causes them to be looked

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upon with suspicion. On the other hand, there has been considerable intermarriage, and the Thai realize that the Chinese flair for trade has contributed notably to the development and prosperity of the country.

The culture, art and literature of the Thai are an interesting blend of Indian and Chinese influences out of which a distinctly Thai culture is emerging. The Thai wisely seek to preserve their traditions and way of life. They are strongly Buddhist and their temples, or wats, are graceful in design and splendidly ornamented; the glittering spires of thousands of temples reach into the blue of the sky, and the brilliant yellow of the robes of the priests who seek to follow the precepts of Buddha are a no less memorable sight for the visitor.

For many centuries the Thai people were ruled by absolute, yet often benevolent, monarchs. There was the great King Ramkemhaeng of the thirteenth century, for example, who caused a large gong to be suspended outside his palace gate so that his subjects might call him day or night and seek justice or comfort. In the nineteenth century King Mongkut, who has been so burlesqued in the Broadway extravaganza, "The King and I," saw the need for Western technology. He and his son, King Chulalongkorn, encouraged the establishment of modern means of communication, improved methods of irrigating the land, modern education and medicine. Under such enlightened rulers, many young Siamese were sent abroad to study, and some drank deeply not only of the wine of technology, but of other bottles labeled "nationalism" and "Socialism."

On June 24, 1932, some of these young men carried out a bloodless coup d'état and established a constitutional monarchy, a form of government that has prevailed ever since. The King's powers are limited, but he enjoys the reverence and respect of his people. King Phumiphon Adundet, the present monarch, is keenly interested in the welfare of his people and the problems facing the country. The government of Field Marshal P. Pibul Songgram, the Prime Minister, has been in office since 1948. Prime Minister Pibul has given unswerving support to the United Nations (Bangkok is the regional center for half a dozen important U.N. agencies) and Thailand was the first Asian nation to send a contingent of troops to Korea. They acquitted themselves splendidly and earned the nickname "Little Tigers."

But today the happy Kingdom of Thailand, with its rich nat-

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

The provisional demarcation line between North Vietnam and South Vietnam agreed on at Geneva, July 20, 1954, begins on the coast at the 17th parallel and runs slightly south of the parallel westward to the Laos border.

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ural resources and its sturdy farmers ploughing their rice fields behind their slow-moving water buffaloes, is in danger. Communist pressures both from within the country and along its frontiers have been steadily mounting, and the Geneva agreements have increased the danger. Laos and Cambodia, stretching along Thailand's long eastern border, lie defenseless and easy prey to further penetration and political subversion by the Communists. The statement made by Ho Chi Minh on the day following the termination of the Geneva Conference, calling for a continuation of the struggle, can permit no illusions: as Foreign Minister Prince Wan Waithayakon said recently, Geneva has left Thailand "uneasy."

II

It is not difficult to understand why. The gallant defense of Dien Bien Phu, an epic of French valor against great odds, was a serious military defeat, and a political and psychological reverse of the gravest character. It dealt the final blow to French will to continue the struggle and led swiftly to the events of the Geneva Conference. It is well to recall that twice within a period of a year Viet Minh forces surged into Laos with startling speed. In the spring of 1953, Viet Minh divisions led by a Vietnamese trained in Moscow raced to within 12 miles of Luang Prabang, the ancient capital of that kingdom. With the commencement of the heavy monsoon rains the Communists seemingly vanished, and the world breathed a sigh of relief.

I was in Bangkok at the time, and from there it was apparent that this well-organized operation was part of a strategy planned to infiltrate Laos and ultimately seize it. When the Viet Minh withdrew they left behind them several thousand political and military agents. These have not been idle. They are training and organizing Laos peasants into guerrilla units which operate nominally under the so-called "Free Laos Government," the titular head of which is a brother of the present Prime Minister of the French-supported Royal Laos Government. Furthermore, the Communists' position in Laos has been strengthened, and given some legal sanction, by the Geneva agreements. Significantly, both the representatives of Ho Chi Minh and the Chinese Communists at Geneva were very insistent upon the retention of enclaves in Laos comprising virtually all of the northeastern region up to the Chinese frontier. These most advantageous terms will

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enable the Communists to intensify the political conquest of Laos, and the increased vulnerability of Laos will inevitably result in intensifying Communist pressure against adjoining Thailand.

It is perhaps not generally realized that 50,000 Vietnamese reside on the Thai side of the Mekong River directly across from Laos. These people fled from Indo-China and the Japanese during World War II, and many of them—particularly those living along the river—have been forced to join secret Viet Minh Communist organizations. They engage in political activities in support of Ho Chi Minh's Government, and smuggle supplies across the Mekong. During the first attack upon Laos, early in 1953, the Thai authorities closed the border, strengthened the police patrols along the river, made a careful registration of all Vietnamese, and moved some 1,500 to the interior of the country. Because of the length of the frontier, these efforts to stop Communist infiltration and smuggling were not wholly successful, but they were sensible and were energetically pressed. Since then the Thai Government has tightened its security measures. The Viet Minh thrust to Thakhek on the Mekong River early this year strengthened Communist links with Vietnamese residents on the Thai side of the river; some 98 of them were recently arrested on charges of espionage and inciting rebellion. Nine provinces bordering the Mekong have been placed in a state of emergency and the frontiers closed; and the Thai Government is considering the removal of other Vietnamese from this sensitive area. Not all can be moved, however, for fear of stimulating open rebellion. The Viet Minh dagger is at Thailand's throat.

Viet Minh forces, after racing to the Mekong River this spring, swung south and invaded the Kingdom of Cambodia. The Geneva agreements call for the withdrawal of Viet Minh forces from Cambodia, and that country's representatives at Geneva successfully resisted Red demands for an enclave in their country. Nevertheless, young King Norodom, who has won important concessions from the French in his dramatic effort to gain complete independence for his country, is faced with grave problems. Several thousand "Free Cambodian" guerrillas remain in northern, western and southwestern Cambodia; in sizeable areas the population has been under Communist influence and control for several years. As in the Kingdom of Laos, agents of the Viet Minh are exceedingly active, particularly along Cambodia's com-

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mon frontier with Thailand, and their task has now been facilitated.

The Red tentacles grasping for the riches of Southeast Asia are not only clutching at the eastern frontiers of Thailand. Within the steaming green jungles of Malaya lying along the southern frontiers of Thailand, Chinese Communist guerrillas raid from well-concealed camps. These are shadowy bands operating in small groups, who have for the past four years made use of two sparsely inhabited areas of Thai territory known respectively as Betong and Sadao. They contain large rubber plantations owned by wealthy Chinese and are worked by rubber tappers who are also Chinese. These circumstances and the fact that the plantations have long frontage on the Malaya border and are surrounded by thick jungles make them ideal for the location of hidden rest camps and bases.

Intimidation of Chinese plantation owners and rubber tappers has been fairly successful and both are subject to levies of money and supplies. Communist agents have quietly organized many of the Chinese of the southern provinces of Thailand into "Min Yuen" groups who furnish intelligence, food, collect cash and carry on political activities. The British authorities in Malaya have been disturbed about this situation for some time, having learned by bitter experience how deadly can be the stealthy operations of a few thousand Communist guerrillas. They have obtained the agreement of the Thai Government to coöperate in security measures, including the formation of joint border patrols and the exchange of intelligence. More recently, joint operations have flushed Communist camps and resulted in the killing and capture of a number of guerrillas. These coöperative efforts are likely to have increasing significance in the maintenance of greater security along the Thailand-Malaya border and in the defense of the vital Kra Isthmus, that narrow neck of land joining the rich lands of Thailand and Malaya. But the danger from the south is causing the Thai authorities much concern, the more so because the enemy is elusive and the Chinese of southern Thailand are reluctant to give information for fear of reprisals.

III

Recent developments to the north of Thailand constitute an even greater threat to the country's freedom and indeed to the whole of Southeast Asia. The Chinese Communists have formed

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a so-called "Thai Autonomous People's Government" in the southern part of the Chinese province of Yunnan in an area which borders on Burma, Thailand and Indo-China. This was the original home of the Thai people from about the seventh to the twelfth centuries. Here the Thai, who had gradually been pushed south from the Yangtze River in central China, set up their kingdom which they fiercely defended against repeated expeditions sent against them by various Chinese emperors. When the hordes of Kublai Khan swept through south China in 1250 A.D., the Thai in Yunnan were scattered and made their way into present-day Burma, Thailand and Laos.

The Thai call their homeland in southern Yunnan "Sibsongpanna." This is the area which the Chinese Communists announced on January 31, 1953, had been formed into a "Thai Autonomous People's Government." It is a fertile region of about 20,000 square kilometers producing rice, fruits and timber, and comprising the present Yunnan provincial districts of Cheli, Fuhai, Nanchiao and Chenyueh and parts of the districts of Chiangcheng, Szumao, Ningkiang and Liushun. The great Mekong River flows through it and then south to form the boundary between Thailand and Indo-China. The present population of Sibsongpanna numbers roughly 200,000 persons comprising about 45 tribes, the majority of which are of the Thai race.

The Chinese Communist announcement referred to above ran in part as follows:

> The first session of the First All-Nationality and All-Circle People's Representative Conference of the Thai Nationality Autonomous Area in Hsi-shuang-pan-na [the Chinese equivalent of the Thai term "Sibsongpanna"] in Yunnan province was held in Cheli on January 17–23. The conference formally announced the inauguration of the Thai Autonomous People's Government. Attending this meeting were 146 representatives of the Thai, Aini, Han Chinese, P'uman, Lohei, Yao and Yulo nationalities as well as Wang Lien-fang, Vice Chairman of the Committee of Nationalities Affairs of the Yunnan Provincial People's Government. The conference, exercising the power and functions of the People's Congress, elected Chao Ts'un-hsin [Thai nationality] as Chairman of the Thai Autonomous People's Government, Tao Ch'eng-tsung [Thai nationality], Tao Hsueh-lin [Thai nationality], Che Lo [Aini nationality], Lieu Yen [Chinese nationality] and Tao Yu-liang [Thai nationality] as vice chairmen, together with 31 government council members. At the meeting, Chairman Chao Ts'un-hsin [previously deputy director of the Puerh Special District Administrative Office in Yunnan province] reported on the work in Hsi-shuang-pan-na in the past three

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years. The conference passed the drafts of the Organic Regulations of the Thai Autonomous People's Government. (At the inaugural ceremony the Chairman and council members pledged that they would learn from the Han Chinese and the example of the Han Chinese cadres to guide the Thai people to help other national minorities to implement area autonomy, make concerted efforts to smash the sabotage activities of the American imperialists and special agents of Chiang Kai-shek's bandit gang and struggle to strengthen national defense of the fatherland and construct a new Hsishuang-pan-na area under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party, Chairman Mao Tse-tung and the Central People's Government.) Wan Lienfang, representing the Yunnan Provincial Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, offered greetings and emphatically pointed out that the Thai and members of Thai nationality in the People's Government should henceforth conscientiously assume responsibility to help other national minorities develop political, economic and cultural enterprises thereby further strengthening the unity of various nationalities. Finally the conference passed telegrams to pay respect to Chairman Mao Tse-tung.

This important development in an obscure part of the world escaped the attention of most Westerners at the time, but we may expect to hear a lot more about it. A careful reading of the communiqué brings out arresting facts: (1) It is obvious that the Chinese Communists have been to some trouble to bring about the establishment of this so-called "Thai Government" for reference is made to the preparatory work undertaken during the past three years; this also indicates a lack of spontaneity on the part of the Thai inhabitants of Sibsongpanna. (2) The designation of this "autonomous" government as "Thai" unquestionably indicates the existence of plans aimed at other Thai in Southeast Asia. (3) It is made abundantly clear that this new "Thai" régime derives its inspiration and direction from the Chinese Communists. There is the pledge of Chairman Chao Ts'un-hsin to learn from the "Han Chinese," to make concerted efforts to smash the "sabotage activities of the American imperialists" and to strengthen the new Sibsongpanna area under the leadership of Mao Tse-tung and the Chinese Communist Party. In conjunction with this forecast of Communist plans for further expansion in Southeast Asia, Communist insistence at Geneva upon the retention of an area in Laos which directly adjoins the eastern frontier of Sibsongpanna is of great significance. I expect we shall presently see this area linked up with if not absorbed by the bogus "Thai" régime in southern Yunnan.

The Viet Minh are being used as the instrument of penetration in Indo-China, the Burmese in Burma, the Chinese in Ma-

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laya. The "Thai Autonomous People's Government" has been created, I believe, to facilitate expansion into Thailand and Laos. The Communists realize that there are about 15,000,000 Thai in present-day Thailand and an additional 2,000,000 to 2,500,000 persons of the Thai race partly in the Kingdom of Laos, partly in the Thai territory of northwestern Indo-China where the now famous little village of Dien Bien Phu is located, and also in the Shan states of northern Burma. Not only do these Thai constitute a sizeable percentage of the total population of Southeast Asia, but, even more importantly from the Communist point of view, they live in four different countries, namely Thailand, Burma, Laos and Vietnam. Furthermore, the "Thai" creation in Yunnan borders on three of these countries and is very close to Thailand. Therefore, from the relatively safe and secure sanctuary of Yunnan province in southern China, and from the enclave in northeastern Laos won at the conference table in Geneva, it is possible for the Communists to operate directly into all those contiguous countries.

IV

Will the Communists succeed in winning over the Thai of Southeast Asia by this new stratagem? I know from close association with Thai Government and other leaders that the creation by the Chinese Communists of this bogus "Thai" régime in Yunnan has seriously disturbed them. They have no doubt that it is a calculated move not only to foster a rival Thai state, but also to seduce the Thai of Thailand and adjoining areas. They believe that former Prime Minister Pridi Panomyong is closely associated with this régime and have noted with concern his recent fulminations over the Peking radio calling upon the Thai people to overthrow the Government and drive out the "American imperialists." They feel Sibsongpanna will be the focal point to which disaffected and pro-Communist Thai within Thailand will gravitate, and from which agents will be sent on missions of propaganda and intrigue. In fact, these activities have already commenced. Here is a shrewd move to enmesh the Thai of Thailand, through the undeniably attractive concept of a mighty federation of Thai peoples in Southeast Asia. The Prime Minister of Thailand said recently that the "Free Thai" movement in Yunnan has aggressive objectives. These developments indicate that the coils are being tightened around Thailand.

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It was in 1926 that Ho Chi Minh established the first small underground Communist group in Thailand. He had been working in Canton with the Soviet General "Borodin" but was forced to flee and took refuge in Bangkok. From this vantage point he carried on secret activities against the French in Indo-China. This Communist cell was originally composed almost entirely of Vietnamese and Chinese, with Thai students and laborers used as "fronts" for occasional demonstrations against the monarchy; it was useful for the conduct of activities not only in Indo-China, Malaya, Burma, but to some extent in Indonesia.

The majority of the group of young Thai military and civilians who carried out the coup d'état which resulted in the overthrow of the absolute monarchy in 1932 had a strong aversion to Communism, which they felt was inimical to the Thai love of freedom. Legislation was therefore passed in 1933 proscribing Communist activities. This remained the law of the land until November 1946, when, in order to gain admission into the United Nations, the Thai Government was quietly forced to repeal it as the price of averting a Soviet veto in the Security Council.

It was after this that the Communists began to emerge from the underground, slowly and cautiously at first, but in 1950 with a bold propaganda campaign extolling the successes of the Chinese Communists and heralding a new era for all Chinese in Southeast Asia. They promised that the "mighty liberation army" of Red China would support them. The propaganda followed a straight Peking-Moscow line, including much vilification of the United States. The campaign is waged with money and blackmail, and has met with some success. Chinese private schools are also a focus of the effort and many Chinese students are being induced to take ship for Communist China for further training; it is reasonable to suppose that some are being infiltrated back into Thailand where their knowledge of the Thai language will make them especially useful. Chinese laborers in the rice mills, sawmills and other factories have been organized, and a number of Chinese trade guilds brought under Communist control. The Chinese Chamber of Commerce at Bangkok, the largest and most powerful Chinese association in Thailand, and other Chinese organizations, have been penetrated. I would say from my knowledge of the Chinese community that the majority are "fence sitters" with a residue of loyal supporters of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. But there is no denying that the numer-

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ous Chinese of Thailand constitute a potential fifth column of serious proportions.

However, within the past two years there have been numerous indications that the Communists are now giving more attention to the subversion of the Thai people than of the Chinese in Thailand—a prerequisite of a successful attempt to overthrow the government. Some success has attended their efforts to influence the news policies of a number of well-known publications in the Thai language, and students in some schools and colleges are being taken in by the Red patter. The Communists in Thailand of course played up the "Stockholm peace appeal," and endeavored to link it with the humanitarian concepts of Buddhism, the predominant religion of the country. This campaign reached crescendo just prior to the much-publicized "peace conference" at Peking in 1952. A number of Thai, well-known in literary and parliamentary circles, not only wrote voluminously about peace but also presided at several public meetings master-minded by the Communists; resolutions were passed and Thai delegates were selected to attend the conference. The Government became seriously concerned and declared that any Thai leaving the country for Communist China would lose his citizenship; nevertheless, a few slipped out and joined the little group of Thai already in Peking.

Of even greater concern to Prime Minister Pibul's Government was the discovery that espionage activities were being carried on by some of the junior officers of the Thai armed forces. The diaries kept by some of these officers (for some unknown reason it seems that all good Communists keep diaries) revealed not only that maps and information concerning military installations were being sold to the Soviet Legation at Bangkok, but also that plans were afoot to depose the King, overthrow the government and to set up a "people's government," with the help of "liberation" forces from within and without. The Thai authorities took action. On November 10, 1952, several hundred Chinese and Thai Communist suspects were rounded up, and the Parliament passed a stiff anti-Communist law. These measures have, to some extent, upset the plans of the Communists, but Thai leaders know that the most important agents remain at large and that efforts at subversion will continue. On June 21 of this year, Prime Minister Pibul said the government was seeking to prevent further infiltration by closing all frontiers, watching all

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known Communists—totalling "tens of thousands," most of them being Chinese—prosecuting Reds whose activities become dangerous or deporting them if firm evidence is lacking, and removing any economic attraction to Communism by improving living conditions and the general welfare.

There is no doubt that the Thai people and the present Government are anti-Communist. While the people have little knowledge of Communist doctrine, they realize that an alien attempt is being made to seize their country and destroy their freedom. The present government understands clearly that defensive strength is needed to keep Thailand free. I have had many frank and friendly talks with government leaders concerning the urgency of the danger and the need for defensive strength, and in 1950 appropriate agreements were signed for the extension of both economic and military aid to Thailand by the United States. The first shipment of military equipment was delivered in January 1951. Now that Americans are beginning to realize the importance of Thailand in the defense of Southeast Asia, the Thai Government's repeated requests for a further increase in military aid have met a favorable response. This is good, but it is needed at once; because of our preoccupation with Indo-China, assistance has heretofore been delivered all too slowly. It has, however, been of benefit to Thailand; her economy has been strengthened and a small but well-equipped fighting force is being created. I believe it will give just as good an account of itself, if the dark hour comes, as did Thai troops in Korea.

The Thai people are our best friends in South Asia today. When our Government called in April of this year for "united action" to halt the further march of Communist aggression, Thailand was the only country that responded immediately and without reservation. Our good friends are now in danger. Developments at Geneva have heightened rather than diminished their fears. On June 3, 1954, the Thai Government appealed to the Security Council to send observers to Thailand to watch and report on the worsening situation, hoping that such action by the United Nations might be a deterrent to further aggression. At that time, Thailand's Ambassador to the United States, Pote Sarasin, stated that recent events had made it clear that the Viet Minh have the intention of overthrowing the legal governments of Laos and Cambodia. That this is so can scarcely be doubted. The Soviet delegate vetoed Thailand's request.

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v

Let us not forget that Indo-China is not the final Communist objective. There was much talk of peace at Geneva by Messrs. Molotov and Chou En-lai, for they know that the peoples of Asia want peace. All good Communists insist that they want peace, too —but it is always at their own price. The armistice in Indo-China means only a cessation of military operations. Communist political activity will be facilitated by it, since cells remain in all areas occupied by the Viet Minh before the Geneva agreements, and the cease fire will make possible the penetration into districts now in the hands of the French and Vietnamese.

What are the possibilities of saving the rest of Southeast Asia? A defensive alliance supported by an adequate defensive system is a common sense approach to the situation, but realization of this goal presents complex and delicate problems. Secretary Dulles has said that the formation of a Southeast Asian alliance may take a year. Aside from the reluctance of the British and the French to proceed rapidly to the construction of such an alliance, the Asian countries, with the exception of Thailand and the Philippines, prefer the neutralist response to the threat of Communist expansion. Nevertheless, I believe it is of the utmost importance that we should with tact and with understanding of their point of view endeavor to convince them that this restless, pushing Communist force can be held at bay only if the nations that have the same basic ideals regarding liberty and human rights join in firm determination to defend and preserve those ideals.

Such a defensive system for Southeast Asia can best function if it is based on Thailand, which is wholly free from the taint of colonialism. Thailand's assent to that is, of course, absolutely essential; and it is equally necessary for the United States and the members of any Southeast Asian alliance that may be formed to undertake to defend Thailand. Thailand would rightly expect such a guarantee. Prime Minister Pibul has in the past often told me of his hope that a strong and effective Southeast Asian Alliance might be formed under United Nations auspices and with the United States an active participant. On June 21 of this year he stated that Thailand would welcome free world troops on her territory if they were needed to fight Communist aggression against Thailand; and he noted that such action would be simi-

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lar to the United Nations' military effort in Korea. He declared that his country would be willing to coöperate in any democratic action to stem the Communist tide, and added that Thailand is willing to join the proposed Southeast Asian defense organization.

Perhaps it is not an accident that our best friends in South Asia are also the people of the oldest sovereign and independent country in the region. They wish their country to be a bastion of freedom in Southeast Asia, and I believe are prepared to fight to preserve it. Their armed forces, plus an effective police force, total more than 100,000 men, and are being augmented through a system of military service which has been in effect many years. The United States is training and equipping these forces, and their military capabilities are steadily increasing. There is no doubt of the bravery and stamina of the Thai soldier. If Thailand's freedom and independence can be preserved, the heart and much of the body of Southeast Asia will have been saved.

At this moment that is so fateful for the future of Southeast Asia and the whole free world, we should, I feel, help build up the defensive strength of Thailand as rapidly as possible. Equally important is the formation of an effective Southeast Asian Alliance, preferably under United Nations auspices. Finally, I feel we need to make a fresh, new effort to prove to our friends in the countries of South Asia that the United States is in fact their good friend; is in fact strongly opposed to colonialism; is in fact doing much to further the cause of independence in those countries not yet free from the vestiges of colonialism; is in fact helping and is prepared to continue to help in improving standards of living and the welfare of their people. We might well endeavor to give new life to Emerson's wise proverb that "The only way to have a friend is to be one."

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HO CHI MINH: DISCIPLINED COMMUNIST

By Ruth Fischer

AMONG the present generation of Communist leaders, so decimated by the Stalinist purge, Ho Chi Minh is one of the rare survivors of the Leninist International which he joined as an ardent nationalistic revolutionary. In our time, many Communist leaders are progressing in the other direction, going from doctrinaire Communism to their kind of National-Communism, a process of which, for the time being, Tito is still the most striking example. I met Ho Chi Minh, then called Nguyen Ai-Quoc, quite often in Moscow in the early twenties. He became popular quickly in Comintern circles with his pleasant, almost timid manners. But it was Ho Chi Minh's nationalism which impressed us European Communists born and bred in a rather gray kind of abstract internationalism.

Ho Chi Minh was born on July 15, 1892 (there is still some discussion about the exact date of his birth), in the village of Kimlien in Annam. His father, Nguyen-Sinh-Huy, was a poor gentleman well-versed in the four books of Confucius, a studious, pious man, but an implacable enemy of French colonial rule and an active participant in the Resistance of Annam, a country riddled with secret societies all plotting, preparing and attempting an uprising against the French. Nguyen-Sinh-Huy named his third child, a son, born in these years of distress, Nguyen Ta't-Thanh. Nguyen, the family name, means "one who lives in the plains" or simply, a peasant; the given name, Ta't-Thanh, can be translated as "a man who will be victorious."

Young Ho received the best education available at that time and in that place, but he left his native Annam and its schools early; his impressive personal culture was enriched later by self-education. In leaving Annam, he was driven by an obsession current among Asian revolutionaries of this period: to seek help abroad among the young anti-colonial nations against the old colonial Powers. M. N. Roy, for instance, a founder member of the Indian Communist Party who later turned against the Stalinist régime, tells us in his autobiography how he left his native Calcutta during the First World War in the hope of getting arms for the Indian revolution from Germany. Roy never got the arms,

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but he wandered about, to land finally at the headquarters of the Communist International in Moscow. Likewise Ho Chi Minh wandered about without finding the help he sought, finally landing in Paris. There he was reduced to earning his living by menial jobs: gardener's helper, laundry man, cook and even as a cook's boy. Most Indo-Chinese were members of secret societies in the home country; Ho of course entered such an organization and may have then chosen his alias, Nguyen Ai-Quoc, which can be translated as Nguyen the Patriot, a name later to become so popular in Comintern circles.

Ho Chi Minh studied French literature, philosophy, and of course Socialist theories; he was attracted by the Syndicalist group around Pierre Monatte, Merrheim and Bourderon, the left radicals with whom Lenin first came in contact from Switzerland. About that time, Ho entered the French Socialist Party, and became acquainted with Alfred Rosmer, Boris Souvarine, Jean Loriot; Jean Longuet, Karl Marx's grandson, invited him to write articles for the Socialist daily, *Le Populaire*. There are still many Socialists in Paris who remember Ho Chi Minh as a short man of slight build with an ascetic face illuminated by tender and intelligent eyes. One still knows the address of the place where he tried to earn a living with a photo studio, the Socialist clubs he joined, the book shops to which he went to sell the theses of the Baku Congress of the Peoples of the East, freshly arrived from Moscow. Thus in 1920 when he joined the Third Communist International at the Socialist Congress of Tours he had already won some experience in the European Socialist movement. In these years he became a close collaborator with some international Communist youth leaders, the Serbian Vuyo Vuyovich, the German Schüller and the Russian Shatzkin (all of whom were liquidated in the thirties).

The newly-founded Communist International was torn apart by the conflict between its local branches and the Moscow Executive Committee which was attempting to control the entire European Communist movement from one desk in the chairman's building in the Kremlin. One group after another rebelled against Moscow's numerous interventions in their parties' affairs; Ho Chi Minh watched these oppositions from the wings, often sympathizing with the anti-Moscow Communists but never joining in these factional feuds. His main interest was then, as it is today, the fight for the independence of his own country.

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Ho Chi Minh went to Moscow for the first time in 1922 to attend the Fourth World Congress of the Communist International and became one of the most energetic organizers of its Southeast Asia bureau. In this capacity he had to cöordinate his efforts with those of the French Communist Party of which Indo-Chinese, Algerian and other anti-colonial groups were still subdivisions.

In 1925, Ho published together with the Algerian Communist, Messali Hadj, an anti-colonial magazine entitled *Le Paria.* This was the publication of the united anti-French resistance of Algeria, Morocco and Indo-China. An Indo-Chinese team organized and led by Ho Chi Minh contributed a collectively written article and signed it with a pen name: Nguyen O-Pháp. Jacques Doriot, the French Communist in charge of underground work in the colonies at that time, inquired what this pen name meant and learned to his surprise that it meant "the peasant who hates France." At Doriot's request articles were henceforth signed "Nguyen Ai-Quoc," a less aggressive expression of Indo-Chinese nationalism.

Michael Borodin, the Soviet advisor to the Kuomintang, took the promising Indo-Chinese revolutionary with him to China. Thus Ho Chi Minh had occasion to observe from the highest level the collaboration between the Stalinist Politburo and Chiang Kai-shek, as well as how and why this collaboration fell apart and changed into bitter enmity between the Chinese and the Russian dictators. He returned from Canton to Moscow with a considerably enlarged insight into the complex problems of Asian national revolution; he became the favorite advisor of the Comintern leaders, Zinoviev, Bukharin, Radek and Trotsky, who recognized his exceptional talents. However, like most other Asian Communists, he did not participate in the party fight which ruptured the Russian Communist hierarchy in the twenties and thus he could make the transition from Zinoviev and Bukharin to Stalin without great difficulty.

During the first spectacular advances of Chinese Communism, Moscow became the rallying point of many Asian revolutionaries; they came for help, for money, for passports, for military training and political schooling. Ho quietly and efficiently organized the schooling and training of his own Indo-Chinese cadres, and among his present collaborators there are still some who worked together with him then at Sun Yat-sen University.

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Ho Chi Minh advanced rapidly in the Southeast Asian bureau of the Communist International. However, after the Communist débâcle in Canton in 1927, the nascent Asian Communist Parties entered their most critical period; thus it was only in 1930 that Ho was able to fuse various Communist groups into an Indo-Chinese Communist Party. It was formed by many local branches of various anti-colonial associations (Thanh-Nien, Association of the Young Annamites, for example) and from prisoner groups detained in various camps of which Poulo-Condore on Condor Island, situated some 300 miles off Saigon, is the best known. Many secret societies, considering their methods of fighting the French as outworn, changed their names and entered the Party sometimes to a man. Ho could operate in a wider range than before, from Moscow, Paris or Berlin, but also frequently nearer home, from Bangkok or Rangoon, from Singapore or the Chinese border. The new Party, the Dong-Duong-Cong-San-Dang, was now recognized as definitely separated from the French Party, an autonomous branch of the Communist International.

It is perhaps necessary to repeat that the Japanese invasion of Manchuria must be considered one of the turning points in the history of Asian Communism. After 1931, when American foreign policy sought to restrain Japanese aggression, Asian Communists welcomed the growing tension between Washington and Tokyo as opportune for the pursuit of their own policies. That war between the United States and Japan was inevitable had been one of the major theses of the Comintern. The Manchurian incident seemed to vindicate the Comintern's prognostication and Asian Communists endeavored to adapt their strategy with an eye to the forthcoming conflict. For the time being, the United States became the desired ally of many Asian Communist Parties because they hoped to be able to combine their own struggle against the old colonial rule with America's fight against Japan's new colonialism. Evidently the international situation became even more propitious for such Communist policy in Asia when, after Hitler's arrival in power, the United States and the Soviet Union began to converge their policies against Nazi Germany in Europe.

While mentioning this major factor in the growth of Asian Communism, I must, however, note some important differences. Undoubtedly, the Chinese Communists got a decisive stimulus

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from the American-Japanese conflict. In India the situation was somewhat different because there Britain, not Germany or Japan, was the main enemy. In Indo-China matters became quite confused because Japan threatened China and hence Indo-China; there was therefore a similarity of interest between Ho Chi Minh and Roosevelt (though Roosevelt probably did not even know of his existence). On the other end of the Communist axis, however, the new coöperation between Moscow and Paris suddenly transformed Indo-China's hereditary enemy, France, into an anti-Fascist friend and ally. Thus while Mao's party could skillfully manœuvre between the conflicting forces in the Pacific and weather the dangerous blows dealt it by Chiang Kai-shek, Ho Chi Minh's party was marking time, and its progress, despite local successes, could in no way be compared to that of the Chinese Communists. Evidently Stalin was more interested in cooperation with the Paris Government against Nazi Germany than with the liberation of Indo-China from French colonial domination.

Ho had a hard time bringing his organization safely through that French phase of the Comintern and the Trotskyites made inroads in his Party.[1] Many leading Communists who disagreed with Trotsky's theory of permanent revolution and distrusted his activities in exile nevertheless trembled with disgust and fear when Stalin persecuted anyone who at one time or other had been in contact with Trotsky or Bukharin as being guilty by association. To break away from the Stalin Politburo, as Trotsky, in exile, demanded, was of course impracticable because the Communist leaders could not renounce the material support which only Moscow could give them nor could they keep their ranks together without the myth of monolithic Communism. But Trotsky's criticism of the Stalin régime found attentive ears in many officially loyal Communist quarters.

The hour of opportunity struck for Ho only after Pearl Harbor. In the fall of 1941 Vichy had concluded a pact of mutual tolerance with Tokyo which granted the Japanese army free movement through certain Indo-Chinese ports and roads and permitted, in exchange, the local French administration to function. Ho could now develop fully his talents for conspiracy and

[1] It is, by the way, interesting to record that the Communist parties of Tunisia, Morocco and Algeria were in similar difficulties after 1934, but there the pro-French attitude of the Communist International resulted mainly in strengthening the non-Communist nationalist organizations.

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diplomacy: he got in contact with Chiang Kai-shek in Chungking, with the British intelligence and the O.S.S. operating in the Pacific area. Ho Chi Minh got very little, if any, material assistance either from the Chinese, the British or the Americans, but he gained political prestige among his co-nationals by becoming, in a way, the ally of the Allies. He adapted his organization to the new setting: the Communist Party faded into the background and in its place arose a Popular Front which succeeded in drawing in many nationalistic groups springing up throughout Indo-China. In 1942, the League of Revolutionary Organizations of Vietnam was founded: *Viet*-Nam-Doc-Lap-Dong-*Minh*-Hoi, or Viet Minh for short.

During the four years of Japanese occupation Indo-China lived in a twilight most favorable for Ho Chi Minh's political acumen. The Japanese were interested in Indo-China mainly as a gate to China; they did not persecute too energetically the anti-French Indo-Chinese groups, Communists included. The French administration, functioning under Japanese jurisdiction, became of course quite insecure in its handling of Indo-Chinese nationalists and Communists. Ho could plant his men in the French as well as the Japanese camp and the Viet Minh agents moved quite freely throughout the country, being the only group in which the native population had confidence. This peculiar balance of conflicting forces was suddenly broken when the Japanese command, probably somewhat out of touch with Tokyo, decided (in March 1945) to seize Hanoi and liquidate the local French administration. Many French changed sides at this time and those who had collaborated with the Japanese for years went into the Maquis, partly to save themselves from Japanese persecution and partly to have a good record for the new De Gaulle government in Paris. Thus for a short time, until August 1945, Ho Chi Minh and the French fought together in an anti-Japanese Resistance.

In these last months of the war, however, Japanese persecution in Indo-China was brutal and many nationalist leaders were forced to take refuge on Chinese territory. The Japanese command proclaimed Bao Dai chief of an independent Indo-Chinese state and he in turn declared the treaty with France null and void; the political situation was so confused that Paris feared Indo-China might declare itself independent under Bao Dai even after the forthcoming defeat of the Japanese. On the other hand,

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Chiang Kai-shek did not want to lose the opportunity which that coming defeat of Japan seemed to offer; he hoped to draw north Indo-China into his future zones of influence. Under Chiang Kai-shek's protection a United Congress of Indo-Chinese took place in Kunming; Ho was among the delegates and he won the day because his men were about the only ones who could still operate underground in Japanese-occupied territory. A small strip on the Sino-Indo-Chinese border was cleared of Japanese troops and in this enclave Ho Chi Minh set up the nucleus of his future Communist state.

In this troubled and delicate situation De Gaulle appointed (April 1945) Jean Sainteny[2] as Commander of a French politico-military mission with the task of watching over French interests against Chinese aspirations. It is perhaps useful to recall today how Ho Chi Minh, the leader of a small underground Communist state, and Sainteny, commander of a weak French military mission, joined hands against Chiang Kai-shek. In order to facilitate Sainteny's task and to obscure his Communist past, Ho changed his name again and called himself from this time on Ho Chi Minh, "the man who attains perfect enlightenment."[3]

The following months seemed to confirm Sainteny's fears that France might be eliminated altogether from Indo-China. At the Potsdam Conference the Allies decided, for military reasons, to divide Indo-China into two theaters of operation along the 16th parallel. In Paris, however, these military demarcation lines must have looked like the first step towards the annexation of north Indo-China by Chiang Kai-shek, perhaps with Bao Dai shifting his loyalty from Japan to China. And indeed, five days after Japan's capitulation (August 20) Bao Dai sent a melodramatic message to De Gaulle demanding complete independence for Indo-China. A few days later, however, due to joint Communist and French pressure, Bao Dai was forced to abdicate, the Red flag was hoisted over the imperial palace and Ho Chi Minh was declared president of the Republic of Vietnam.

On March 6, 1946, the French recognized the democratic Republic of Vietnam by a convention in which Indo-China was

[2] *Cf.*, "Histoire d'une Paix Manquée; Indochine 1945–1947," by Jean Sainteny. Paris: Amiot-Dumont, 1953. (Sainteny, by the way, is an alias adopted as a cover and later assumed as a definite name.) On August 8, 1954, Jean Sainteny was appointed general delegate of the French Republic to North Vietnam.

[3] "Ho" means "barbarian" in Chinese. Many Indo-Chinese took that name as a symbol of their resistance against Chinese imperialism.

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considered a free state with its own government, parliament and army, but at the same time, an indissoluble part of the Indo-Chinese Federation to be created and of the French Union. In exchange, Ho declared he wanted the French army to reënter Indo-China to relieve the Chinese troops which had entered Indo-China in pursuit of the Japanese army.

Ho Chi Minh, recognized by the French Government, became for a time the legal head of the Republic of Vietnam, but he ruled a country thoroughly disorganized and confused, a checkerboard of withdrawing Japanese and advancing Chinese troops, of regrouping French Expeditionary Corps, British and American military missions and a medley of Indo-Chinese loose political associations. In such a chaotic situation, Ho was unable to prevent many local rebellions against the returning French administration. Moreover, a sizeable group in Ho's party was seriously discontent with his compromise with the "Parisians" notwithstanding the fact that Thorez at that time was a member of De Gaulle's Cabinet. The nationalist extremists wanted a definite secession from France, the organization of a peasants' army on the Chinese Communist pattern and the establishment of Soviets throughout the peninsula. Again Ho acted as moderator among the conflicting factions. But he found himself caught in the middle at the Conference of Fontainebleau (July 1946) when his policy was challenged by French nationalist extremists as well as by his own ultra-leftists. French extremists played with the idea of setting up a separate state of Cochin China; to the majority of the Viet Minh delegation this was of course nothing but the beginning of a plan of partition. The Conference, instead of working out a viable compromise between the Viet Minh and French governments, became the first phase of the Eight Years War in Indo-China.

The collapse of the Fontainebleau Conference seemed to justify the viewpoint of the extremists in Ho Chi Minh's party that the French military wanted to reoccupy Indo-China and bring it back into the former colonial status. At this time India, Indonesia, Burma and the Philippines won their independence. In Indo-China, however, the French Expeditionary Corps continued to behave according to its tradition that Indo-China was to be governed from Paris. The numerous declarations that Indo-China would be granted complete independence became a tragicomical ritual.

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Ho Chi Minh had suffered a terrible blow: from being the recognized chief of a state, he became again the underground leader of a large but dispersed guerrilla army which was driven from the industrial strongpoints into the jungle. General Vo Nguyen Giap, a man who combined brilliant military talents with long experience in party politics, came to the fore; he was surrounded by a team of able and dedicated young men who were convinced that Vietnam could win its freedom only by proclaiming total mobilization of the Indo-Chinese after the pattern of the Chinese revolution. Ho could not but accept that policy, although he might have known better than anyone in his entourage that "total mobilization" and "democracy" are incompatible forms of social organization.

The Viet Minh's policy of total mobilization met with considerable success in many parts of Indo-China. Many nationalists who had wavered during the intermediate years now chose the Viet Minh as the only effective representation of the national movement for independence. The Viet Minh organized a network of branches and sub-branches cutting horizontally and vertically through the Indo-Chinese body politic, on lines of the party, the popular front and the military. A good deal of voluntary coöperation on the part of the native population was found by the Viet Minh, but there was also considerable coercion in case of opposition.

It may be safely assumed that until 1950 Ho's guerrilla army got little if any help either from Moscow or Peking; his partisans were poorly fed and housed and ill-provided with medical and other facilities and, of course, in the early period, badly armed. The discontent of the Indo-Chinese Communists at being thus abandoned was quite well known inside international Communist circles. Thus when Jugoslavia broke away from Moscow the Belgrade rebels hoped for a moment that the Indo-Chinese Communists would join them in their move and proclaim their independence from the Cominform. Ho kept his men in line.

The Viet Minh carried out the policy of total mobilization with such force and penetrated so deeply into French-controlled territory that Indo-China has become one of the most interesting samples of how an underground state can supersede the legal administration of its enemy. At the same time, Ho Chi Minh tried time and again to make new contact with Paris to end the civil war with a negotiated peace.

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The French Government could not make up its mind whether to negotiate with Ho or whether to grant Bao Dai full independence. It wavered between various plans for military offensives which did not succeed. It accepted substantial financial assistance from the United States without permitting the United Nations to intervene. The Geneva Conference was the result of these grave mistakes. There, however, the French got a much better deal than they could expect in view of their seriously compromised military situation. It is by no means a secret that the Viet Minh delegation in Geneva was bitterly disappointed with the final armistice settlement. In their estimate Chou En-lai made too great concessions to France because he himself was under pressure from Nehru, who feared that the Indo-Chinese civil war could degenerate into an extended war in Southeast Asia. To most of the Viet Minh delegates the threat of internationalizing the war was bluff. These Viet Minh extremists are not likely to forget that General Giap was deprived of the fruits of victory and could not make his triumphal entry into Saigon similar to that of Mao into Peking. They fear that the partition of the Indo-Chinese states may become permanent and they also fear the difficulties increased by that partition in their part of Indo-China. The northern provinces have of course suffered considerably more from the war than the south. In the atmosphere of uncertainty about the future Indo-Chinese states, projects of industrialization necessarily must remain vague or the Communists must be resigned to building a much smaller Vietnam state than they had hoped to get under their control. Furthermore, the Viet Minh do not expect substantial assistance from Peking because for the time being China is too involved in her own economic difficulties; on the other hand, Moscow's interest in Indo-China is only marginal, in contrast to its interests in North Korea, a country situated on a crucial strategical point. The Viet Minh of course hope that a strong drive towards national unity will override the fears of Communism among many of their co-nationals; however, they realize that the West might be able to raise the living standard in south Indo-China quickly and efficiently and that if so economic interests may prove to be stronger than sentiments of national solidarity.

Again Ho has a formidable task before him. He has called repeatedly for the loyal implementation of the Geneva accords; these appeals are destined as much for his own followers as for

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his Western counterparts. In the end, Ho's moderation will win the day as it has so often won out against the opposition of his extremists, because the Democratic Republic of Vietnam is not strong enough to change the policy in Peking or Moscow.

However, Ho Chi Minh's submission to the strategy of the Moscow-Peking axis which needed that compromise with France may not be the end of his own political story. Ho is of course a veteran Communist; he will of course head a party state striving for the maximum industrialization and finally for collectivization of agriculture. One can even describe Ho as the model of the disciplined Communist; he has proved time and again his profound loyalty to Communism. However, his subordination to Moscow's authority stemmed as much from a sober evaluation of his political alternatives (which in the past was practically none) as from his Marxist convictions. After Geneva, his status is considerably elevated; he will now take his seat in the highest councils of the Communist hierarchy, regardless of where the frontiers of the Indo-Chinese state are definitely established. Will he be nothing more than an echo to Chou En-lai or Molotov? In the answer to this question lies much of the answer to the future of Southeast Asia.

In attempting to assess Ho Chi Minh's future political orientation one should avoid by all means the comfortable cliché of calling him a potential Asian Tito. Tito's was a case in itself, a product of Zhdanov's and Beria's kind of cold warfare. This team drove Tito into the Western camp, but Malenkov is not likely to repeat the errors of his predecessors. Moreover, Tito is the head of a Balkan state, situated at the crossroads of the two worlds, aspiring to affiliate itself with the West. Ho Chi Minh will not secede from the Moscow-Peking empire to become a camp follower of the Western World. His political reorientation may lie in quite another direction—in carefully planned, slow moves to align the Democratic Republic of Vietnam rather towards the group of non-committed Asian states, towards India, Indonesia, Burma and Ceylon. Furthermore, it is by no means a simple propaganda trick that Ho has continually repeated his proposal to make Vietnam part of the French Union, in the image of the British Commonwealth. He is not anti-French in the style of many Arab nationalists whose own culture and traditions are alien to France. To enter the French Union may give Vietnam a measure of independence from Moscow and Peking

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which Ho, a man with so much experience with changing political fronts, has certainly not overlooked.

Among the people of Indo-China there has always been a strong anti-Chinese current. Like many other border peoples the Indo-Chinese fear being assimilated by a powerful neighbor. To conserve their national integrity, Marxists or no Marxists, the Indo-Chinese have to set themselves apart. And among the many brands of Asian nationalism, the Indo-Chinese kind is certainly one of the most vigorous.

At the Geneva Conference and after, Chou En-lai has proclaimed the doctrine of Asianism. The logical implementation of such a doctrine would be the United States of Asia. Such a grandiose power combination, however, is not likely to be realized in our generation or even in our century. However, the Chinese Communist régime seems to steer in this direction. On that road there are some formidable blocks for which the West can hardly be blamed. Asia is divided into too many authentic sub-continents to be easily coördinated. India is one of the most important counterweights to the growing power of Communist China and so, in any case, will be Japan. The smaller Southeast Asian nations will have to seek their appropriate status in between. Ho Chi Minh has the stature, the political experience and perhaps the wisdom to become the inspirer of such a movement of independents in Southeast Asia.

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FIVE YEARS OF COMMUNIST RULE IN CHINA

By C. M. Chang

FIVE years have now passed since the proclamation of the "People's Republic of China" on October 1, 1949. What have these years meant to the 500,000,000 people who live on the mainland of China? Are the impoverished peasant masses any better off than before? Have the new rulers been more successful in solving China's fundamental problems than their predecessors? If the people are dissatisfied with the Communist régime will they or can they rise in revolt as they have done in the past? How strong is the Moscow-Peking axis, viewed from the angle of political, economic and ideological relations?

These are important questions. Let us try to answer them in the light of the information at hand, both from Communist and non-Communist sources.

II

When the Communists first came to power China was devastated, hungry and sick. There was a serious shortage of trained personnel, particularly of men experienced in the administration of cities and of technical personnel. To make up for this deficiency, the new rulers had to secure the coöperation of administrators and technicians left behind by the Nationalist régime. The "People's Government," in accordance with Mao Tse-tung's "New Democracy," is "a united front of the four classes—workers, peasants, petty bourgeoisie and national bourgeoisie." Accordingly, prominent non-Communists and Kuomintang turncoats were given high if nominal places in the "Central People's Government." These "democratic personages," as such men are euphemistically called, were invariably seen at Mao's side on ceremonial occasions and at parades. Lesser figures were made members of the Regional and Provincial Governments. The surface appearance of coalition is being kept up to this day. No one doubts that the real power is vested in a handful of top Communist leaders dominated by Mao Tse-tung.

In the cities, in the first months of their power, the Communists carried out a calculated policy of moderation. They were at pains to show that their government, if not of the people and by

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the people, was at least for the people. Communists were exemplary in behavior. They acted like a body of selfless and truly dedicated men who accepted with great cheerfulness long hours of work and study and a standard of food, clothing and working conditions even lower than that of the general population. Courteous and friendly, they had nothing of the arrogance and inflated self-importance commonly associated with conquerors, which they were. Everything seemed to augur well for a long spell of political mildness. Many observers were led to believe that a humanistic future awaited the Chinese people, who would be spared the harshness of the Soviet régime in Russia.

This was of course wishful thinking. Those who had taken the trouble of looking into the actual conditions in Communist-held areas in the Kiangsi or Yenan days knew that Mao Tse-tung and his cohorts were not given to "bourgeois" softness. A close reader of the official statements would have discovered that the "People's Republic," like its Soviet prototype, is built on violence and force, made worse by the pretense of democracy.

The Communists were in fact not mild. If they had appeared so to the people in Shanghai, Tientsin or Peking, it was because the city dwellers had expected a reign of terror or at least a period of repression marked by arrests and executions to accompany the take-over. When this did not immediately happen, they felt a sense of sudden relief. They were apt to regard everything the Communists did as mild. The Communist propaganda exploited this state of mind by constantly reminding the people that they were both happy and free. The people, for a short time, believed it, so much so indeed that many a banker or industrialist who had fled the country at the time of the "liberation" was lured back.

In rural areas, however, a different state of affairs prevailed. Here, unlike the urban centers, violence was very much in evidence from the start. The "land reform" set in motion immediately after the take-over soon transformed the countryside into a pandemonium. Lands belonging to landlords and rich peasants were forcibly seized and redistributed among poor and landless peasants. Many landlords and rich peasants were put to death through mob action instigated by Communist political workers. The class war, in its most naked form, was on, mounting steadily towards its bloody climax.[1]

[1] For a more extended treatment of the Communist land reform, see an article by the writer, "Mao's Stratagem of Land Reform," in *Foreign Affairs*, July 1951.

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The Korean war provided a convenient excuse for tightening up political control and for employing brute force as an instrument of policy. The campaign for the "suppression of counter-revolutionaries" was stepped up in the latter part of 1950. It reached the proportions of a major disaster for the Chinese people in the first six months of 1951. Mass slaughter was the order of the day. It is not possible to know how many people lost their lives in this colossal blood-bath. Mark Tennien, a Catholic priest who had lived in China for a quarter of a century, estimated in 1953, on the basis of official figures, that some 7,000,000 people had been executed and some 20,000,000 imprisoned. The actual situation, according to him, may have been much worse.[2] In addition, countless landlords, rich peasants, "counter-revolutionaries" and "bandits" were sent to labor camps for "transformation through hard labor." It was reported that in 1952 seven such camps existed in various parts of China. The total number of inmates in them amounted to about 8,000,000, distributed as follows: northeast (Manchuria) 1,000,000; north China 1,700,000; southeast 300,000; central-south 600,000; eastern China 1,800,000; and Sinkiang more than 2,000,000.[3]

Lo Jui-ching, Minister of Public Safety and the man who had over-all charge of the campaign, hailed the suppression as being "unprecedented in its thoroughness, in its depths of penetration, and in its phenomenal achievements." "This," he said, "is a great victory. It has strengthened the foundation of the People's Democratic Dictatorship. It has heightened the prestige and authority of the Communist Party and the People's Government." He called for continued vigilance.[4]

At the same time the intellectual class suffered great degradation. University professors, scientists, writers, as well as old civil servants were made to recant their beliefs and convictions; to accuse themselves of sins they had probably never committed; and to expose their friends and associates. Absolution was given only at the price of the most solemn contrition, usually in writing. They had to do this over and over again before it could be accepted as satisfactory. It was always advisable to add each time some sin graver than those admitted before. Self-debase-

[2] Mark Tennien, "No Secret is Safe." New York: Farrar, Straus & Young, 1952.

[3] According to a study made by the Secretariat of the Kuomintang on the basis of figures published in the Communist press.

[4] An article written by Lo Jui-ching on the occasion of the third anniversary of the founding of the People's Republic of China.

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ment was the ransom for self-preservation. It served the purpose of the new rulers to break the spirit and destroy the self-esteem of a class of men who had enjoyed a status and exercised an influence unequalled in Chinese society.

But why did these men meekly submit to all this humiliation? Why did they so lightly forswear their past? Where were the Ma Yin-chus and the Wen I-tos who in the Kuomintang days had braved imprisonment and death in defense of academic freedom? The answer is that even martyrs must have an appreciative audience. Martyrdom is possible only when there are people to acclaim it. When the halo of martyrdom is stripped away, martyrs disappear. Under the People's Republic the air is so pervaded with fear that no one dares show sympathy for a "counter-revolutionary." It is no longer glamorous to die a hero's death.

The new régime's easy tolerance of the industrial and commercial classes came to an end with the Korean war. Exorbitant "contributions" were extracted from them in the name of patriotism. The so-called *wu-fan* or "five-anti" movement, launched in February 1952, was directed against them. This was a war on the five cardinal sins which the majority of the Chinese traders, shop-keepers, bankers and industrialists were supposed to have committed. These included bribery, stealing of government property, cheating the government, obtaining and using economic information from government sources for private speculation, and tax evasion. Every businessman, large or small, had to go through the standard routine of confession, criticism and self-criticism. Confessions thus obtained were then examined by a committee composed of government representatives and employees of the shop, factory or firm in the light of their knowledge of the person in question. Sons, wives and servants were called upon to testify. Alleged offenders were fined, imprisoned, sent to labor camps, or, in serious cases, executed. A considerable number of them committed suicide. Funds diverted to the government were estimated to have amounted to the equivalent of $2,500,000,000 in United States currency.[5] Private enterprise as such has not been wholly wiped out. But it exists only on the sufferance of the government.

[5] Various estimates exist. The present figure is based on the estimate made by Shih-yi in his "An Analysis of the Communist Economic Policy," in *National Renaissance,* Hong Kong, June 1953.

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Nor has the industrial worker—representing supposedly the leading class of the new society, the proletariat, and exercising an alleged "hegemony"—fared much better. He has been under incessant pressure to increase output. Every standard Soviet technique—"Socialist emulation," "storm attack," etc.—has been introduced to squeeze the greatest possible effort out of the worker. The 12-hour day has become the rule rather than the exception. In state-owned enterprises the working day is often lengthened to 14 and 16 hours in response, we are told, to the "demands" of the workers.[6] It is said that instead of being docile and passive, the workers are now exhibiting initiative to break production records. But this initiative has been provided far more by the political campaigns which have been carried out from time to time. Exceptionally hard workers receive a good deal of publicity. They are given special privileges, including a trip to Peking to shake the hand of Mao Tse-tung, decorations and medals, and marching at the heads of parades and demonstrations. Real wages, however, have not been increased since 1949. The régime frowns upon high wages, denouncing them as "ultra left," "unrevolutionary" and "dangerous." The workers are told to work harder and harder in order to set an example for other classes, as the leading class in a workers' state should. There is evidence of exhaustion. Sick leaves and incidents have become more frequent.

Thus, within three years of their take-over, the Communists succeeded in eliminating the landlords and rich peasants, reducing the private sector of the Chinese economy to impotence, and keeping labor in subjection. They then proceeded to bring the millions of peasants into line in order to prepare the way for "Socialist transformation."

III

The land reform program, so-called, was virtually completed by the end of 1952. As a result, China has become exclusively a country of small farmers, each owning a tiny plot of land. There are no official estimates of the sizes of the average farms in various parts of China after the land redistribution. As we know, the ratio of land to man in China was approximately one-

[6] For example, in an alcohol factory in Harbin the working day was extended to 16 hours (*People's Daily*, January 21, 1951), in state-owned Tung Kuan Construction works in Anhwei and in a general provision store in Peking to 14 hours (*Workers' Daily*, August 9, 1952).

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half acre of land per farm person. As the acreage of arable land has not increased, this ratio still stands. The land reform has not therefore solved the age-old problem of population over resources. The peasant, after redistribution, continues to live barely above the subsistence level. It is true that he no longer pays rent to the landlord. But he is not better off on that account. The village Communist leader, who has replaced the landlord, is a much harder man to deal with. In the old days the peasant could always ask for postponement in the payment of rents or even outright remission if the harvest had been bad. Now taxes, in kind rather than in cash, must be paid punctually and with no excuses. There is no evidence that, after taxes, his real income has increased. With all the special contributions and drives, he may find his lot considerably worsened.

The redistribution of land is but the initial step. The eventual goal is full collectivization. For, in the Communist view, only a collectivized agriculture can provide the growing population with food and the planned industrial development with capital.

Hand in hand with land redistribution, the Communists established during the 1949–1952 period hundreds of state farms modelled upon the Russian *kolkhoz*. The larger ones are found in parts of Manchuria; in the coastal regions of the provinces of Hopei, Shantung, Chekiang and Kiangsu; in the areas which had been flooded by the Yellow River during the war; and in the steppes of Sinkiang.[7] These are provided with tractors and combines. The labor force is drawn from refugee camps, labor camps and unemployed urban workers. The total acreage covered by these farms is still small, amounting to about 0.3 percent of all land under cultivation. But a pattern has been set.

It is not an easy task to collectivize the millions of farmers with their strong sense of private property. The actual process of collectivization consists of several steps. The first is the organization of mutual aid teams. The purpose, it is said, is to provide extra labor to those who need it and to facilitate the introduction of improved farming techniques. Members of a team do not put their produce in a common pool and then divide it according to the value decided upon previously, as in a coöperative, but merely pool their labor. The teams sometimes own common draft animals and implements. According to official figures, in the middle

[7] "Communist State Farms and the New Serf System," a study made by the Sixth Division of the Reconstruction Committee of the Kuomintang, Taiwan, 1952.

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of 1953, two out of every five peasants had joined this form of organization. By this time the lone and independent farmer may well have disappeared altogether. The new society does not look with favor upon the individualistic habits to which he has from time immemorial been addicted.

From mutual aid teams the peasants move into a more advanced stage of development—coöperative farming. Here they pool, not only their labor and farm implements, but also their land. In theory each individual farmer still owns his plot of land. But the land he owns has been integrated into a larger unit, with defined boundaries obliterated and management unified. The management decides on the crops to be planted and the amount of labor each farmer should contribute. The produce is divided on an agreed basis after provision has been made for taxes, seeds and other expenses.

It is not surprising that the farmer has shown great reluctance to enter into this type of coöperative farming. But he has no choice in the matter. The *People's Daily,* official organ of the government, warned on November 9, 1953:

> If the peasants refuse to carry out large-scale production they will be unable to meet the needs of the nation and those of the peasants themselves, thus causing difficulties for national industrial construction and for a portion of the peasants who are desirous of making a living from farming. Failure to unite and carry out large-scale production will not merely make it impossible for the rural people to keep their standards of living on a par with those of the cities. The inherent weakness of the "small-farmer economy," together with the expansion of capitalist fleecing, will inevitably keep many peasants in abject poverty.

Liao Lu-yen, deputy chief of the Agricultural Division of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, in a recent article in *Pravda,* reveals that at a Central Committee meeting last December it was decided that full collectivization of China's 100,000,000 peasant families is to be essentially completed in less than a decade. The régime plans to collectivize 35 percent of them by 1957.[9]

The road to collectivization is strewn with difficulties. But, as I wrote three years ago in this journal, "the very size of the obstacles means that the pace will be speeded, and harsher and still harsher measures will be employed." Whatever may be the farmer's reluctance and opposition, the rulers will in the end have their way.

[9] *The New York Times,* August 5, 1954.

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Collectivization does not, of course, guarantee increased production. On the contrary, if the Soviet and Eastern European experience is any guide, a sharp decline in output may take place. If so, the Chinese people may yet face a mass starvation compared with which the Soviet disaster in the 1930's was but a picnic.

IV

The Communists have no intention of having China stagnate in the backwaters of a pre-industrial age. It is not merely because industrialization provides a solution for China's basic problems. It is an article of faith. For without industrialization there can be no real Socialist construction.

With the unrestricted use of forced labor, the Communists have made an efficient job of rehabilitation. Within a relatively short time all railways and highways were repaired, open to traffic, and even extended; dilapidated factories and mines were renovated and put into operation. At the same time most of the private enterprises were brought under state control. By 1952, 80 percent of the heavy industry and 40 percent of the light industry, 60 percent of the steamships plying in home waters, 90 percent of the banking, and practically all imports and exports were in government hands.[10] Having done all this, the authorities were ready to embark on a planned program of industrial development.

On August 17, 1953, Chou En-lai, Premier and Foreign Minister, found himself in Moscow at the head of the first of four Chinese missions which were scheduled to arrive in the Soviet capital before the end of the year. Among the members of these missions were Red China's Minister of Fuel Industries, Deputy Chairman and Secretary-General of the Committee on Finance and Economics, Deputy Minister of Heavy Industries, and Deputy of Communications. It was apparent that important negotiations were on foot. On October 1 *Pravda* announced that the Chinese Government would shortly put into force its first Five-Year Plan, on the same general pattern as the Soviet Five-Year Plans.

While the target levels for the various sectors of the economy were not announced, Chou En-lai in February 1953 stated that,

[10] "Economic Development of the Mainland of China," *Economic Bulletin for Asia and the Far East*, v. IV, no. 3, November 1953.

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using 1952 levels as a base of 100, production in 1953 was expected to reach the following levels: pig iron 114, steel ingots 123, coal 100, power 127, petroleum 142, copper 139, lead 149, zinc 154, machine tools 134, caustic soda 131, cement 117, timber 138, cotton yarn 109, cotton cloth 116, paper 106, grain 109, raw cotton 116, and tea 116. The total expenditures in 1953, according to Finance Minister Po I-po in his presentation of the 1953 budget, amounted to the equivalent of about $4.2 billion in U. S. currency.[11]

The targets have subsequently been revised downward. The reason is not far to seek. China's present industrial base is extremely small. In heavy industry she is inferior to Belgium. To make the Five-Year Plan a success, a tremendous amount of equipment has to be imported. Neither the Soviet Union nor Eastern Europe is in a position to supply all the needs. In a 1953 agreement with Peking, Moscow promised to help China modernize as well as to build a total of 141 industrial plants of all sorts. But this is still insufficient to implement the Plan. A variety of capital equipment has to be obtained elsewhere. The trade control enforced by the free world has made this difficult.

The shortage of technicians is another inhibiting factor. China's potential productiveness is stultified by the thinness of the "noncommissioned ranks"—foremen and mechanics. To some degree the worst gaps are being filled by Russians. Some 15,000 industrial experts have been sent by the Soviet Union to China. Frantic efforts are being made to train technical men in the lower grades. This, however, takes time.

By far the most serious problem the Communist planners have to contend with is how to accumulate sufficient capital to finance the industrialization program. Low interest rate credits to the tune of $60,000,000 to $100,000,000 per annum have been granted by Russia. But this amounts to only about 2.5 percent of the total investment outlays. The rest would have to be made good by taxation. The peasants, who occupy 80 percent of the population, would have to bear the major portion of the burden. The unhappy peasants, already groaning under staggering taxes, would undoubtedly be squeezed to the limit of their endurance and beyond. The Communists can be depended on to do this with their customary resourcefulness and efficiency.

[11] Robert M. Rosse, "The Working of Communist China's Five Year Plan," *Pacific Affairs*, March 1954.

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Meanwhile, the authority of the Central People's Government is being centralized "to meet the new situation and the new responsibilities thrust upon it by the large-scale, nationwide planned economic and cultural construction." The greatest single act of centralization took place on June 19 this year. With a stroke of the pen, the Central People's Government abolished all the six Regional Governments established at the beginning of the "liberation." Such powerful figures as Kao Kang (overlord of Manchuria), Lin Piao (Chairman of the Southcentral Political Council), Liu Po-cheng (Chairman of the Southwestern Political Council), and a host of less prominent political and military men were either recalled to the capital or assigned to other posts. At the same time the Party was cleansed of opportunists who had climbed on the bandwagon in great numbers, and of those who had acquired a taste for bourgeois life or whose heads had been turned by power.

V

The question arises: Does the Soviet Union really want Communist China to industrialize? This raises the larger question of Sino-Soviet relations as a whole.

In this connection it should not be forgotten that the relations between the Chinese Communist Party and the Soviet Union began more than 30 years ago. Indeed, the Chinese Party was created with Soviet money. It may even be said that the Party was not founded by Ch'en Tu-hsiu or Li Ta-chao, but by such Comintern emissaries as Gregory Voitinsky and Maring. The Chinese Communists themselves have always regarded the Soviet Union as their mentor, source of inspiration and trusted friend. The sentimental ties have been strong and have weathered many a storm. Without the Soviet Union, Mao Tse-tung has maintained, the People's Republic of China could never have come into being. No one can deny that there is a great deal of truth in this. Mao Tse-tung might never have captured state power without Soviet help. Certainly he could not have won so quickly. It would be extremely unwise, as so many Western observers have been in the habit of doing, to dismiss the expressions of gratitude and the professions of loyalty by Chinese Communist leaders to the Soviet Union as empty rhetoric and without real depth. The sense of solidarity with Moscow in an international cause has been so systematically and so assiduously inculcated

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that it goes much deeper than most observers imagine. It is no mere pretense. It is something palpably real.

It was once believed that Maoism, relying as it did on the organized peasantry as a main force rather than on the industrial proletariat, is not true Marxism-Leninism-Stalinism. We know now that it is true Marxism-Leninism-Stalinism applied to semi-colonial countries. There has never been any ideological cleavage between the Kremlin and the Chinese Communists. The land reform in China had been a stratagem, a bait to the peasants, who were attracted by the promise of land for themselves and did not realize until too late that Mao's real objective has always been collectivization. With all the propaganda about the "union of four classes" under the "New Democracy," there is no policy for them except gradual liquidation, which is speeded up whenever the Party is in a confident mood and slowed down whenever serious economic difficulties are encountered. Mao has proved himself a loyal disciple of Lenin and Stalin. Moscow is justly proud of him.

After the war there was a time when the Kremlin was not quite sure that their Chinese adherents could capture power in the foreseeable future. It had counted on a relatively long period of Kuomintang control. Otherwise the looting of Manchurian industry would not have made sense. But as soon as the Chinese Communists showed the will and capacity to win, the Russians spared no effort to make Communist domination a reality. Since the establishment of the People's Republic the Soviet Union has left no stone unturned to make Red China a major World Power. In Korea the combination of Chinese manpower and Russian armament stood off an army headed by the greatest Power on earth. At the recent Geneva Conference Red China scored a diplomatic and moral victory far exceeding its expectations. The Sino-Soviet partnership has paid off handsomely. There is no reason to believe that there has been any rivalry between the two. Under the glaring spotlight of international conferences, they sometimes acted as if they were out of step. But this too is a stratagem, designed to befuddle an already confused world. Those who expect Moscow and Peking to get in each other's way and trip each other up will be disappointed.

In economic relations the scale of Soviet aid has not been large. Still, Red China has received adequate technical assistance, has obtained a sizeable amount of equipment and has ac-

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quired some capital in the form of loans and joint-enterprises. There has not been any Chinese complaint of Soviet "niggardliness." Indeed the Chinese Communist leaders have taken pains to explain to their countrymen that Soviet assistance is subject to the restrictions of the Soviet economic system. What it has already done has been done at the expense of its own economy. In any case, no foreign aid, however generous, can of itself make China an industrialized nation. The major part of the burden must be borne by the Chinese themselves. There would be difficulties, of course. But squeamishness is not a part of the Communist creed. Forced-speed economic development necessarily involves sacrifices of the grimmest kind. Here, as elsewhere, the Soviet experience is considered relevant. Millions of people died in Russia during the first Soviet Five-Year Plan. Why not China?

The fact that practically all new developments are concentrated in the north and in areas easily accessible to the Soviet borders testifies to the close economic collaboration that is being contemplated. Old industrial centers along the coast of southeastern China are now as dead as a doornail. They have been stripped of their equipment. On the other hand, Lanchow—that once inaccessible little provincial town in the far west—has become the center of oil and chemical industries, sizzling with life and activity. So also is Taiyuan, the new center of coal mining. Uranium in Sinkiang is being exploited with feverish energy. Manchuria, with its industrial foundation laid by the Japanese and with its rich resources, remains the greatest center of development. All these developments cannot be solely due to the availability of power and raw materials in these regions. There is a real desire to integrate China's industries with those of the Soviet Union.

Sino-Soviet trade has witnessed a phenomenal expansion since 1949. The proportion of mainland China's trade with Russia was claimed to have increased from 26 percent in 1950 to 61 percent in 1951 and 70 percent in 1952. With the adoption of the Five-Year Plan the percentage has further increased. Substantial changes in commodity composition have accompanied the reorientation of China's foreign trade. Consumption goods have practically disappeared from the import list; China now imports only raw materials, mineral oils, chemicals and industrial equipment. Before the Communist take-over China had been a food importing nation; now she exports food. Agricultural produc-

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tion has not appreciably increased. The belt has been tightened.

This trade with Russia has its disadvantages. The transport and carrying costs are high. To the Communists, however, costs mean nothing. The most outstanding characteristic of the Soviet bloc is its close "monolithic" integration. The stationing of Peking's trade commissioners in East Berlin symbolizes the fact that from there to the East China Sea there stretches a closed economic society, trade with any part of which is trade with the bloc itself.

China still needs to trade with the West to make up what the Soviet bloc cannot supply. The amount of this trade is far less spectacular than the technicolor visions conjured up by Communist propaganda. Those who want to drive a wedge between Red China and Soviet Russia by trade would find that in the end they have strengthened rather than weakened Sino-Soviet relations. For the Communist bloc is now planning for a period of many years during which China will be both industrialized and equipped with an arms industry and modernized armed forces, while the Soviet Union improves its internal supplies of consumer goods and food. The bloc needs outside help to make the plan a reality. To ease trade controls is to play right into its hands.

VI

The five years of Communist rule in China can thus be written down as years of betrayal. The democratic rights and freedoms promised by the Communists, the "union of the four classes," and the land reform were decoy programs bearing no relationship to the final objectives. The Communist rulers may be able to carry out an industrialization program more successfully than their predecessors, but at terrible human costs. Since the Chinese people live under a revolutionary totalitarian police régime it is too much to expect them to rise in revolt against their oppressors. It simply is not possible. However, the will to revolt, though smothered, is not dead. It may burst into vehement flame if the opportunity presents itself. At present the régime has been weakened by the disillusionment of its people and the critical economic dislocation. It needs the help of its enemies to forge ahead. Will the Western World oblige?

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POLITICAL INSTABILITY IN FRANCE

By François Goguel

SINCE the constitution of the Fourth Republic took effect in January 1947, less than eight years ago, there have been 15 successive cabinets in France. Times of government crisis, that is, periods when there has been no government at all (one cabinet having resigned and its successor not yet having been approved) have totalled over six months. These two sentences tell the story of how far political instability has gone in France today. It is not a new phenomenon. From 1789 to 1946 France lived under 13 different constitutions, not counting the provisional governments. The most lasting of them, that of the Third Republic adopted in 1875, saw 93 different governments within 65 years. But such instability has much more serious consequences today, when the complexity and multitude of problems facing France call more urgently for continuity in action.

Actually, of course, the situation is not quite so bad as it might seem. Although we have had 15 governments between January 1947 and July 1954, there have been in fact only three real changes in political orientation: the first, in May 1947, when the Communist Party was expelled from the government; the second, developed by stages between March 1952 and June 1953, when the Socialists went into opposition and thus made it necessary to bring the Gaullists into the majority and later into government; the third, in June 1954, when the circumstances under which M. Mendès-France became Prime Minister led the M.R.P. to go—temporarily perhaps—into opposition.

It must also be remembered that even though the governments of the Fourth Republic may not have lasted much longer than an average of six months, certain officials have been very much longer at the heads of the same departments and thus have given continuity to their policies. In fact, it usually happens that when a new government is formed 50 percent of the ministers of the preceding government remain in their jobs, 25 percent change jobs but stay in office, and only 25 percent turn their places over to newcomers.[1] The same stability of personnel was the rule in the past. There were only 49 different Prime Ministers in the 93

[1] The Mendès-France cabinet of June 1954 is an exception in this respect, for only five of its 29 members belonged to the Laniel cabinet.

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administrations of the Third Republic, and from 1880 to 1890 Georges Clemenceau could reply to those who reproached him for having overthrown too many cabinets that in fact it had always been the same one.

The French political system has neither a real separation of powers (since the cabinet is responsible to the National Assembly) nor an effective procedure for dissolving governments. In these circumstances it is a paradoxical fact that government crises may actually provide the executive branch with the means for getting its projects accepted by the legislative. More than once in the last eight years when parliament's refusal to vote unpopular fiscal proposals brought on a crisis, the plain impossibility of changing the majority and the reiteration of the same program by the various candidates for the Premiership have finally brought the National Assembly to admit the need for the measures and grant a new government what it had refused its predecessor.

Further, the instability of the political personnel is somewhat compensated for by the permanence of the administrative personnel. In ten years, for instance, France has had a dozen Ministers of Finance but only two Directors of the Budget and two Directors of the Treasury. Thus there exists a continuity on the administrative side which helps explain the frequent similarity of the projects of successive ministers, who in fact very often are defending in parliament only what their technical assistants have suggested to them.

But in spite of these mitigating factors political instability does represent a very grave evil in French political life. It is chiefly responsible for the sense of sterility and unreality which is felt not only by French people themselves but also, because of France's key position in the free world, by their allies. The present study, without making any direct reference to the current state of affairs, intends to probe into the basic reasons for French political instability and see what remedies might check or end it.

II

The main cause of the instability is evidently the excessive number of political parties, which forces the formation of coalition governments. These are at the mercy of any spell of bad humor on the part of one of its members who when he quits may hope to force his partners to take greater account of his program.

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There are six main political shades in France today, and even these are not entirely united so far as party organizations and parliamentary groups are concerned.[2] The situation is not new; since the beginning of the Third Republic there have always been at least as many parties seeking public support. This is because, in the first place, the French traditionally think about politics in terms of history and therefore tend to split over the problems of the past just as much as over those of the present. In 1871 the National Assembly included supporters of every régime that had existed in France from the time of the Revolution. Indeed, it was the irreconcilable division of the Catholic and Monarchist majority into Legitimists, Orléanists and Bonapartists which finally permitted the Republican constitution to be voted in 1875. One could, in fact, trace back several of the present French parties in almost direct line to those historical parties of the early days of the Republic.[3]

The multitude of our parties is also partly explained by the diversity of France region by region and by the existence of individual political traditions in the various provinces. These factors are in addition, of course, to the well-known individualism of the French temperament as such. But even more important, perhaps, is the French taste for arguing about principles and above all the importance they attach to decisions of a political sort in a doctrinal sense. People who agree in practice on the concrete solutions of technical problems but who disagree on their philosophical aspects are prevented from speaking the same language and would have a very hard time forming the same party in France. That, for instance, quite as much as their division on the problem of state subventions for private schools, is what today prevents the Catholic conservatives of the moderate parties and the non-clerical conservatives of the Radical Party from joining forces in a Conservative Party and keeps the Catholic progressives of the M.R.P. and the non-clerical progressives of the Socialist Party from forming a Workers' Party.

[2] They are: 1, Communists; 2, Democratic Socialists; 3, Christian Democrats (M.R.P.); 4, Radicals (radical in the old etymological sense of the word, but as they have hardly changed at all while everything around has changed they have ended up as a socially conservative party, though rather unfavorable to the Roman Catholic Church and more or less true to certain leftist forms of expression); 5, Moderates (divided into Independents and Farmers and traditionally split by numerous personal rivalries and divergencies in policy); 6, the Gaullists (elected in 1951 on the list of the *Rassemblement du Peuple Français* some of whom are now a political group, the Union of the Social Republicans, outside the *Rassemblement* itself).

[3] *cf.* René Rémond, "La Droite en France de 1815 à nos jours." Paris: Aubier, 1954.

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The French electoral system has never, as it might have done, encouraged the various parties to draw closer to one another. Of course, one must not take the French electoral system as it has been since 1871 as the whole explanation of a situation which in reality existed much earlier. But it is nevertheless true that neither the single-member-district system with two ballots which was in force during almost all of the Third Republic, nor the system of proportional representation requiring a list of candidates for each electoral district, which has been in use since 1945, tended to simplify party groupings.

Under the Third Republic system, a candidate had to secure an absolute majority of the votes in order to be elected on the first ballot. If that was not obtained, there was a second ballot, and here a relative majority sufficed to win. No risk was involved if adjoining parties—or even a single party—presented several candidates in the first ballot, since their mutual opponent could not win unless elected by more than half the voters. Only in the second ballot did it become essential to collect as many votes as possible for one single candidate, usually the one who in the first ballot had obtained more votes than the candidates with tendencies similar to his own. These candidates of adjoining parties stepped down in his favor; but they kept hoping to outdo him in the next election and the particular political shade which they represented thus lived on. This system of balloting tended to perpetuate a multi-party system, but the parties were nevertheless capable of drawing closer to one another to form eventually two opposing camps defined by their mutual hostility. Until the First World War, and even, though less regularly, between the two wars, the numerous French parties did in fact regroup themselves generally into two large camps at the time of elections—one conservative, more or less anti-democratic and favorable to the Roman Catholic Church, the other progressive (in expression, at least), democratic and anti-clerical.

That is no longer so today; regroupings have become much more complicated. The former dividing factors were mainly political and religious. To these have now been added others of an economic, social and international order.

The institution in 1945 of proportional representation and voting by list in one ballot was in line with this new situation. Pure proportional representation was in use from 1945 to 1946; in 1951 it was modified to permit a merger of different lists and

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to allow them to share all the seats of a district provided their total votes exceeded an absolute majority. Both forms of the system evidently permit or indeed encourage a relatively large number of parties to flourish, especially in the densely populated departments of France where five or six different lists may each hope to get at least one candidate elected.

Thus the habit of having a multitude of parties appears to be traditional in France. It is deeply rooted in the habits of the people, it represents what they seem spontaneously to want, and their electoral institutions have always been organized so as not to hamper its development.

III

Old though it is, the instability of French governments resulting from too many parties and the need of forming coalition majorities in parliament has nevertheless assumed a new character and importance in our time. Until 1914 and even between 1919 and 1939 it resulted more from rivalries and personal ambitions than from real disagreements on policy. Also, the evils of frequent changes in government were not sufficiently obvious to cause a serious reaction against interpretations of the constitution which weakened the power of the Executive. The Executive was more and more at the mercy of parliament. The Chamber of Deputies could overthrow a cabinet at any moment, and when the two disagreed the cabinet could not appeal to the public because it had no way of forcing the dissolution of the Chamber and bringing on elections.

The gradual slipping away from a parliamentary system with balanced executive and legislative powers into a régime in which the legislative branch—and in particular the Chamber of Deputies—has almost absolute preponderance is the story of the constitutional evolution of the Third Republic.

The resulting instability and weakness is much more serious now than it used to be. Before 1914, currency stability, light taxation and slow economic progress (despite which revenues from French foreign investments easily kept the budget in balance) created conditions of social tranquillity. French political life thus was free to occupy itself almost exclusively with ideological and religious issues such as the Dreyfus Affair and the separation of Church and State. Government instability was of little importance under such conditions. Somewhat paradoxically, it went

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with the apparently permanent preponderance of a leftist coalition. French society was thoroughly based on free enterprise, and the Socialists were not yet numerous enough to represent a threat to it.

The two world wars changed all this.

The war of 1914–18 brought rapid industrialization to certain regions, followed by an increase of the working class. The political result was the strengthening of Socialism in the period between the wars and the rise of the Communist Party which, unlike the old Socialist Party, was hostile to democratic parliamentary practices. As a result, the homogeneity of the leftist coalition disappeared. The parties of the political left which were not leftist socially (*i.e.* essentially radical) more than once preferred to ally themselves with the Conservatives rather than with the Socialists both in forming governments and in elections.

Besides, the material destruction of two world wars, with the consequent inflation and wiping out of many French foreign investments, has thrown the French economy out of balance. Financial, fiscal and economic problems have taken a new place in public policy, government programs and parliamentary debates. Antagonism between social categories—farmers and city dwellers, employers and workers, government officials and businessmen—has become much stronger than it used to be. Each group tries to secure for itself a larger part of the national income at the expense of the other, devoting more effort to altering its distribution than to increasing its volume. Faced by questions which it never had to deal with before, the French political system has shown itself to be tied up in old-fashioned practices and incapable of modernizing them, hence largely impotent. Its impotence has aggravated the difficulties. Governmental instability no longer could be said to consist simply of rivalries and personal ambitions; it reflected a real incapacity to present problems correctly and to see the necessary alternatives. The governmental attitude toward the economic depression of the thirties tragically illustrated this lack of public spirit and political impotence.

The reason the true nature of these problems was not recognized was largely because they appeared in quite different forms in different regions and in different branches of economic life. Two-thirds of the departments of France, with more than 50 percent of the total population, had then and still have today an

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economic structure belonging more to the nineteenth than the twentieth century. Their agriculture, their trade and even their industry (or rather their crafts) are organized in small individual or family enterprises with very small working capital. Each has a very limited number of employees and works for only the local market. Their success or failure seems to depend much more on the personal qualities of the people who run them than on general economic conditions or on the government's social, fiscal, trade or public utilities policies.

This static France of small enterprises—perhaps it should be called this underdeveloped France—provides an ideal social set-up for the survival of old-fashioned political habits—mistrust of the state, preference for weak and unstable governments, priority of ideological issues over standards of efficiency and performance in political life. It is here in the south and in the west of France, for instance, that religious issues continue to play a primary rôle, dividing the Radicals from the Moderates just as much as the Socialists from the Christian Democrats, even though their respective positions on economic and social matters may be much alike. And here, where the population is static or declining and there is no housing problem, there is a general if almost unconscious hostility toward the financial sacrifices that would be involved in an efficient government policy to solve the desperate housing problem which is creating such discontent among the workers in overpopulated industrial regions.[4]

In a word, there are very obvious geographic differences in economic, social and demographic structure between the dynamic regions of present-day France in the north, the east and the environs of certain large cities and seaports and all the rest of the country; and this difference creates a lack of homogeneity in public attitudes which contributes greatly to the instability of political life.

Let us see now what has happened in practice, particularly since the Second World War intensified the economic and social problems of 30 years ago and since the recognition of French industrial backwardness led to plans for modernization which divert a larger proportion of the national income into capital investment, to say nothing of the part that goes into military expenses. The fact that an insufficient part of the national income

[4] The three Paris districts where the Communist Party got the largest percentage of votes in the 1951 elections were the ones with the worst housing conditions.

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is left for consumption intensifies the antagonism between social groups. In dynamic and modernized France, the France of the big cities and large enterprises, large sections of the population are attracted by the extreme parties, the Communists on one side and the Gaullists on the other. Between these extremes the France that is static and underdeveloped, the France of the rural districts and small enterprises which is also the moderate France, acts as arbiter. It keeps a check on Communism in elections, but it does not urge or even support a policy of economic expansion or social justice which might put Communism on the defensive. That is what gives instability to government coalitions of the various democratic parties, conservative as well as progressive. If the government's fiscal and social policy threatens the interests of the privileged classes, the conservatives abandon it. If its policy on the contrary is too timid, the progressives start the crisis. And this instability is aggravated when, as in 1951, the religious problem enters the sphere of politics in the question of government subventions for private schools and leads the anticlericals of the south and the Catholics of the west to take diametrically opposing stands.

Thus we see that the lack of homogeneity in the French economic and social structure is an almost insurmountable obstacle to political stability, even though it is often ignored by observers who study only the parties and political institutions as a means of learning how majorities are formed and durable governments might be created.

IV

What chance is there of successfully remedying the varied causes of French political troubles outlined above?

The diagnosis of the troubles of the French party system made by General de Gaulle in a speech at Bayeux on June 16, 1946, does not need the change of a single word to make it true today. "In our country," he said, "party rivalry is so fundamental that it always puts everything in question and often blots out the higher interests of the country. This is an obvious fact, the result of the national temperament, historic events and present troubles, but one which in the future our institutions must take into account and guard against . . . our new democratic institutions must compensate for our habit of perpetual political effervescence." But if the diagnosis was right, the proposed

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remedy—the establishment of a quasi-presidential system but without a real separation of powers—could hardly have had any other effect than to aggravate still further the fights between parties and between parliament and the president.

The multitude of parties and the continuous political turmoil created by their rivalries might be reduced if reforms were adopted in the voting system and if the relationship between the executive and legislative branches could be improved. But that is not enough, since they are only the expression of the social disparity between underdeveloped France and dynamic France. That disparity, we have seen, is psychological as well as political. Hence action to improve the nation's economic structure is indispensable also.

First let us look at election reform. Many people simply recommend a return to the system as it was in the Third Republic (single-member-district system with two ballots). Some of the results of this would be happy—if only that it would abolish proportional representation, which puts up solid walls between the parties. But let us remember that already during the Third Republic there were too many parties, and although as sometimes happened between the two wars parties might join forces in elections (Radicals with Socialists and, in 1936, even with Communists) they would split up when it came to governing.

The Anglo-Saxon single-member system with one ballot and election by relative majority would obviously work powerfully to reduce the number of parties. But it would have that effect only in the long run, while at the start it would risk giving the Communist Party a representation in parliament really superior to its strength in the country. And afterwards there might be no way of checking it.

The type of ballot best suited to the needs of France would be a list system operating under the majority principle with two ballots, allowing neighboring parties to form coalition lists on the second ballot. Such a system would bring the parties closer and more permanently together than do the deadlocks created by the single-member ballot. Real solidarity would exist between deputies of various parties elected on the same list by the same voters after a joint campaign. This was the system recommended by Gambetta in 1881–82 precisely for the purpose of encouraging the formation of large homogeneous parties, the only way, he thought, to halt the deterioration of the parliamentary system

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and the weakening of the executive which already was beginning to be evident. There is, in fact, no other electoral system which can encourage neighboring parties to forget their divisions and form lasting alliances, for no other to the same extent makes this to the interest of the deputies themselves; for deputies of different parties who are elected on the same list in the second ballot must, if they wish to facilitate their reëlection, stay united during the whole legislative session.

The list ballot just described has supporters in the present National Assembly, though undoubtedly not so many as the single-member ballot. But when the electoral system is reformed, as it almost certainly will be before the next elections (which ought in principle to occur in less than two years), it is not impossible that the votes of the present supporters of proportional representation may make the list system outweigh the single-member system. But in any case the single-member system would still be better than the proportional system because it would tend more effectively to reëstablish electoral coalitions between parties.

As to the relationship between the cabinet and the parliament, several suggestions for reform have been made recently, particularly by the Minister for Constitutional Reforms in the Laniel Cabinet, M. Barrachin. Their object is to make the executive more stable without giving it the right to dissolve parliament. Interesting as they may be, all such suggestions hit on the same snag: they all tend to allow the cabinet to stay in power even if parliament refuses to vote the bills which it considers necessary. Thus they run the risk of weakening the executive even further and moving another step toward government by the National Assembly.

Even though many deputies are not inclined to admit it, the truth is, as M. Paul Reynaud recalled in May 1953, that there can be no stable parliamentary régime, *i.e.* one which confers authority and responsibility on the executive in equal measure, unless it is given the power of dissolution. Most French specialists in political science recognize this, and their view was vigorously confirmed recently by Senator Gilbert Jules, rapporteur of the Committee on Constitutional Revision in the Council of the Republic. It is to be hoped that the pressure of public opinion will in the end bring the National Assembly to recognize the necessity.

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But it must be repeated that even if the system of voting were reformed as suggested above and even if the executive were given the necessary power to dissolve the Assembly, the essential cause for French political instability would still remain. Old-fashioned habits would continue to flourish in the regions where the economic structure is individualistic, out-dated and under-equipped. Even if powerful currents of public opinion were formed in favor of an expanding and productive economic policy and a social policy directed at raising the standard of living of the working class, they would still meet with incomprehension in regions where the economic and social problems of the twentieth century do not arise simply because those regions are still in the nineteenth century.

Compared to an average per capita production of 100 for all of France, the figure is under 70 in 13 departments, between 70 and 80 in 20, between 80 and 100 in 31, between 100 and 110 in 11, between 110 and 120 in ten, and exceeds 120 only in five departments. This disparity in production corresponds to very profound differences, department by department, in economic structure and production methods, which in turn produce equally important differences in collective mentality and the way of looking at political problems. Here, in sum, is the basic cause of French political instability.

A policy of modernization, then, seems not only an economic necessity but a political must. It should not consist, however, of concentrating industrial, electrical, agricultural and commercial equipment in the regions which are the most productive today. On the contrary, it should extend a modernized economy to regions where it so far has hardly penetrated. It is a fact that party disputes over religious problems are much less strong—indeed often do not exist—in regions where a modern economic structure has made people conscious of the importance of economic and social problems. The rebirth of a collective public spirit in the departments of southeast France will no doubt be hastened by the power plants being built at Donzère-Mondragon and by the projects for irrigation and power production in the Durance valley. Similar results will be produced in the southwest, where the Gascony irrigation project will increase the productivity of a large agricultural region and enable it to specialize.

It must be understood, however, that the increase in production resulting from the modernization of the French economy

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should go to the benefit of the workers in order to prevent the strengthening of extremist parties and of the Communists in particular. This would be easier to achieve, of course, with an expanding income than it is under present conditions.

It naturally cannot be expected that the economic modernization of the whole territory of France will have immediate results in a political sense—which is one more reason why the remedies of an institutional order described above should be carried out meanwhile. But already the fact that plans for modernization and reëquipment of plant are under way has been a most encouraging factor and is arousing the initiative of many local administrations even in some of the less productive departments. Under the auspices of the Plan for Modernization, the coördination of local or regional projects is more advanced today than one might have hoped a few years ago, and the administrative and technical competence of the local bodies which more and more take an interest in these projects raises hope that if they are encouraged by the government they will be carried into effect methodically and efficiently.

All in all, then, we arrive at a conclusion which is not as pessimistic as it might have been if we had limited ourselves to an analysis of French political life and political institutions. The political instability of France is not the inevitable result of some congenital incapacity of the French people to govern themselves efficiently but rather of an economic and social unbalance which, of course, France should have perceived long ago but which she is now busily trying to set right. In this view, the results which we hope to achieve by modernizing our plant will be at least as important to our political life as they will be in the purely economic field.

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BRITAIN AND AMERICA: THE NEED FOR COMPROMISE

By Lord Coleraine

YEARS ago, when I was a reporter on a New York newspaper, I would sometimes be sent out to Quarantine to board an incoming liner and explore the mind of some visiting notability. There was one thing especially that used to strike me about these excursions. Whatever the new arrival might be—literary lion, musician, scientist, soldier, statesman or vaudeville artist—and wherever he might come from, whether it was India or France or England or Japan or Venezuela, he could always be counted upon to declare that the future of mankind depended, and depended alone, upon the closest possible association of his own country, whichever that might be, and the great Republic of the West.

Pronouncements of this kind are no doubt little more than the expression of a conventional courtesy but they always seemed to me to smack a little too much of a sense of favors to come. At any rate, whenever I have been considering the subject of Anglo-American relations, whether officially or unofficially, whether privately or in public, I have always tried to keep clear of the idea that the relationship between my own country and the United States was, or ought to be, of an exclusive character. Today I am not so sure.

I still hold that this world is too big a place—or too small a one—for any two peoples, however powerful, however experienced or however well-intentioned, to bulldoze mankind into agreement with their views. The world is not to be saved only by the joint exertions of the United States and the United Kingdom. But equally it cannot be saved without them. It is possible to conceive of rifts occurring between the United States—or the United Kingdom—and almost any other country in the world, rifts which would be damaging without, however, the damage being utterly irreparable. It is inconceivable, on the other hand, that there should be a permanent division between the United Kingdom and the United States which would not involve the breakdown of civilization.

That is an assertion which I could buttress with a number of arguments. Here I will adduce only one. A reversion to isolation-

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ism by the United States would mean the collapse of Western morale. I suppose that nothing would more surely swing the American people into a new kind of isolationism than the conviction, even the strong impression, that the associate whom they had come to regard as being the most reliable—indeed, and in the final analysis, alone reliable—was not to be relied upon after all. If the divisions which have shown themselves recently between our two countries become any deeper, or take on any degree of permanency, the outlook is dark indeed.

In the few pages that follow I will seek, therefore, not so much to defend British policy as to explain it. In politics as in other human relationships understanding is the best antidote to misunderstanding. And if I am able to show here that the British attitude is grounded in something other than fear, indifference and shortsightedness, I shall have done all that I set out to do—more, perhaps, than I can hope to do.

II

It may be as well, first of all, to clear away some of the undergrowth which covers up the problem which faces us. For we have to realize that a number of the differences in approach, and even in policy, which have arisen between Britain and America are not really as deep and unbridgeable as they seem to be: this is so because they stem not from any real difference of national temperament or national interest but from the simple operation of the democratic process.

In wartime the struggle for power within a country is in abeyance in greater or less degree, and subordinated to the struggle for national survival. But in peace the democratic politician regains his freedom of action: it is his right—one might almost say that it is his duty—to engage himself once again in the struggle for parliamentary or electoral power. In the final analysis nothing is sacred, and however devoted a patriot a man may be he cannot always draw an absolutely clear line between domestic and foreign policy. Sometimes even the noblest ambition will blur the boundary lines, and that which is less restrained will lose sight of them altogether.

This, or something like it, is what has been happening on both sides of the Atlantic. In Britain a bitter fight is taking place for the leadership of the Socialist Party, and it seems to be centered on the international field. The real issue between Mr. Attlee and

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Mr. Bevan has very little to do, however, either with the rearmament of Germany or with the admission of Red China to the United Nations. That is only the ground which Mr. Bevan has chosen, because it is there that he can make his strongest appeal to the less thoughtful membership of the Socialist Party, a party which has always had a strongly pacifist wing and one to which the revolutionary, simply as a revolutionary and irrespective of the merits in his case, will always appeal. And Mr. Bevan has been able to choose the ground because in a progressive party, especially when it is in opposition and therefore without responsibility, the extremist will always seem to be forcing the pace just as in a conservative party the reactionary will usually have a disproportionately loud voice. But this does not mean, in either case, that the extremist will necessarily have the last word.

And there is to be found, perhaps, in the attitude of the Prime Minister himself another example of the effect of the party battle upon national policy. During the general election campaign of 1951 Sir Winston Churchill was the target of a countrywide campaign of vilification tending to show that he wanted war with Russia. It is clear not only that Sir Winston himself was deeply wounded by the slander but also that the Conservative Party lost a number of seats in the House of Commons as a result of it. It can hardly be a matter for surprise, therefore, that some of the Prime Minister's animadversions upon the international situation have been directed towards the electoral position at home. But no one in his senses would believe, because of this, that Sir Winston has changed his view of the evils and dangers of Communism or that he is any less clear-sighted in combating them.

It would seem that considerations of this kind enter, too, into American politics, and one has the impression that some official pronouncements are the result less of a genuine appraisal of the facts than of a determination to demonstrate to its supporters that the present Administration differs in every particular from its predecessor. And certainly, to take another example, the leadership of the Republican Party in the United States seems to present itself in much the same light as the leadership of the British Socialist Party, as tolerating the expression of views which, in present circumstances, are like high explosives flung into a gasoline tank. Happily there is little reason to suppose, because of this, either that the junior Senator from Wisconsin will one day be President of the United States or that the right hon-

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orable gentleman the member for Ebbw Vale will ever be Her Majesty's First Minister. It is only that these two gentlemen are an expression of that struggle for power which is in itself of the essence of democracy.

For we have to remind ourselves continuously that democracy is not pure gold. If it were it would not have the strength or the resilience to survive. We may be startled and even shocked when we come upon these coarser alloys, but we need not suppose that they represent the whole compound or even the most valuable part of it. It is a fact, nevertheless, of which we have to take account, that the uglier elements of democratic politics will often obtrude themselves onto the international scene. We must be vigilant, therefore, to distinguish between those issues which represent a real difference of approach between the United States and the United Kingdom and those which are only the reflection of some aspect, more or less sordid, of the struggle for power at home.

III

That there should be real differences of outlook between the two countries is scarcely to be wondered at in the light of their widely different experience even in the present century. During the past 50 years the United States has experienced two world wars, and after each has known a marked accession of political and economic strength. After the second it was faced, openly, unmistakably and for the first time, with the emergence of a Power which clearly threatened its own security. During the same period the United Kingdom passed through the same two world wars, and after each has seen a marked decline in its political and economic strength. After the second it was faced, not for the first time but once again, for the fourth time in 400 years, with a Power which clearly threatened its existence. In both wars both countries exerted a tremendous military effort, but it was only in the United Kingdom, and only during the second war, that the civilian population was given a foretaste of atomic warfare. It is hardly to be expected that experiences so different will produce an identical approach.

Let us consider first of all the effect of air warfare, as the British experienced it between 1940 and 1945, upon their attitude towards the present international situation. During the Second World War I made a number of visits to the United States on government

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business of one kind and another, and on more than one occasion I experienced the inconvenience of an air-raid alarm. I remember, too, paying a visit to a civil defense headquarters in a Midwestern city. It was all very realistic and the civil defense arrangements struck me as being more elaborate (and no doubt they would have been more efficient) than anything that I had seen at home. But no civilian whose actual experience of air warfare is limited to what happened in the United States can have any conception of what a mass air attack is like. I think that it would be quite impossible for such a one, no matter how vivid and sensitive his imagination, to share the experience emotionally as well as intellectually.

Of course this makes a deep distinction between the war experience of the American and British civilian population, but although there are many Americans who realize it there are few who draw the right conclusion. British hesitations in the light of atomic warfare fill with impatience those who do not grasp the distinction; but those who do are filled too easily, I think, with despair. For they assume that the actual experience of air bombardment has softened morale to such an extent that the British people, faced with the possibility of destruction through the hydrogen bomb, have lost the will to resist. But it is not so. Nothing has happened in the past tragic 30 years to persuade us that appeasement or the payment of Danegeld does anything except increase the danger which it is intended to turn away. And the Englishman, if he were faced with the choice, would still prefer the loss of life to the loss of his liberty.

But he does not wish, if he can avoid it, to make the choice necessary. And what he does instinctively feel is that it may not be very wise to get the habit of reading ultimata from the cuff, or to play with grenades as though they were tennis balls. The Englishman would be a good deal more than human if he did not feel some irritation whenever he read an especially fiery objurgation, from someone who had never experienced a mass air attack, bidding him to stand firm at all costs. "At all cost to whom?" he is inclined to ask himself, for he is no more able to imagine that New York City is likely to be in the same case as London in the next war than the New Yorker is able to imagine what it will be like if it is.

Here, then, is one case where a different experience leads to a different approach and even to friction and misunderstanding. There

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are others. The American is living today under a real threat to his security. Nothing like it has ever happened to him before. Throughout its history the republic has either kept itself clear of the outside world or (with the single exception of Pearl Harbor) chosen for itself the moment and the method of intervention. Now it is being pushed around. The natural reaction of a nation subjected for the first time to such an experience is the reaction of a man who is stung by a wasp. He can settle to nothing until he has destroyed the creature and smoked out the nest. But the Englishman is accustomed to being pushed around. He always has been pushed around, and he expects that he always will be. To the Englishman, therefore, an international crisis is not something which must be solved as the condition precedent of a civilized life. It is something to be lived with, and although with patience and determination he will one day work out some kind of a solution, by then, no doubt, he will be faced with some other problem which will prove equally intractable.

In a time like the present it is neither strange nor reprehensible that British policy should be more tentative, more cautious, more persistent in seeking an accommodation, than that of the United States. It arises from the very different experience of the two peoples. It does not mean, for instance, that England any more than the United States is indifferent to the threat of militant Communism. Nor is it strange that the hesitations and seeming uncertainties of British policy should provoke impatience and sometimes even anger in America. That, too, is the result of a different experience. The American temperament is better adapted—it might be fairer to say longer adapted—to taming a continent than to wrestling with the complexities of international politics. These, it is true, the American regards with a trained eye, but it is the eye of an engineer, not a politician. The American who moves easily and naturally in a world of plans and blueprints, plumb lines and set squares, asks sternly, "Where do you propose to draw the line?" The Britisher, more used to weighing the imponderable, replies, "Yes, I see. We must face the danger when it comes. But in the meantime perhaps it would be as well to leave the line as it is, a little blurred." The Britisher sees as clearly as the American that the snake must be watched and, if necessary, killed, but he is not yet wholly convinced that it is wise to dig it out. Given time, it may die or change its skin.

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IV

There is one field of policy—British policy towards India—which merits separate examination, for nowhere do the confusions and contradictions of Anglo-American relations show themselves more clearly and with greater paradox than here. From the beginning of time opinion in the United States has ranged itself against what is called "colonialism," and especially that brand of it which the British used to practise in India. Britain, on the other hand, saw her Indian Empire not as something predatory and immoral but as a powerful element of order in a continent which, without it, would never have emerged from chaos. At any rate the Indian Army—I mean, of course, the army that was recruited locally—as it existed until 1948, numerous, well armed, well disciplined and wholly loyal, did more than maintain order in India (and maintain it almost always without firing a shot); its very existence helped to buttress law and order over a wide part of the globe from the Mediterranean to the Pacific.

Be that as it may, time, the pressure of events, the pressure, too, of public opinion in Britain and America alike, changed all that. The Indian Empire was dissolved and the Indian Army is no longer held as a reserve at the disposal of British diplomacy. In these circumstances, and in the light of American pressure upon Britain to pull out of India, there is surely an element of irony in the idea of Americans reproaching the British for not being tough enough with Mr. Nehru—just as there is an element of paradox in the British, on their side, being at such pains to conciliate a country which, if it did not actually do so, ejected them just as efficiently as if it had defeated them in war.

The British attitude, however, is more rational than it sounds, and certainly it is in the British tradition. After the War of Independence (and in spite of 1812) it was British policy to conciliate the United States and to use the young republic as a bastion in the Western Hemisphere, if not of British interests at any rate of law and order. And it may not be altogether farfetched to draw an analogy between Canning's approach which resulted in the enunciation of the Monroe Doctrine and Mr. Eden's wooing of the Colombo Powers: here, too, a British statesman may be regarded in some sense as calling a new world into being to redress the balance of the old. And after the Boer War the British conceded to the Union of South Africa a freedom which they had

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fought a long, costly and unpopular war to prevent the Boer republics from enjoying. British policy towards India may be right or wrong but there can be no doubt that it is in the British tradition.

It is by no means certain, however, that it is wrong, although there are misgivings about it in England as well as in the United States. For it is possible that colonial Powers know more about nationalism than those whose only experience of it has been through watching it from the sidelines. At any rate Great Britain, like other colonial Powers, has learned about nationalism the hard way. And if the British feel that you cannot compel, you can only persuade a new nation to come in on your side, it may be that they are right.

Most Americans would say, I fancy, that the British are insufficiently aware of the dangers of Communism, on the one hand, and of the strength of nationalism on the other. I am by no means sure that we do not better understand both than our friends sometimes suppose. For it seems to us that one of the most dangerous elements in the present situation is that events have made an alliance between international Communism and Asiatic nationalism. It seems to us that this alliance must be broken if it is at all possible to break it. And it seems to us that it should be possible to break it, for there is very little to hold it together except for the fact that in the past each of the contracting Powers has been opposed by the West. In all other respects—the necessities of trade, the desirability of raising standards of life all over the world, the overwhelming need for peace—there ought to be more in common between the new nations of Asia and the West than there is between them and Soviet Russia. I am not arguing here that the diplomatic recognition of Red China was right: for my own part I am inclined to think that it was wrong. All I am suggesting is that it was not perhaps so utterly wrongheaded as is generally supposed. And when Mr. Nehru says that there is nothing to choose between Soviet Communism and Western imperialism he seems to us to be very silly as well as very irritating—but we can understand why he says it because we, too, can remember the past. It is a strange irony that the British, only a few short years ago the rulers of India, can understand it when many Americans cannot, those Americans who were themselves in those days the foremost critics of the British Raj.

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V

Two world wars within a generation have weakened Britain economically as well as politically so profoundly as to affect her approach to international problems. Everyone knows by now that the whole standard of life of the British people depends upon their ability to sell exports to pay for the necessary imports. Successive American administrations have taken the lead in international measures leading towards the reduction of trade barriers (a leadership, however, which has been much handicapped by the operation of the U.S. tariff itself) but still it cannot be easy for the American to understand just how vital is a high level of international trade to Britain's very existence as an effective force in world affairs. The prosperity of the United States, too, depends upon international trade, but there is a very marked difference in degree. To the American a fall in the level of international trade may mean the difference between a holiday in Europe and a holiday at home. To the Englishman it probably means the difference between freedom and the loss of it, for the British economy is so precariously balanced that any pronounced slide over the knife edge must lead to widespread hardship and to a measure, at least, of social disintegration. There are many conservative Americans who have told me that a return to the bread lines of the early thirties would mean revolution in the United States. That is a measure of the importance to Britain of her export trade.

It is not, therefore, greed or cynicism which makes Britain seek to maintain and develop trade even with those parts of the world where there are political régimes unsympathetic or even hostile to Britain. Nor is it certain that a refusal to trade with one's enemy will weaken him as much as it weakens oneself. There is a difference between dictatorship and democracy which is relevant here. If tens of millions of Chinese or Russians are forced below the level of subsistence, Chinese or Russian policy will not necessarily be affected at all: the salt mine or the firing squad can look after everything. But if a relatively small number of British people, say a million or two, were forced to subsistence level or somewhere near it, because of our inability to maintain a high level of international trade, British policy must be profoundly affected and in ways, one would suppose, not at all beneficial to the cause of the West.

There is another consideration which is often lost sight of.

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While there is general agreement that there should be no export of materials which are of direct strategic advantage to the Communist bloc there are marginal cases which would seem to be debatable. Twenty years ago 90 percent of British exports of machine tools went to Russia. If anything like the same thing were happening today there would be universal alarm on both sides of the Atlantic. And yet it is by no means certain that it would be justified. At any rate there is something to be said for a course of action which would increase Communist dependence upon the West. It would detract from the military strength of Communism, not add to it.

It would be misleading, however, to push these arguments too far. Economic self-sufficiency is one of the aims of the Communist bloc, and British trade with countries now behind the Iron Curtain (including China) was never, even between the wars, more than 7 or 8 percent of British exports: today it is doubtful if it would amount to 2 percent and it is unlikely that the figure could be greatly increased.

But quite apart from the general economic argument, strong if not overwhelmingly decisive, there seem to us to be strong political arguments for not imposing a total embargo on trade between East and West and even for developing it as far as may be done without adding to the over-all strength of the Communist bloc. The overriding purpose of the Western peoples is to defeat the Communist conspiracy. This purpose can be realized without war only if the Communist empire disintegrates from within itself, and the process of disintegration is likely to be facilitated rather than hindered by the extent to which there is a line of communication between the Communist peoples themselves and the outside world. It is surely as much in the interest of the peoples of the West to maintain this line of communication as it is in the interest of the dictatorships of the East to close it.

That is why the British attach so much importance to Hong Kong. It is not only that Hong Kong has been in the past a valuable center of entrepot trade. It is a channel, in some sort, between the Chinese mainland and the outside world, a listening post, the shop window of democracy in a totalitarian wilderness. It is the West Berlin of Communist Asia.[1]

[1] It is thought in many quarters, I know, that Hong Kong has been a center for the smuggling of strategic materials into Red China. This is not substantiated by the figures. In 1952, after the embargo on the export of strategic war matériel, exports through Hong Kong dropped from £100,000,000 to £32,000,000 in 1952, and to £33,000,000 in 1953.

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VI

I have tried here, however superficially, to touch upon some of the differences between the British and the American outlook upon the international scene, and to explain as faithfully as I can the British point of view. I have not been able, in doing so, to conceal from myself that the differences are real and deep and such that they cannot be wiped away simply by good will. But differences in outlook, even though they may be sharp, do not necessarily predicate divergencies in policy. Indeed, they must not be allowed to do so. And they need not do so.

For policy can always be compromised, as principles cannot be compromised. There are those in Britain who pine for what they like to believe is "an independent foreign policy." There are those in the United States who hold that in the last resort America "can go it alone." There can be no such thing, today, as an independent foreign policy for Britain, any more than there can be an independent defense policy or an independent economic policy. America can no more go it alone today than she could in 1941. It is no longer possible to have a good American foreign policy or a good British foreign policy. One can say that the judgment of the State Department is better than the judgment of the Foreign Office—or vice versa—but one cannot say that the Foreign Office or the State Department can therefore write its own ticket. There is only one policy that can be effective now, and that is an Anglo-American policy.

If this is true there must be compromise, and on the part of both countries. I have very little doubt that over recent months there has been a great deal of compromise, and that in the months to come there will be more. Each time that United States policy is compromised it must seem to Mr. Dulles, I imagine, that the result is very much worse. Each time that British policy is compromised it must seem to Mr. Eden a very much worse policy. But things are not so bad as they would be if each insisted on his own policy.

And what are we to do who have no responsibility for policy? Surely our duty is clear. It is something more than that each should back his fancy, as though the whole thing were a kind of heroic boxing match. It is that each in his own country must understand, and insist, that a worse joint policy is better than the best separate policy. For the best is often the enemy of the good. In this field it most certainly is.

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THE ARAB REFUGEE DILEMMA

By Don Peretz

SIX years after their flight from Palestine, over 880,000 Arab refugees continue to be a problem in the Middle East. Their great sprawling camps are an eyesore which no visitor can bypass if he travels beyond the heart of most of the Arab capitals. In Beirut, refugee encampments are clustered only a ten-minute drive from the hotels and night clubs of the city's "Riviera" area. In Amman and Damascus the unemployed Palestinians can be found squabbling with the natives for every scarce job opening. The burden of them weighs down the economy and social and political structure of every Arab state where they live.

Today, the number of refugees is even greater than it was in 1948. The extension of the Palestine war in that year and early in 1949, and a yearly natural increase of almost 25,000, has more than doubled the population of the camps despite United Nations appropriations of nearly $427,000,000 to liquidate the problem.

The heaviest concentration of refugees is in Jordan where 500,000 of them constitute nearly a third of the population. In the Egyptian-occupied Gaza strip more than 200,000 are crammed into an eight-mile-wide area which is hardly more than one vast refugee camp; they outnumber the natives there four to one. The 100,000 Palestine refugees in Lebanon have increased that country's population by nearly 10 percent. Only in Syria, where they number 85,000, do they fail to create an almost insurmountable social and economic problem.

By a bare statistical estimate the refugees are better off than the majority of citizens in most of the host countries. They have access to complete health services, and a social service network covers a large part of their needs. The incidence of sickness and the death rate figures are lower among them, and their birth rate is higher. Of the children of school age, 45 percent receive free education. Although their food rations are meager—1,600 calories of flour, pulses, sugar and rice per month—they are sufficient to prevent serious malnutrition.

But a trip through the camps is enough to convince an observer that these statistics tell but little of the plight of the refugees. Many who today live in hovels or leaky, torn tents on mud flats or rocky, arid hillsides were middle-class city dwellers who

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owned their own modest but adequate houses in their native land. Their social life was built on a family system which has been smothered in the overcrowded, sweltering encampments. The self-reliance and individual initiative of former tradesmen and farmers have been drowned in the present boredom and frustration. A professional refugee mentality has begun to grow among those who for nearly seven years have been unable to find any way of existence other than living off handouts from the United Nations. Although only about a third of the refugees live in the tent camps of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency, nearly all draw United Nations rations. The economic conditions and morale of all have so deteriorated that a growing number are pressing for entry into the camps where they are guaranteed complete UNRWA sustenance.

Despite UNRWA's excellent record—there is no doubt that it has kept most of the refugees alive for the past five years—the psychological and emotional impact of this long-existing situation greatly endangers Middle East stability and adds to the risks of war in that area. Resident observers believe that the two greatest political influences in the camps are the Communists and the national extremist followers of the ex-Mufti of Jerusalem. Hatred of the British, the Americans, the United Nations and Israel permeates the camps—in that order. Resentment has built refugee tensions into a hysteria which makes it dangerous for Westerners to enter some camps. Failure to settle the problem is still a main obstacle to peace between the Jews and Arabs. It is blocking American technical and economic assistance as well as Allied defense plans in the area. Recognition of these facts has made solution of the problem a main objective of United States policy in the Middle East, and has led the United States to contribute over $153,000,000 as its share of the costs of the United Nations refugee relief and rehabilitation program.

II

The international efforts on behalf of the refugees have had two foci. On the one hand, beginning in 1948 and continuing to the present, the Conciliation Commission for Palestine (C.C.P.) has endeavored to find a long-term political solution. It has been supported behind the scene in talks by the British and the Americans with both sides. On the other hand, immediate relief operations costing $192,000,000 have kept the refugees alive. When it

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became obvious to the C.C.P. in 1949 that its political parleys were stalemated, it tried an economic approach linked with projects for Middle East economic reconstruction. So far neither



of these efforts has made any appreciable difference in the number and condition of the refugees. The efforts to find an economic solution of the problem they present have been an expensive

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failure; not more than 3,000 of the 880,000 refugees have been permanently absorbed by the U.N. development program.

The earliest approach in 1948 aimed at the most obvious political solution—repatriation. Count Folke Bernadotte, the United Nations Palestine Mediator, spent much time and effort in attempting to persuade Israel to allow a return of the Arabs *en masse*. His recommendations were underscored in a United Nations resolution calling upon Israel to permit "those refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at peace with their neighbors . . . to do so at the earliest practicable date. . . ." After the Count failed in his persuasion his work was turned over to the C.C.P. But Israel's insistence that a signed peace with the Arab states was part of the United Nations settlement and Arab demands that repatriation be fulfilled prior to direct peace parleys soon stalemated the efforts of the C.C.P. to solve the refugee problem. The apparent impossibility of simultaneously carrying out the call for peace talks and the repatriation of refugees has kept United Nations efforts to find an end for the Palestine problem turning in a vicious circle ever since. Meanwhile constant border incidents, talk by the Arabs of a "second round" of fighting and then boycott of direct parleys have increased Israel's sense of insecurity to a degree where at present all thought of repatriation has become illusory.

But even if by some miracle there were to be a peaceful settlement of the Jewish-Arab dispute it could no longer realistically include repatriation of more than the merest token number of Arabs. The Palestine they left no longer exists. A completely new social and economic structure has been built upon the ruins of their abandoned towns and villages, their orange groves, orchards and fields, their industrial, rural and urban property. Their flight made possible rapid Jewish immigration which more than doubled Israel's population in the first three years.

Today nearly half the new Jewish immigrants live in homes abandoned by the Arabs. They occupy nearly 400 Arab towns and villages. About a quarter of the buildings now in use in Israel formerly were Arab property. The Arabs left over 10,000 shops and stores in Jewish hands. The Israel Custodian of Absentee Property took over more than 4,000,000 dunams of former Arab land, or nearly 60 percent of the country's cultivable area. This was nearly two and a half times the total Jewish-owned property at the time the state of Israel was estab-

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lished, and includes most of its olive orchards, a large part of its fruit and vegetable crop land and almost half the citrus groves.

Recognition that there was a political stalemate on the repatriation issue occurred by August 1949, when the C.C.P. turned to its new economic approach and established the Economic Survey Mission for the Middle East, under the Chairmanship of Gordon R. Clapp. The Mission, it was hoped, would produce an over-all plan enabling the Arab governments "to overcome economic dislocations created by the hostilities . . . to reintegrate the refugees into the economic life of the area on a self-sustaining basis . . . [and] to promote economic conditions conducive to the maintenance of peace and stability in the area."

When it was ready to report, the Mission's principal recommendations were for an early termination of relief and the substitution of productive employment through works projects which would benefit both the refugees and their host nations. The Mission was not overly optimistic about the results of its survey. As Mr. Clapp said in his final report, the Mission at the beginning had cherished a hope—"a faint hope to be sure"—that several large development projects, based on surveys and reports already made by government missions, private engineers and other experts, could be recommended for immediate exploitation by large capital outlays. He continued: "The Mission's hope has not been realized. The region is not ready, the projects are not ready, the people and Governments are not ready, for large-scale development of the region's basic river systems or major undeveloped land areas. To press forward on such a course is to pursue folly and frustration and thereby delay sound economic growth."

In lieu of major schemes, the Mission proposed a number of short-term pilot demonstration projects that could be commenced without delay or large capital expenditures, could employ a fairly large number of refugees, and if successful, could serve as a base for future larger projects. They included road construction, housing, water conservation, terracing, afforestation and irrigation works near refugee centers in Jordan, Lebanon and Syria. To execute these projects the United Nations General Assembly set up UNRWA and authorized it to spend $34,700,000.

The new works program was vigorously planned and pushed by UNRWA during the first year of its operations. But the refu-

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gees viewed the projects with suspicion and the Arab governments lent them little coöperation. The refugees feared that success would prejudice their rights to return eventually to Palestine. Of the 878,000 refugees on the Agency's rolls in 1950, the largest number employed was 12,287 in December, and seven months later the figure had dwindled to a mere 812. Although these UNRWA projects primarily benefited the local governments, these contributed almost nothing to their costs. When the work was finished, the refugees returned to their tents and ration lines. None of them was economically integrated. UNRWA reported to the General Assembly that it had "found itself financing and operating labor camps to build public works which the governments themselves would have built the following year." When its public works funds began to run out, UNRWA decided to bring that part of its program to a close. It had created no permanent benefit for the refugees nor financial relief for the United Nations, but had cost five times more than simple relief.

A new start toward an economic solution of the refugee problem was made when the General Assembly established a reintegration fund of $30,000,000 in November 1950. Its purpose was to help the refugees repatriate if the opportunity developed, or to resettle elsewhere if they chose to do so. Jordan agreed to use the fund for a few small projects and Egypt offered to draw on it for a survey of the Sinai desert in the hope that 10,000 refugee families could be settled there if water were found. Both governments consented to this only on assurances that refugee rights to repatriation and compensation were in no way affected.

Such assurances were a prerequisite to any successful United Nations operations in the Arab countries. Failure to state them in unequivocal terms was liable to lead to such failures as that of the 1950 UNRWA public works projects. Therefore the General Assembly's resolution establishing the reintegration fund carefully emphasized that it in no way prejudiced these refugee rights. But the Arab governments were not satisfied with the language; they wanted to know more about the terms and conditions of the benefit to the refugees, although such information could hardly be presented until surveys based on agreements with the Arab states had been carried out. They also feared the integration plans might suffer a fate like that of the previous year's work relief program, which led them to ask assurances that any new projects would receive sustained and substantial interna-

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tional support. A paradoxical Arab reaction against assuming any administrative responsibility on the one hand, and on the other, a fear that any program not administered by themselves might be a "bridgehead of Western imperialism," created an additional dilemma for UNRWA.

To break this stalemate the director of UNRWA, John Blandford, made a round of the Arab capitals to explain the plans and ask for help, culminating in parleys with a special committee of the Arab League States at Alexandria. There were hammered out the elements of a new plan which became the basis of the Sixth General Assembly's Palestine refugee resolution. It offered a new three-year program of financial support which the Arab states had requested. Their contribution was to be in the form of land and services. Improvement of refugee living conditions was not to compete or conflict with schemes for improving local conditions. UNRWA must abstain from participation in the political negotiations on the Palestine problem.

To carry out this program the United Nations authorized expenditure of $250,000,000, divided into $50,000,000 for relief and $200,000,000 for reintegration. Relief was to be reduced progressively until it would cost the United Nations only $5,000,000 for the year 1954. Fifty million dollars during the first and third years and $100,000,000 during the second were to be laid out for rehabilitation. A gradual transfer of responsibility for both relief and rehabilitation projects from UNRWA to the Arab states was projected, although they continued to condition their coöperation on an absolute guarantee of the refugees' political rights regarding repatriation and compensation.

III

The objective of the three year program was to liquidate the financial responsibility of the United Nations in 1954. Actually, not even 3,000 Palestinians have been made self-sufficient to date. Only 10 percent of the $200,000,000 has been used, and the United Nations has had to increase its relief funds. Progress on major development schemes is lacking.

To begin with, the negotiation of program agreements with the Arab governments dragged on far longer than expected; from 7 to 17 months were required to conclude the four agreements signed. The next step was to determine specific projects in the three countries—Jordan, Syria and Egypt—which signed up for

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major development works. Even in the Sinai desert of Egypt and in the fertile Jordan Valley, where government lands were freely offered, extensive engineering surveys had to be made. Were there sufficient water resources and was the soil suitable for cultivation? Preliminary engineering work, preparation of specifications, drafting of plans and designs, took many more months. At that rate years would pass before the construction of a single large hydroelectric plant with its main and subsidiary irrigation canals. It was estimated that the only major plan which even reached the survey stage, the Yarmuk-Jordan Valley scheme, would require a minimum of five years' work.

The Jordan Valley scheme is the most elaborate and expensive of the four so far worked out in draft. It was intended to absorb some 150,000 refugees after five years of work at a cost of $40,000,000. The plan, which included development of the richest lands of the Hashemite Kingdom through irrigation, was linked with a project for the unified development of the entire Jordan Valley. It called for efficient storage and control of Jordan waters for hydroelectric power and irrigation regardless of international frontiers, and was designed to give maximum benefits with the least cost to people on both sides of the river.

Acceptance by Jordan, Syria, Lebanon and Israel of the basic principle of the plan is essential if its full benefits are to be realized. To convince them of its importance President Eisenhower delegated Eric Johnston as his Special Representative to the area. But Mr. Johnston has found that differences between Israel and the Arabs concerning the plan are so great that the implementation of it in the near future does not appear very likely. The Israeli were worried lest the diversion of Jordan water to the Arab states under the plan would interfere with their own development of their sparse desert lands and permanently curtail their settlement projects in the empty but strategic Negev.

The announcement of a unified development scheme gave most of the Arab states an opportunity to stress their old demands. "No Arab nation will coöperate with Israel on anything until Israel executes the resolutions on Palestine passed by the United Nations in 1948," said the Jordan Minister to Washington, Yusuf Haikal. Although some Arabs agreed to the principle of unified Jordan development they continued to insist that they would not deal directly with Israel and would not concede that country's right to use Jordan waters for development of the Negev.

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In Mr. Johnston's view, the Arab objections could be overcome by negotiating separate agreements between each of the riparian states and the United Nations. But even if such agreements are worked out, the implementation of them will be technically involved among nations still in a state of war, or at best, not on speaking terms. Allocation of water rights, or dredging and construction work in strategically sensitive areas where the river separates Israeli and Syrian troops by only a few feet, will be difficult without coöperation, let alone a complete absence of violent border flare-ups. The difficulty is increased by the fact that Israel refuses to accept international control or supervision.

Added to the political obstacles in the way of the Yarmuk-Jordan scheme are problems inherent in the social and economic structure of the Arab countries. The UNRWA plans call for irrigating 30,000 dunams in Syria and 490,000 in Jordan, although no accurate land tenure surveys of many areas where the bulk of the refugees would be absorbed have been made. In both countries absentee ownership of great estates in the most fertile regions is common. Many of the smaller private farms are so fragmented that despite improvement of irrigation facilities there is little likelihood of increasing agricultural output. Large numbers of peasants live on *musha'a* (communal owned) land which is periodically redistributed, thus encouraging mining of the soil rather than its conservation. Large-scale development projects in such a setting are hardly likely to benefit more than a handful of individuals with vested interests in the lands affected. Before a plan which is rational in social as well as in engineering terms can be worked out, a change in the distribution of land holding —which in the region means power—must be brought about.

A second major UNRWA development project would help, if successful, to relieve Egypt of the 200,000 refugees locked up in the Gaza strip. Barriers have been raised against their entrance into Egypt herself. Although the Nile Valley is one of the most productive agricultural regions in the world, it is also the most overpopulated. The Egyptian Government's own plans for economic reconstruction call for emigration rather than an increase in population. And without risking their lives by attempting to cross Israel, the Gaza refugees have no way of reaching any other Arab states, which are not eager to receive them anyway.

The only apparent outlet at present for the crowded population in the Gaza area is the UNRWA development and resettle-

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ment project in the Sinai desert. Although half a century ago the El Arish scheme for Zionist colonization in that area failed because no water sources were found there, UNRWA invested $100,000 in a new water search. It also failed. But Arab leaders from Palestine insisted that the failure to find water was only a British plot to frustrate part of their plans for concentrating the refugees along the frontiers of Israel in preparation for a reconquest of the "homeland." The Egyptian Government is also eager not to abandon Sinai, for both economic and strategic reasons. If settlement there became possible, it might absorb not only the Gaza refugees but provide an outlet for Egyptian surplus population. Furthermore, settlements in the region could defend it against military thrusts like that in 1948 when Israeli troops almost reached the Suez Canal. With these ends in mind the Egyptian Government signed new UNRWA agreements for engineering and economic surveys of Sinai. The new proposal is that instead of searching for water in the desert, water might be brought there from the Nile. For the past year and a half engineers have been examining the possibility of siphoning sweet water from the Ismailia Canal, which is fed by the Nile, under Suez to the Sinai peninsula. If that could be done, 120,000 dunams could be irrigated for the benefit of 60,000 to 70,000 refugees.

All the Arab refugees could be absorbed in Syria, according to UNRWA technical surveys. That country has a cultivable area of over 14,000,000 acres, of which about 6,000,000 are at present under the plow. Yet Syria has been slow to develop her resources for her own native population, let alone for the Arab refugees. The reasons for this lag are mainly political.

Since the Syrian Republic was established, its governments have been unstable. Four revolutions since the outbreak of the Palestine war have prevented any long-term constructive planning. Although comparative political stability was achieved after the Shishakli coup d'état in November 1951, his régime collapsed in March 1954. The budget had been showing an annual deficit, due largely to military expenditures. Attempts at reform were made through distribution of state-owned land among tenant farmers, establishment of government credit banks, and a progressive income tax; but they were feeble. The coalition government established after Shishakli's downfall has not undertaken any constructive programs. Unsettled conditions of land tenure

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lege, for example. The day-to-day duties of any career officer are engrossing; details tend to absorb his full energy. As he progresses have also blocked development schemes of either the Syrian Government or the United Nations.

Middle Eastern anti-Westernism has its center in Syria and it breeds continual suspicion against any large-scale projects financed by foreigners. This mistrust prevents Syria from joining the Point Four program, and strengthens her resistance against loans from abroad. It also would preclude a welcome to any large number of Palestinians as immigrants, since there would be question as to their loyalty. For the same reason resettlement of any large number of refugees is impossible since that would be considered tantamount to admission of defeat by Israel.

Shishakli did modify his policy of self-sufficiency for Syria in September 1950 to the extent of agreeing to accept UNRWA's help in absorbing the 85,000 refugees already in the country. However, the strength of public opinion prevented any official announcement of the agreement for many months, and no progress was made in carrying it out. Under the new agreement with UNRWA, $30,000,000 was to be reserved for an integrated program of technical training and education, and the development of industry, commerce and agriculture. The total sum was to have been absorbed by June 1954, but by that date only $500,000 had been spent. The Syrian Government's part of the agreement was to provide public lands, but by early 1954 only two small areas had been contributed, one of 1,700 dunams near Homs and a second of 160,000 dunams near Damascus. Only 20 families could be resettled on the first, while the second consisted of a tract of marginal land on the outskirts of the Damascus oasis, of which only 10,000 dunams can be cultivated. Most of the soil contains quantities of salt and alkali which would have to be washed out at great cost to be suitable for agriculture. Eleven wells have been drilled at a cost of $88,000 in a search for irrigation water, but only one is producing enough to be of practical use.

The cost of developing these lands for the few refugee families which could settle them is five times what it would be in other areas which the Syrian Government has withheld from UNRWA. Areas more suitable for agriculture were found in the north and northeast of the country; opportunities exist there on land in the state domain not only for major development schemes but also for many cheaper and quicker projects involving only minor

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pumping from the Euphrates. But there the Syrian Government has refused to permit refugee settlement.

Political considerations make any refugee resettlement in Lebanon impossible. Despite the designation of the Litani River area as a site for one of the four pilot projects proposed by the Clapp Mission, all United Nations development plans there in connection with the refugees were abandoned. Lebanon's attitude toward the refugees is so unaccommodating that not only are they refused citizenship but even the right to work. Fears of upsetting the tenuous balance of the country's communal system cause this lack of hospitality.

According to official estimates, Christians constitute a slender majority of about 53 percent of Lebanon's population. But no accurate census has been made for many years, and it is common knowledge that today Moslems outnumber the Christians. Nevertheless, political and social life continues to operate as though Lebanon were a Christian republic. The system of proportional representation in the executive and legislative branches of the government is based on the inflexible official estimates which are presumed to be static. Since 90 percent of the Palestine refugees in Lebanon are Moslems, granting them citizenship would overturn the official figures along with the whole structure of government.

IV

Assuming that the major development programs of UNRWA should succeed, they would absorb no more than 320,000 refugees. No plans have yet been considered for the remaining 550,000. Present proposals contemplate parallel development programs undertaken with aid such as that offered by F.O.A., the Export-Import Bank, the International Bank, the British Middle East Office, the United Nations Technical Assistance Board and self-help from the nations concerned. No visible progress in absorbing refugees has been made through the help of any of these agencies as of the present writing.

No Arab government would dare to initiate a resettlement project of its own. The very idea is associated by nationalists with defeat by Israel and with "Western imperialism." Israel's desire to see the refugees absorbed in the Arab states is in itself enough to rouse strenuous opposition. The Arab retort is to demand repatriation and to point out the absence even of adequate

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Israeli offers of compensation for the hundreds of millions of dollars' worth of Arab properties now in Jewish hands.

Although three governments did sign agreements with UNRWA, it should not be imagined that their official attitude toward resettlement has been modified. According to the Agency's acting Director this was merely "an indication that they appreciate that the facilities offered to the refugees are no more than temporary, and that the acceptance by a refugee of a house and an opportunity to resume a normal life does not in any way affect or reduce his right to repatriation or compensation when the time comes." The frequent manifestos submitted by refugee organizations rejecting UNRWA resettlement schemes ignore or widely misunderstand this basic principle. Refugee opposition, with which local opinion tends to sympathize, is "a formidable obstacle which must be overcome if tangible progress is to be achieved in implementing the . . . three year plan." UNRWA alone cannot do much to change refugee attitudes, still less that of the local population. Such a change would require the combined efforts of the Arab governments in full and unqualified support of the Agency. But no Arab government now feels strong enough to take on such a great political liability.

"The outlook is not, however, entirely dark," according to UNRWA officials. They report that individual refugees, when offered opportunities to take advantage of minor projects, are ready and willing to abandon the enervating life of the camps. Some have even approached the Agency asking for a chance to become self-supporting.

Such small-scale successes have occurred mostly in Jordan. There, as part of an $11,000,000 agreement aimed at making approximately 5,000 refugee families self-supporting, two small agricultural projects were carried out on state lands. One, at Marj Naja in the Jordan Valley, cost about $100,000. There some 40 families are cultivating 800 dunams with water from wells developed by the Agency. Houses, tools, agricultural equipment and livestock were provided to assist the project. The second, near Jenin, is on rain-fed land, and therefore cost only about $17,000. It has succeeded in making 100 refugees self-sufficient.

Part of the $11,000,000 was used to establish a series of small agricultural settlements along the Israel frontier. By June 1954, 263 families whose land was on the Israel side of the border had been settled. The crazy-quilt pattern of border adjustments

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fixed by the Israel-Jordan Armistice Agreement in 1949 cut about 100,000 Palestine Arab farmers off from their lands, abandoning them in Jordan villages with no means of livelihood. These people, who from the rocky hills watch new Jewish immigrants work the fields in the plain which formerly were theirs, constitute the main group of "infiltrators" who create the strings of incidents like those which led to Kibiya. Groups of them nightly cross the borders to try to reap crops on their former lands, to steal irrigation pipe, or to take vengeance for a family member who may have been a casualty in some previous infiltration escapade. It is hoped that UNRWA resettlement of these landless infiltrators, although they are not all refugees according to the strict definition of the term, will help ease the friction between Israel and Jordan. So far four new border settlements have been set up, and several more are planned with UNRWA funds.

In Amman, the capital of Jordan, an urban housing project costing $68,000 was also financed under the same agreement. Fifty dwellings were completed on the outskirts of the city late in 1952 for 250 refugees who had already found employment. The provision of a house at a nominal charge enabled them to become completely self-supporting. The agreement also made possible the employment of another 800 refugees and their dependents through establishment of the Jordan Development Bank. It began with an authorized capital of $1,400,000, of which 80 percent was contributed by UNRWA, 10 percent by the Government of Jordan, and 10 percent by other subscribers. The Bank's articles of association stipulate that 80 percent of the loans issued must benefit the refugees directly. By June 1953 the Bank's loans amounted to $621,000, a little over half of it for agriculture and most of the rest for industrial development.

What has been the reason for the success of these small projects in comparison with the lack of success so far of the large scale development schemes? The psychological factor is perhaps the most important. In small projects the individual refugee can see the actual house he will live in, the plot of land he is to cultivate or the handloom he will operate. The dangers and possible insecurity awaiting a person removed from the ration rolls or from a camp to a specific farm or industrial plant where chances of making a living are clearly visible are far less than those which might be in store for a mass of people who will be moved to some outlying region where no one knows who will live in what houses

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or farm what kind of land. The Palestine Arab will gladly surrender the security offered by UNRWA relief for that of a definite and tangible alternative which is within the realm of his experience. But nearly all would prefer to remain professional refugees rather than gamble on an experiment beyond their ken.

The Arab governments and refugee leaders can afford to lend their support to small projects or at least not sabotage them. They are not stigmatized with the political tag of "resettlement" which in nearly all Arab minds is synonymous with defeat by Israel and abandonment of the hope of repatriation to the homeland. Small projects are largely self-sustaining and do not require inter-regional coöperation—as does the Jordan-Yarmuk scheme —either between an Arab state and Israel or between competitive Arab neighbors. Neither is a long term infusion of foreign capital and experts required to see such projects through. Cooperation is therefore not a political liability.

Finally, small projects are not based on immense plans to which the region is not yet socially adjustable. There is no need for the responsible administrative machinery (non-existent in any Middle East nation) required to run a major river development. In the case of small projects, moreover, the social structure of the nation—its land tenure and distribution of economic power—does not have to be changed to guarantee minimum benefits to the refugees.

The Clapp Mission's warning that "The region is not ready, the projects are not ready, the people and Governments are not ready . . ." should be borne in mind. Even should the large-scale development plans eventually come to fruition their capacity to absorb refugees would still be limited and some supplementary means of integrating the refugees would be required ultimately.

Small-scale projects do offer some hope, albeit over a long period of time, for solving the refugee dilemma. Although to date they have absorbed fewer than the natural increase of the refugee population, their freedom from political difficulties seems to indicate that they could be more widely encouraged. Such support would not imply abandonment of the major schemes for development or render useless the work which has been done on them. When the time comes and the Middle East is ready for regional development, the small projects which meanwhile will gradually have assimilated many refugees can be integrated into an over-all plan.

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THE CHALLENGE TO MAGSAYSAY

By Russell H. Fifield

THE election of Ramon Magsaysay to the presidency of the Philippines in November 1953 was widely interpreted as the beginning of a progressive era in the history of the Islands. The new President has the genuine support of the great majority of the people of the Philippines, and is keenly aware of the many problems that face them. But the program of rural reform with which he came to office had not been worked out in much detail, and although Magsaysay has been energetic, sincere and zealous, the first year of his administration has been somewhat disappointing to the Filipinos. This need not be too surprising, for his task is hard and complicated. Some of his most difficult problems are administrative, and only experience can enable him to find the solutions.

More serious is the challenge to his leadership from factions among the politicians of the Philippines. As in the United States, the President of the Republic must have the support of Congress if he is to accomplish his major objectives. Since a substantial part of the Magsaysay program requires legislative approval, he must capitalize on his popular appeal to win the acceptance in the Philippine Congress of economic measures that are contrary to the vested interests of many of the legislators. At the same time he has to work on a personal basis with the leaders of the Congress. As might be expected, his pro-American policy has been seriously challenged, and his rural reform program has met sharp opposition.

An analysis of the 1953 election that brought Magsaysay to Malacañan reveals the nature of the political obstacles that threaten his administration and suggests what is likely to be the pattern of Philippine politics in the next few years. The campaign of 1953 was the most bitterly contested in the history of the country. In a way the fundamental issue was whether or not free and honest elections would be held in the country that is sometimes called the show window of democracy in the Far East. The success of Magsaysay, a Nacionalista, over the Liberal nominee, President Elpidio Quirino, indicated that the government of the Republic could be changed by the ballot.

The electoral campaign was fought against the background of the 1949 general election when the Liberals swept the nation with the selection of President Quirino, Fernando Lopez as Vice President, all of the eight senatorial candidates, and more than two-thirds of the house. That election, characterized by many instances of fraudulent voting and open terrorism, was never conceded by the Nacionalista presidential candidate, Jose P. Laurel, who continued to refer to President Quirino as the "squatter in Malacañan." The off-year election of 1951, on the other hand, was conducted under reasonably honest conditions, and resulted in the victory of the Nacionalista senatorial candidates along with substantial gains for the party in the provinces.

The first of the major parties to hold its national convention was the Nacionalista. On April 12, 1953, Ramon Magsaysay was chosen the party's standard bearer in a secret ballot of 702 votes to 49 for his rival Camilo Osias.

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Senators Laurel and Recto, the "old guard" of the Nacionalistas, had previously thrown their support to Magsaysay. This assistance not only assured Magsaysay's nomination but also meant that the two senators would hold key positions if he were elected. The Liberal convention, opening on May 24, was divided on the issue of secret balloting. The followers of candidate Quirino wanted *viva voce* voting and those of candidate Carlos P. Romulo called for the secret ballot. In the final voting on the issue the Quirino faction won, with the Romulo group walking out of the convention. Quirino was then unanimously acclaimed the presidential candidate of the Liberal Party. Romulo was subsequently nominated for the same office in the Democratic Party created for him.

From June 21 to August 22 when the Nacionalistas and Democrats formed a coalition against the Liberals, the Philippines witnessed an exciting three-cornered race under the Quirino-Yulo, Magsaysay-Garcia and Romulo-Lopez tickets. The party of each presidential candidate had its platform, its rules and its propaganda. But since personalities rather than platforms are more important in Philippine politics, attention should be directed to the ranking nominees.

The backgrounds and personalities of Quirino, Magsaysay and Romulo are as contrasting as colors in the rainbow. President Quirino had held the highest office of the country since April 17, 1948, when as Vice President he succeeded upon the sudden death of President Manuel Roxas. An Ilocano from Ilocos Sur, he was graduated from the college of law, University of the Philippines, and has held the offices of Congressman, Senator and at various times Secretary of Finance, Interior and Foreign Affairs. He is cosmopolitan, egotistical, shrewd and sincere in his beliefs. In poor health, and during most of this period in a Baltimore hospital, he was the oldest of the candidates.

In marked contrast, Ramon Magsaysay is young, energetic, personable and unsophisticated. Born in Zambales and still a relatively poor man, he never had an extensive formal education. A guerrilla leader against the Japanese during the Second World War, he was later twice elected to Congress and in September 1950 chosen by President Quirino to be Secretary of National Defense. In the latter office he made a splendid record in greatly reducing the menace of the Communist-led Hukbalahaps, and, during the 1951 election, in insuring relatively free and honest balloting at the polls through the use of the armed forces.

Carlos P. Romulo is the most distinguished leader in foreign affairs yet produced by the Philippines. Editor, author, soldier, he had served as resident commissioner to the United States, ambassador in Washington, chief of the Philippine delegation to the United Nations, foreign minister of the Philippines and president of the General Assembly of the United Nations. Born in Tarlac, he was educated at the University of the Philippines and Columbia. Eloquent, ambitious, capable, Romulo is better known on the world stage than in the provinces of the Philippines. The coalition of the Nacionalista and Democratic parties formed in an effort to insure the defeat of President Quirino resulted in his withdrawal as candidate.

In terms of issues it would be difficult to find any that were definitive. The opposition devoted considerable time to characterizing the administration as

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riddled by graft and corruption and to asserting the need for a change at Malacañan. The Quirino party called for more time to continue the program of "total economic mobilization" and raised the charge of American intervention in the politics of the Philippines. The coalition accused the administration of planning to terrorize the voters at the polls, while the Liberals accused the opposition of preaching revolution if Magsaysay lost. Quirino told the voters that if he won they would be electing two presidents, as under the constitution he could serve only two more years and Yulo as Vice President would succeed him. Magsaysay in his campaigning in the barrios informed the people that if he won he would give them roads, schools and artesian wells. Foreign policy in practical terms was not an issue in the campaign either with respect to the ratification of the Japanese peace treaty or the revision of the Bell Trade Act, the two major problems facing the occupants at Arlegui.

From the mountains and swamps to Luzon the Communist-led Hukbalahaps or People's Liberation Army viewed the campaign with interest. Definitely weakened by Magsaysay's work as Secretary of National Defense under President Quirino and following an over-all program of retrenchment until better days, the Huks supported a number of candidates in Luzon regardless of party. This policy of "critical support" caused them in practice to back certain Liberals in central Luzon and certain Nacionalistas in the northern and southern parts of the island. Quirino's charges of United States intervention were quickly supported by Luis Taruc, who asserted that "American imperialism" was the key issue in the election, and also by Moscow's *Izvestia* which declared that the Philippines was still "an American colony."

Amid the political turmoil of the times the Commission on Elections occupied a key position. Charged under Article X of the Constitution of the Philippines with the "enforcement and administration of all laws relative to the conduct of elections," the three Commissioners—Chairman Domingo Imperial and his two associates, Leopoldo Rovira and Rodrigo D. Perez, Jr. —rendered valiant service to the cause of democracy. Though the Commission on Elections has no powers of prosecution, it can send recommendations to the Department of Justice, and in order to insure free elections, it can deputize law agencies. In the 1953 elections the Commission authorized the use of some 17,000 men from the Philippine Constabulary, from units in training and in the reserves, and from various battalion combat teams to police the polls.

The efforts of the Commissioners to insure clean and honest elections were reinforced by a number of factors. In an unprecedented step on September 15 the hierarchy of the Catholic Church in the Philippines issued a pastoral letter asserting that "God will surely punish, if the State does not, anyone who for personal or party considerations will sink so low as to prevent or sabotage free and fair elections, thus depriving the will of the people of its effect, and those whom the people choose as their representatives of their lawfully-acquired positions." Leaders of other church groups likewise called for honesty at the polls.

In another effort to arouse public opinion, the NAMFREL (National Movement for Free Elections) waged an active campaign, especially in Ma-

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nila. Closely associated with its effort were the League of Women Voters and certain other civic-spirited organizations in the Philippines. The Philippine press and radio also contributed to the crusade for free elections. Although the press and radio are largely centered in Manila and their influence is limited in the vast majority of the 52 provinces, the effect of these calls for honesty and freedom at the polls was real and salutary. At the same time, however, most of the press tended to exaggerate in black headlines charges of plots and counterplots whether or not valid. The fact that the large newspapers in Manila were generally anti-administration testified to the freedom of the press.

From the constitutional viewpoint one of the rather effective but not too subtle influences on free elections was the announcement by 15 members of the Senate, all belonging to the opposition, that they would not proclaim any candidate as president elect or vice president elect if they believed his victory had been secured through fraud and terrorism. In a "Covenant" dated October 18, the senators of the Nacionalista, Democratic and Citizens Parties agreed that they would all be bound by a majority of the signatories to the pact.

The rôle of the United States was also a significant factor in the crusade for an honest and free election. Although American officials in Washington and Manila explicitly asserted that they were not taking sides in the Philippine election, they called for honesty at the polls. A substantial part of NAMFREL material was printed and distributed with the assistance of American officials. A relatively large number of American journalists visited Manila and wrote articles on the political situation, most of them favorable to the candidacy of Magsaysay; this helped create a situation that led President Quirino to accuse the Americans of intervention. Senator Laurel's remarks, rather vaguely calling for American assistance in preserving Philippine democracy, added fuel to the President's apprehensions. Although the issue of intervention did not assume overwhelming proportions, Americans in the Philippines did have a healthful influence on the conduct of the elections.

It was against this complex background that the Filipinos went to the polls. Despite the apprehension of many people, the elections were held with no more than a dozen deaths, half of these being in the traditionally troublesome province of Cavite. As widely expected, Magsaysay swept the country, receiving 2,912,992 votes to Quirino's 1,313,991. At noon November 12 the President conceded his defeat, although he later bitterly accused the Joint United States Military Advisory Group of assisting in his rival's victory. Garcia easily defeated Yulo but his margin was less than that of Magsaysay. There can be no doubt of the fact that the election was an overwhelming personal victory for the new President.

In the Senate the coalition won all eight seats. As a result, the new Senate consists of 13 Nationalistas, five Democrats and one Citizens Party member against three Liberals and one independent. The twenty-fourth seat is vacant in view of the election of Garcia to the vice presidency. In the House of Representatives the former large Liberal majority was reduced to less than one-third of the total membership of the body. Among the victors, it should be noted, the Nacionalistas far outnumbered the Democrats.

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Certain significant developments stand out in retrospect. In the first place it was demonstrated that by democratic processes an opposition coalition could overthrow a well-entrenched and long-established administration. Here stress should be placed on the words "democratic processes," for a major consideration was the holding of an election generally free from fraud and terror. Although the campaign indicated that political morality was not at a high premium, the election itself revealed definite progress in political maturity. The use of soldiers to police the polls was necessary, but a practice that should eventually be terminated. Democracy in the Philippines should be able to flourish without the presence of armed men near the voting places.

A development of considerable importance in the last election was the awakening of public opinion in many of the villages of the Philippines. No leader has ever before come so close to the masses of Filipinos. In addition to Magsaysay's visits to many parts of the country, the organization of the Magsaysay-for-President Movement (M.P.M.), reaching from Manila far into the provinces, helped to focus support for the candidate. And closely associated with the M.P.M. was the Women's Magsaysay-for-President Movement, effective in organizing the feminine vote. All of this was something new and encouraging in Philippine politics, and it could mean great potential strength for the President in appealing to the people.

The election results also indicated that Magsaysay would face many difficulties in Congress. Although the Nacionalista Party holds a majority of the seats in the Senate, its leaders are by no means united in their estimate of Magsaysay or in their support of his program. They had tended to look upon him simply as the candidate most likely to defeat Elpidio Quirino, and once he became President the struggle for power in the party began in earnest. Senator Claro M. Recto emerged as the leader of the anti-Magsaysay faction among the Nacionalistas, while Senator Jose P. Laurel, whose son is Speaker of the House of Representatives, sought to maintain party unity. The Democratic senators and the one Citizens Party member who had supported the candidacy of Magsaysay found themselves in a strategic position in the struggle for leadership between Recto and the President. The controversy among the Nacionalistas came to a head on June 6, 1954, and Magsaysay triumphed temporarily at least, when, in a caucus at Malacañan, the leaders pledged all-out support for his foreign and domestic program. Magsaysay was thus recognized as the spokesman for the major policies of the party. Although Recto was not present he later stated that he would abide by the declaration of principles approved at the caucus.

The direction of Philippine foreign policy is an important issue in the controversy between Recto and Magsaysay. The victory of the Nacionalistas in the election placed them in a position to determine the attitude of the Philippines toward the rest of the world. Recto, long considered the spokesman of the party in foreign policy, believes in Asia for the Asians, in closer ties with the geographic neighbors of the Philippines, in extensive reparations from Japan, in abrogation of the Bell Trade Act under certain conditions, and in the lessening of the ties with the United States. Magsaysay is in favor of complete coöperation with the United States and is eager to maintain the intimate relations existing between the two republics. The basic

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differences of viewpoint between the President and the Senator on foreign policy have not been resolved.

One of the plainly encouraging consequences of the election, however, was the weakening of the Hukbalahaps, who had hoped that fraud and violence at the polls would discredit the democratic process in the Philippines. Even during the campaign, the personal popularity of Magsaysay and his promises of rural reform had weakened the peasant support of the Huks in Luzon, and when he was in office he pressed his policy of carrying the fighting to the Communist insurrectionists while endeavoring to remedy the conditions that breed revolt. In contrast with the dissidents the new administration declared that they must surrender their arms and submit for trial if accused of crime; in return it promised that those who were cleared or pardoned would be resettled with government aid. On May 17 Luis Taruc, one of the top Communist leaders, surrendered to Philippine authorities and faced trial on charges of murder, rebellion and sedition. Although the backbone of the dissidents has not yet been broken and a Communist policy of infiltration in the government, press, youth organizations and labor unions of the country is not unlikely, the surrender of Taruc added prestige to Magsaysay as an anti-Communist leader.

The more active rôle taken by the Catholic Church in domestic politics during this election may also be a portent for the future. The pastoral letter calling for free elections was a constructive forward step, but a later statement by prominent figures in the Church amounted in effect to a plea for votes for Catholic candidates and raises a number of serious questions. In his educational policy especially, President Magsaysay must cope with the always difficult problem of Church and State.

So far as international politics are concerned, President Magsaysay is off to a good start. If the charges of American intervention had been proved, or if the voters had acted as if they believed it, the reputation of the Philippines would have seriously suffered in the eyes of other newly independent and very nationalistic states in Southeast Asia. In reality, however, the election provided a good example of the processes of free democratic government —an example that should be especially helpful to Indonesia, which is still wrestling with the problem of holding a national election. Although the present influence of the Philippines in Southeast Asia is limited, it is quite possible that Magsaysay will strengthen the ties of his country with its neighbors without weakening the special relations existing with the United States, thus also strengthening the ties between America and Asia. Whether the new President can become a popular leader around whom the free nations of Asia can rally against international Communism will, however, depend upon the success with which he copes with his domestic problems.

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RECENT BOOKS ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

By Henry L. Roberts

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General: Political, Military and Legal

STRATEGY FOR THE WEST. BY MARSHAL OF THE ROYAL AIR FORCE SIR JOHN SLESSOR. New York: Morrow, 1954, 180 p. $3.00.

Sir John Slessor, an experienced strategist and former Chief of the Air Staff, proposes a military and political strategy to deal with the Soviet Communist danger in an age of atomic and hydrogen bombs. Regarding the nuclear weapons as indispensable to avert a general war, he counts on a proper combination of diplomatic means and conventional weapons to check Communism and, eventually, to drive it behind its own frontiers. The book provides much food for thought, though there are some disturbing gaps in the author's argument.

SURVEY OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 1938: VOLUME III. BY R. G. D. LAFFAN AND OTHERS. New York: Oxford University Press (for the Royal Institute of International Affairs), 1953, 622 p. $9.50.

SURVEY OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, 1939–1946: HITLER'S EUROPE. EDITED BY ARNOLD AND VERONICA M. TOYNBEE. New York: Oxford University Press (for the Royal Institute of International Affairs), 1954, 730 p. $14.50.

DOCUMENTS ON INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, 1939–1946. VOLUME II: HITLER'S EUROPE. SELECTED AND EDITED BY MARGARET CARLYLE. New York: Oxford University Press (for the Royal Institute of International Affairs), 1954, 362 p. $6.10.

DOCUMENTS ON INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS: 1951. SELECTED AND EDITED BY DENISE FOLLIOT. New York: Oxford University Press (for the Royal Institute of International Affairs), 1954, 698 p. $9.60.

These two new volumes of the "Survey" are a continuation of the task of picking up the narrative broken by the Second World War. The third volume for 1938 carries the story of Czechoslovakia from Munich to the occupation of Bohemia and Moravia in March 1939. It also deals with events in northeastern Europe, the Soviet Union and the Balkans, and with British, French and German rearmament down to Munich. The volume on Hitler's Europe is part of the special war series. It covers the political and economic structure of the Hitlerian empire, and includes chapters on Italy, Vichy France and the Free French Movement, and the occupied and satellite countries in Western and Eastern Europe. Of the volumes of documents, the first is complementary to the Survey volume on Hitler's Europe; the second illustrates the Survey for 1951 (noted here July 1954).

TOTALITARIANISM. EDITED BY CARL J. FRIEDRICH. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1954, 386 p. $6.50.

A symposium of articles originally prepared for a conference held by the American Academy of Arts and Sciences in March 1953. The contributors are an exceptionally able and informed group, and while, as is inevitable in such a work, more problems

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are raised than solved, the book is most useful in suggesting the dimensions and complexity of that phenomenon we have come to recognize as the most pressing threat of our century.

THE THREAT OF SOVIET IMPERIALISM. Edited by C. Grove Haines. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1954, 402 p. $5.00.

A valuable symposium of papers prepared for a conference held by the School of Advanced International Studies in August 1953. The distinguished group of contributors discuss in turn the Soviet posture toward the non-Soviet world, techniques of subversion and attack, Soviet strength, and Soviet relations with, and actions in, the Western World, the Near and Far East. In general, the picture which emerges is about as grim and unpromising as it could be.

WHY DICTATORS? By George W. F. Hallgarten. New York: Macmillan, 1954, 379 p. $5.50.

The author of an important study of imperialism here undertakes a comparative analysis of the political techniques of dictatorship and of the political and social circumstances which have been conducive to such a régime. The treatment is both historical and by type: Classical, Ultra-Revolutionary, and Counter- or Pseudo-Revolutionary.

GERMAN MARXISM AND RUSSIAN COMMUNISM. By John Plamenatz. New York: Longmans, 1954, 356 p. $4.25.

Primarily a study in political theory and ideology, the book's aim is to discuss Marxism as developed by its German authors and then to trace the modifications of this theory when taken over by the Russian revolutionaries and applied to a quite different environment. In so far as he deals with current affairs Mr. Plamenatz gains comfort from his belief that while the Soviet leaders are dupes of a false philosophy, they are sane and not maniacs.

AMERICA FACES WORLD COMMUNISM. By Anthony Trawick Bouscaren. New York: Vantage Press, 1954, 196 p. $3.00.

In part an acrid criticism of past American policies toward the Communist Powers, in part an exposition of present dangers and how to overcome them, based on the premise that the defeat of Soviet Communism is no longer an issue in doubt.

GUIDEPOSTS TO THE FUTURE. By William H. Wilbur. Chicago: Regnery, 1954, 176 p. $2.50.

Holding American foreign policy in the postwar years to have been ill-conceived and misdirected, General Wilbur, formerly economic adviser to Syngman Rhee, proposes, in reasonably concrete terms, the elements of a new approach.

THE VOCABULARY OF POLITICS. By T. D. Weldon. Baltimore: Penguin, 1953, 199 p. 50 cents.

The author of this study of the use of language in political theories has three aims: to show that the questions of traditional political philosophy are wrongly posed, that the theoretical foundations of political systems are worthless, and that this does not matter. At times the semantic mills grind exceeding fine.

COMMUNISM IN EDUCATION IN ASIA, AFRICA AND THE FAR PACIFIC. By Walter Crosby Eells. Washington: American Council on Education, 1954, 246 p. $3.00.

A study of the extent and reasons for Communist influence in education in several score non-European countries and colonies, based on two years' travel in 1951–1953. The author was formerly educational adviser for SCAP in Tokyo.

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N.A.T.O. AND ITS PROSPECTS. By Wing-Commander J. D. Warne. New York: Praeger, 1954, 110 p. $3.00.

Some thoughts on the function and adequacy of NATO in view of the absence, in the author's opinion, of any really coherent policy toward the Soviet Union.

THE "ISMS." By Eugene O. Golob. New York: Harper, 1954, 681 p. $6.00.

An effort to classify and analyze the major contending ideologies in the contemporary world. These the author places under four headings: capitalism, neomercantilism, Socialism and corporatism. His own preference is for a *via media.*

THE ORIGIN AND GOAL OF HISTORY. By Karl Jaspers. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1953, 294 p. $4.00.

Meditations by the eminent German philosopher on the meaning of history, the relation of past to present and of present to future. Abounding in insights and suggestive observations, many of which cast light on current problems, but rather elusive and cloudy when considered as a whole.

PAST AND FUTURE. By William H. McNeill. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954, 216 p. $3.75.

A thoughtful essay, by a historian at the University of Chicago, on the present state of the world as it has arisen from the past and as it promises to develop in the future. Written quietly and composedly, it nonetheless faces the grimmer prospects squarely and with perception.

THE CATHOLIC CHURCH IN WORLD AFFAIRS. Edited by Waldemar Gurian and M. A. Fitzsimons. Notre Dame (Ind.): University of Notre Dame Press, 1954, 420 p. $4.25.

Sixteen essays on the rôle of the Roman Catholic Church in the contemporary world. Half the essays are concerned with the Church's position in a number of Western European and American nations.

A HUNDRED YEARS OF WAR. By Cyril Falls. London: Duckworth, 1953, 419 p. 30/. (New York: Macmillan, 1954, $6.00.)

An able history of warfare over the century 1850–1950, with particular emphasis on strategy, tactics, weapons and administration, by an authority in this field.

FROM ARROW TO ATOM BOMB. By Stanton A. Coblentz. New York: Beechhurst Press, 1953, 539 p. $6.00.

A history of warfare from the Stone Age, with an attempt to get at the underlying attitudes toward conflict. After considering the wars of the twentieth century the author makes some proposals for altering the psychological urges promoting conflict.

MOSLEMS ON THE MARCH. By F. W. Fernau. New York: Knopf, 1954, 312 p. $5.00.

A rather general introduction to the contemporary Moslem world, extending from North Africa to South Asia. (A translation of "Flackernder Halbmond." Erlenbach-Zurich: Rentsch, 1953, 319 p. Swiss Fr. 12.50.)

DER DIPLOMATISCHE DIENST. By Richard Sallet. Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1953, 366 p.

The history and organization of the foreign offices and diplomatic services of France, Great Britain and the United States from their origins to the present.

WEGE UND IRRWEGE DER DIPLOMATIE. By Wipert von Blücher. Wiesbaden: Limes, 1953, 184 p.

Chapters on the nature of diplomacy and the requirements for a diplomat.

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THE LEGAL COMMUNITY OF MANKIND. By Walter Schiffer. New York: Columbia University Press, 1954, 367 p. $5.50.

An extensive historical and critical examination of the concepts which came to find embodiment in the principles underlying the League of Nations and the United Nations. The late author (he died in 1949) was of the view that a something-for-nothing expectation was an important feature of this set of concepts.

LEGAL CONTROLS OF INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT. By Julius Stone. New York: Rinehart, 1954, 851 p. $12.00.

A massive systematic treatise which undertakes to examine, and to diminish, the gap between the formulations of international law and the actual conduct of interstate relations. The author is a professor of international law at the University of Sydney.

EXPROPRIATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW. By S. Friedman. London: Stevens (for the London Institute of World Affairs), 1953, 236 p. 35/.

A monograph on an issue of increasing international importance.

General: Economic, Social and Cultural

CAPITALISM AND THE HISTORIANS. Edited by F. A. Hayek. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954, 187 p. $3.00.

Essays by T. S. Ashton, L. M. Hacker, W. H. Hutt and Bertrand de Jouvenel in development of the thesis that historians have, in general, harbored an anti-capitalist bias, especially with respect to their treatment of the Industrial Revolution. A number of relevant points are made, but the work is conceived in a rather polemic spirit.

THE LOGIC OF BRITISH AND AMERICAN INDUSTRY. By P. Sargant Florence. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1954, 368 p. $5.00.

A comparative study of British and American industry in regard to size of firms, extent of concentration, locational patterns, investment incentives, labor relations and government controls.

THE DOLLAR. By Roy Harrod. New York: Harcourt, 1954, 156 p. $3.50.

Four lectures by an able and informed British economist: the evolution of the dollar, the operation of the Federal Reserve System, international economic coöperation, and the dollar gap.

THE FUTURE OF STERLING. By A. C. L. Day. New York: Oxford University Press, 1954, 227 p. $2.00.

A rather pessimistic estimate of the prospects of the sterling area and of sterling as an international currency.

ECONOMIC CONTROLS AND DEFENSE. By Donald H. Wallace. New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1953, 260 p. $2.00.

This book dealing with the problems raised by the use of direct controls over the economy in a protracted period of defense is the fourth and last volume of the series sponsored by the Committee on Economic Stabilization of the Twentieth Century Fund.

FOREIGN EXCHANGE IN THE POSTWAR WORLD. By Raymond F. Mikesell. New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1954, 658 p. $5.00.

This very substantial study of foreign exchange policies since the Second World War brings together a great deal of information on exchange-controls systems and

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payment arrangements, evaluates them, and sets forth the principal international currency problems to be solved.

UNE POLITIQUE ÉCONOMIQUE D'HÉMISPHÈRE. By Xavier de Chamisso. Paris: Fournié, 1953, 677 p. Fr. 1875.

A heavy rather than weighty monograph on inter-American economic and financial coöperation since 1939.

THE FRONTIERS OF ECONOMIC KNOWLEDGE. By Arthur F. Burns. Princeton: Princeton University Press (for the National Bureau of Economic Research), 1954, 367 p. $5.00.

Essays written over a number of years by the present Chairman of the President's Council of Economic Advisers, relating to the subject of economic change and the means of increasing our understanding and control of it.

THE CHALLENGE OF MAN'S FUTURE. By Harrison Brown. New York: Viking, 1954, 290 p. $3.75.

One of the more important books to deal with the projection of the relationship between population and resources. The author, a geochemist who assembles a great deal of pertinent information from a number of fields, is on the pessimistic side. While technology may permit the feeding of many more people, its application, especially if a delayed crisis is to be avoided, would require enormous social reorganization and control.

THE TROPICAL WORLD. By Pierre Gourou. New York: Longmans, 1953, 156 p. $3.50.

A study of the economic and social conditions determined by a tropical climate and of the prospects for future development. A translation of "Les Pays Tropicaux," noted here April 1948.

DER GEIST IN DER DESPOTIE. By Peter de Mendelssohn. Berlin: Herbig, 1953, 281 p.

On the possibilities for creativity and moral and intellectual integrity in a totalitarian society, a theme developed through a study of Knut Hamsun, Jean Giono, Ernst Jünger and Gottfried Benn.

The Second World War

UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II. THE EUROPEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS: THE SUPREME COMMAND. By Forrest C. Pogue. Washington: Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Military History, 1954, 607 p. $6.50.

This volume in the official series, "United States Army in World War II," and one of the subseries devoted to the European Theater of Operations is focused on SHAEF and its commander, General Eisenhower.

BILANZ DES ZWEITEN WELTKRIEGES. Oldenburg: Stalling, 1953, 472 p.

Twenty-seven German specialists—generals, admirals, economists, scientists and technicians—try to assess the significance of the Second World War in their various fields. The result is a somewhat disjointed series of chapters, many on the technical conduct of the war, others on international relations, social and economic changes, etc.

V-2. By Walter Dornberger. New York: Viking, 1954, 281 p. $5.00.

A German official, responsible for rocket development, tells the story of V-2, how it came into being and what obstacles prevented it from becoming a decisive weapon in the closing stages of the Second World War.

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DER 20. JULI IN PARIS. By Wilhelm von Schramm. Bad Wörishofen: Kindler, 1953, 412 p.

On the anti-Hitler plot among the German officers stationed in the West and on the repercussions in Paris of the attempt of July 20, 1944. The author has been able to make use of the war diary of the Oberbefehlshaber West which showed up in the summer of 1951.

COMMUNIST GUERILLA WARFARE. By Brigadier C. Aubrey Dixon and Otto Heilbrunn. New York: Praeger, 1954, 229 p. $4.50.

A study of guerrilla warfare as practised by the Russians against the Germans in 1941–1945 and the anti-guerrilla measures taken by the Germans. The intent of the book is practical rather than historical.

MARTYRS AND FIGHTERS. Edited by Philip Friedman. New York: Praeger, 1954, 325 p. $4.00.

A documentary account, based on official and unofficial reports and testimonies, of the Nazi assault on the Warsaw ghetto.

IWO JIMA: AMPHIBIOUS EPIC. By Lt. Col. Whitman S. Bartley. Washington: U. S. Marine Corps, Historical Branch, 1954, 253 p. $4.75.

A volume in the series of historical monographs on United States Marine operations in the Second World War.

The United States

GOD'S COUNTRY AND MINE. By Jacques Barzun. Boston: Atlantic (Little, Brown), 1954, 344 p. $5.00.

In these observations and reflections on the cultural and social scene in the United States, Professor Barzun has a happy capacity for remaining cool on many issues which cause most temperatures to rise sharply and yet displaying eloquent enthusiasm or dislike for a number of features of our life which he feels warrant more attention. The result is a brisk and witty appreciation of our machine-age democracy.

AMERICA DAY BY DAY. By Simone de Beauvoir. New York: Grove Press, 1953, 337 p. $4.00.

The report of a four-month trip to and across the United States, by a prominent French writer. Aggressively subjective, very selective in the areas of American life sampled, the book is of primary interest as a double-mirror problem: what reflection does the author see when looking at America and what reflection does the American reader see in his encounter with the author?

BUT WE WERE BORN FREE. By Elmer Davis. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1954, 229 p. $2.75.

In these articles and addresses dealing with a number of subjects but centering in our present discontents in this age of real and fomented apprehension and mistrust, Mr. Davis succeeds in transferring to the printed page the same timbre of expression which has established his position as a radio commentator and news analyst.

THE END OF INNOCENCE. By Jonathan Daniels. Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1954, 351 p. $5.00.

A review, part history and part memoir, of the years of the Wilson Administration when the United States and its leaders were driven into the world and wars of the twentieth century—the end of innocence. Written in a personal vein by the son of Wilson's Secretary of the Navy, who is the central character, the book provides many revealing views of the young, and immature, F.D.R.

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SECRETARY STIMSON. By Richard N. Current. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1954, 272 p. $4.50.

A critical examination of certain aspects of the long public career of the late Henry L. Stimson. In general the author finds little to praise and much to blame in Stimson's handling of the Manchurian issue, the events leading to Pearl Harbor, or the employment of the atomic bomb; he was one, in Mr. Current's words, "among a whole blundering generation of American statesmen."

WOODROW WILSON AND THE REBIRTH OF POLAND, 1914–1920. By Louis L. Gerson. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1953, 166 p. $4.00.

The author's aim is "to show how the patriotic leaders of the movement for a new Polish nation worked on President Wilson through the Polish immigrant population of the United States, and the Polish-American vote, to secure the rebirth of Poland." Feeling such pressures to be of questionable value for the American national interest, the author shows little sympathy for the Polish position, which he often depicts in a one-sided fashion.

IS THERE A REPUBLICAN MAJORITY? By Louis Harris. New York: Harper, 1954, 231 p. $3.50.

While the author, reasonably enough, refuses to give a simple answer to his question, he does provide material for thought for both parties in his discussion of the fluid play of forces and interests which make up the present American political scene.

THE ADVICE AND CONSENT OF THE SENATE. By Joseph P. Harris. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1953, 457 p. $5.00.

A substantial, and critical, examination of the history of the confirmation of appointments by the Senate and an analysis of the practical effects of this procedure. Most of the cases studied are from the last two or three decades.

CIVIL LIBERTIES AND THE VINSON COURT. By C. Herman Pritchett. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954, 296 p. $5.00.

A professor of political science, who has previously written on the Roosevelt Court, here considers the Supreme Court decisions relating to civil liberty during the years the late Fred M. Vinson was Chief Justice, 1946–1953. Using the quantitative method he finds that "authority" rather than "liberty" was gaining the ascendancy.

ELIHU ROOT AND THE CONSERVATIVE TRADITION. By Richard W. Leopold. Boston: Little, Brown, 1954, 222 p. $3.00.

This brief volume in the Library of American Biography is a useful contribution to our understanding of the conservative tradition in American life—recently the object of growing interest—principally in the fields of foreign affairs and governmental administration.

THE AGE OF SUSPICION. By James A. Wechsler. New York: Random House, 1953, 333 p. $3.75.

The editor of the *New York Post* tells of his youthful involvement in the Communist movement in the 1930's, his subsequent break, his activities as a journalist, and his running battle with Senator McCarthy, including his bizarre examination by the latter.

Western Europe

L'EUROPE UNIE. By André Philip. Paris: Presses Universitaires, 1953, 364 p. Fr. 900.

A professor at the University of the Saar discusses in considerable detail the eco-

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nomic conditions for European unification and the commercial relations between Europe and the world market. In the concluding section he touches on the relationship between economic and other forms of European coöperation.

A SOCIAL GEOGRAPHY OF EUROPE. By J. M. Houston. London: Duckworth, 1953, 271 p. 21/.

A survey of Europe's rural and urban geography and demographic pattern, designed primarily for students.

L'EUROPE ET SA POPULATION. By Alfred Sauvy. Paris: Éditions Internationales, 1953, 221 p. Fr. 750.

A study of European demographic trends in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the meaning and extent of overpopulation, and suggested courses of action. The whole study is aimed at demonstrating the utility of European union and integration.

AN IDEA CONQUERS THE WORLD. By Count Coudenhove-Kalergi. New York: Roy, 1954, 310 p. $5.00.

The autobiography of the exceptionally single-minded proponent of Pan-European organization is of interest for its revelation both of the circumstances underlying Count Coudenhove-Kalergi's dedication and of this particular strand of twentieth-century history.

GOUVERNER, C'EST CHOISIR. By Pierre Mendès France. Paris: Julliard, 1953, 146 p. Fr. 360.

An extended parliamentary address by the present French Premier, delivered in June 1953 and presenting his views on French foreign and domestic policy.

CONFESSION D'UN VIEUX DIPLOMATE. By Comte de Saint-Aulaire. Paris: Flammarion, 1953, 794 p. Fr. 1500.

Memoirs of a French diplomat who entered the service in 1892, was in Morocco before the First World War, in Rumania from 1916 to 1920, and served as ambassador in London in the early 1920's.

SOUVENIRS DE SEPT ANS, 1937–1944. By Jérôme Carcopino. Paris: Flammarion, 1953, 702 p. Fr. 1150.

Memoirs, largely of the Vichy period, by the Minister for National Education in 1941–1942 and thereafter Director of the École Normale Supérieure.

THE HEART OF NORWAY. By Frank Noel Stagg. London: Allen and Unwin, 1953, 194 p. 18/. (New York: Macmillan, $4.25.)

This sequel to the author's book on North Norway, noted here July 1953, sketches the history of the central provinces, chiefly in the medieval and early modern period.

OROSTID. By Erik Palmstierna. Stockholm: Tiden, 1952–53, 2 v.

An extensive diary, by a Swedish Social Democratic leader and diplomat, of the years of the First World War and revolutionary upheaval in Finland, Russia and the Baltic.

MODERN GERMAN HISTORY. By Ralph Flenley. New York: Dutton, 1953, 406 p. $6.00.

A survey, by a professor at the University of Toronto, of the history of Germany since the Reformation. Designed for university students and the general reader.

THE SECRET FRONT. By Wilhelm Hoettl. New York: Praeger, 1954, 327 p. $3.95.

An account of the Nazi security service before and during the war, by an official in the Sicherheitsdienst who was responsible for central and southeastern Europe.

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It has something to say on a number of the murkier events of those years—the Red Army purge, the Venlo incident, Mussolini's rescue, etc.

DAS SPIEL UM DEUTSCHLAND. By Fritz Hesse. Munich: List, 1953, 443 p.

Informative memoirs of the years 1935–1945 by a German press officer in London, subsequently an adviser to Ribbentrop. His principal concern is with British-German relations, but there is also some new material on Hitler's conduct of the war.

DIE TRAGÖDIE DES DEUTSCHEN LIBERALISMUS. By Friedrich C. Sell. Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1953, 478 p.

A history of the vicissitudes of German liberalism, from its beginnings in the early nineteenth century, its rise and fall in the Bismarck era, its brief victory in the Weimar republic, to its collapse after 1930. In the author's view the German liberal tradition was real, not just a façade, and he undertakes to discover why it lacked the strength to counterbalance other, and destructive, political forces.

ZWISCHEN LONDON UND MOSKAU. By Joachim von Ribbentrop. Leoni am Starnberger See: Druffel, 1953, 336 p.

Memoirs of the Nazi Foreign Minister, written in prison, to which are appended some of his last letters plus documentary material from 1938 and 1939.

WEG UND ZIEL DER DEUTSCHEN WIRTSCHAFT. By Gustav Bothe. Berlin: Engel, 1954, 344 p.

After sketching the state of German industry and agriculture in 1936 the author then turns to Germany's postwar economic problems: manpower, agriculture, industry, trade, commerce, money. He is strongly opposed to a socialized or planned economy as a means of solving these problems.

DER 17. JUNI. By Arno Scholz and Werner Nieke. Berlin: Arani, 1953, 95 p.

A brief account of the uprising in East Berlin and the Soviet Zone of Germany in June 1953.

AUSTRIA'S INTERNATIONAL POSITION, 1938–1953. By Cary Travers Grayson, Jr. Geneva: Droz, 1953, 317 p. Swiss Fr. 15.

A substantial study of Austria's rôle in the international picture since 1938, with greatest emphasis on the period of four-Power control after 1945. The author has done a great deal of work in the sources, and the book includes a useful documentary annex.

CINQUE ANNI A PALAZZO CHIGI. By Carlo Sforza. Rome: Atlante, 1952, 586 p. L. 2000.

The late statesman's account, written during the months of his last illness, of Italian foreign policy during his five years as Foreign Minister from 1947 to 1951. A useful contribution to contemporary history, it includes a number of previously unpublished documents as well as a selection of his speeches.

MUSSOLINI. By Paolo Monelli. New York: Vanguard, 1954, 304 p. $4.00.

A translation, with the addition of some new material, of the Italian biography, "Mussolini: Piccolo Borghese," noted here April 1951.

STORIA DEI FUORUSCITI. By Aldo Garosci. Bari: Laterza, 1953, 308 p. L. 1400.

The author, biographer of Carlo Rosselli, here presents the history of the political exiles who left Italy at various stages of the Mussolini era. Of value as a study of exile politics and for the light cast on a number of postwar Italian political alignments and differences.

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MY MISSION TO SPAIN. By Claude G. Bowers. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1954, 437 p. $6.00.

Mr. Bowers was American Ambassador to Spain from 1933 to 1939, and the body of this personal report on that tumultuous and tortured period was written shortly thereafter. As a result it has both the heat of contemporary judgment—it is strongly anti-Franco—and the freshness of recent impressions; but it should not be read as a history of the Civil War.

MÉMOIRES D'UN MONARCHISTE ESPAGNOL, 1931–1952. By Juan Antonio Ansaldo. Monaco: Éditions du Rocher, 1953, 319 p. Fr. 660.

A condensed translation of the memoirs of a Spanish monarchist who was an active supporter of Franco during the Civil War but broke with the régime on matters of foreign policy during the Second World War.

LESSONS OF THE SPANISH REVOLUTION (1936–1939). By V. Richards. London: Freedom Press, 1953, 154 p. (New York: Ravin, $1.35.)

In support of the rôle of the syndicalist C.N.T. and the Socialist U.G.T. in the Spanish Civil War.

Eastern Europe

MANAGEMENT OF THE INDUSTRIAL FIRM IN THE USSR. By David Granick. New York: Columbia University Press, 1954, 346 p. $5.00.

This substantial monograph, in the series sponsored by the Russian Institute of Columbia University, is focused on the plant directors who manage the firms in Soviet heavy industry: how they administer production and personnel and how they are geared to the larger complexes of the planned economy, the government and the Communist Party.

HOW STRONG IS RUSSIA? By George B. Cressey. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1954, 146 p. $3.00.

"A geographic appraisal"—in terms of population, land, climate, resources and space—of the Soviet Union's economic and, less satisfactorily, of its political prospects.

THE RUSSIAN CHURCH AND THE SOVIET STATE, 1917–1950. By John Shelton Curtiss. Boston: Little, Brown, 1953, 387 p. $6.00.

An able, scholarly study of Soviet policy toward the Orthodox Church since 1917 —a shifting policy demonstrating a willingness to accommodate for reasons of state together with a basic and continuing hostility.

UKRAINIAN COMMUNISM AND SOVIET RUSSIAN POLICY TOWARD THE UKRAINE: AN ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY, 1917–1953. By Jurij Lawrynenko. New York: Research Program on the U.S.S.R., 1953, 454 p. $4.75.

An extensive guide to the literature on this important and controversial topic.

CHALLENGE IN EASTERN EUROPE. Edited by C. E. Black. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1954, 276 p. $4.00.

Twelve essays by Eastern European and American scholars and political figures dealing with the recent history, present tribulations and possible future of the nations lying to the west of the Soviet Union.

THE GREAT POWERS AND EASTERN EUROPE. By John A. Lukacs. New York: American Book, 1953, 878 p. $7.50, and Chicago: Regnery, 1954, $10.00.

A stimulating and substantial survey of diplomatic relations in, and relating to, Eastern Europe between 1917 and the falling of the Iron Curtain after 1945. The

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author, who is of Hungarian birth and now teaches in the United States, is generally critical of the policies of the Western Powers, and, more pointedly, of the American position vis-à-vis the Soviet Union during the Second World War; but while some of his conclusions may be debated they are well argued and based on an extensive acquaintance with the sources.

CENTRAL EUROPEAN DEMOCRACY AND ITS BACKGROUND. By Rudolf Schlesinger. London: Routledge, 1953, 402 p. 30/. (New York: Grove Press, $5.00.)

Giving a somewhat specialized meaning to his title, the author is primarily concerned with the origins, development, and fall in the 1930's of the labor and Socialist movements in Germany, Austria and, to some extent, Czechoslovakia. A substantial piece of work with some interesting interpretations, though tied to the framework of Dr. Schlesinger's particular Marxist outlook.

CROSS ROAD COUNTRY: LATVIA. Edited by Edgars Andersons. Waverly (Iowa): Latvju Grāmata, 1953, 386 p. $9.80.

A collection of articles on the geography, people, culture and history of Latvia.

DAS ÖSTLICHE POLEN. By Wladyslaw Studnicki. Kitzingen/Main: Holzner, 1953, 211 p.

On the areas east of the Curzon line, their history, ethnic composition, and the nature of the Polish claims.

THE POLITICAL CONTROL OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA. By I. Gadourek. Leyden: Stenfert Kroese, 1953, 285 p.

A study of the nature, extent and efficacy of the controls exerted by the Communist Party and the state apparatus over Czech society and individuals. The reader is likely to be impeded rather than aided by the sociological scaffolding.

O VZNIKU A ZALOŹENÍ KSČ. By Jindřich Veselý. Prague: Státní Nakladatelství Politické Literatury, 1953, 176 p.

The official story of the origin and foundation of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia superseding the earlier versions written by various (mostly purged) members of the Party.

KDO BYL VINEN? By Bohumil Laušman. Vienna: Vorwärts, 1953, 238 p.

The former chairman of the Social Democratic Party presents his version of the Czechoslovak crisis of 1948, endeavoring to explain his rôle in the developments leading up to the Communist seizure of power. Apologetic with little concrete evidence.

WILSONOVSKÁ LEGENDA V DĚJINÁCH ČSR. By Jiří S. Hájek. Prague: Státní Nakladatelství Politické Literatury, 1953, 220 p.

A specimen of contemporary historiography endeavoring to invalidate the "Wilsonian legend," *i.e.* the story of President Wilson's genuine interest in the liberation of the Czechoslovak people. Highly tinged by the Communist dislike of T. G. Masaryk and his associates.

TITO'S PROMISED LAND: YUGOSLAVIA. By Alex N. Dragnich. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1954, 337 p. $5.75.

The author, a professor of political science at Vanderbilt University who spent three years in Jugoslavia after the war, writes very critically of the new order, the manner in which it came to power and the way it has run the country over the last decade. He questions both the popularity and the stability of the régime.

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DESTIN DE LA ROUMANIE (1918–1954). By Henri Prost. Paris: Berger-Levrault, 1954, 279 p. Fr. 750.

A French observer, who lived in Rumania from 1931 to 1950, writes a well-informed history of that country's uneven and tragic course from the First World War to the present.

The British Commonwealth of Nations

CHURCHILL—BY HIS CONTEMPORARIES. Edited by Charles Eade. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1954, 461 p. $6.00.

A miscellany of some twoscore portraits and appreciations by Churchill's contemporaries over the long span of his career.

AS IT HAPPENED. By C. R. Attlee. New York: Viking, 1954, 312 p. $5.00.

This autobiographical sketch by the former Prime Minister is a good mirror of its author: restrained, undramatic, prosaic, but displaying the moral earnestness and balance which brought Mr. Attlee to the leadership of the Labor Party.

EMPIRE BY MANDATE. By Campbell L. Upthegrove. New York: Bookman Associates, 1954, 239 p. $3.50.

A study, completed in 1941, of the relations between Great Britain and the Permanent Mandates Commission of the League of Nations with respect to the British mandates in Africa, Iraq and Palestine.

THE SCOTTISH ECONOMY. Edited by A. K. Cairncross. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1954, 319 p. $6.00.

A symposium of papers giving a quantitative, statistical picture of the social and economic life of Scotland.

NATION OF THE NORTH. By D. M. LeBourdais. New York: Praeger, 1954, 270 p. $5.00.

A history of Canada since 1867, the political portion of which is centered on the three figures of Sir John A. Macdonald, Sir Wilfrid Laurier and Mackenzie King.

THE AUSTRALIAN WAY OF LIFE. Edited by George Caiger. New York: Columbia University Press, 1954, 158 p. $3.00.

A UNESCO-sponsored examination, by seven authors, of "Australian Ideals and Values," encompassing the nation, the family, the educational system, and political, economic and religious institutions and aspirations.

THE SUNBURNT COUNTRY: PROFILE OF AUSTRALIA. Edited by Ian Bevan. London: Collins, 1953, 256 p. 15/.

A collection of brief articles, some of them affectionate and sentimental, others rather thin, on Australia, its landscape and people, by a group of Australian writers living in Great Britain.

The Middle East

LA TURQUIE. By Jean-Paul Roux. Paris: Payot, 1953, 192 p. Fr. 750.

A concise survey of the geography, history and culture of Turkey.

NEUE HERREN IN MITTELOST. By Lily Abegg. Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1954, 558 p.

A Swiss journalist who has written some penetrating interpretations of the Far East here turns her attention to the Arab world. Though not an Arabist, she has recently spent two years to excellent advantage travelling about the Middle East

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and North Africa. The first half of the book is devoted to an introductory tour of the Arab countries and to portraits of the leading personalities. In the second half she tackles some of the major issues besetting the area: social tensions and nationalism, the conflict with Israel, Suez and the Sudan, the abundance of oil and the paucity of water, and the problem of defense.

THE ARABIAN PENINSULA. By Richard H. Sanger. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1954, 295 p. $5.00.

The author, Public Affairs Adviser of the Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs, Department of State, offers an informed and most interesting tour of Arabia, from the Kingdom of Ibn Sa'ud to the lesser known fringes of the peninsula: the oil-laden coast, Kuwait, Oman, Aden, Yemen. In all areas he stresses the growing impact of the new upon the old.

'IRAQ, 1900 TO 1950: A POLITICAL, SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC HISTORY. By Stephen Hemsley Longrigg. New York: Oxford University Press (for the Royal Institute of International Affairs), 1953, 436 p. $6.15.

In 1925 Brigadier Longrigg wrote "Four Centuries of Modern 'Iraq." The present book picks up the story at 1900 and provides a compact history, primarily political though including economic and social developments, of the last half-century. A valuable book, not lacking in marked opinions.

THE ANGLO-IRANIAN OIL DISPUTE OF 1951–1952. By Alan W. Ford. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1954, 348 p. $4.00.

A monograph analyzing the oil controversy up to July 1952, when the International Court of Justice dismissed the United Kingdom's application to submit the dispute to the Court. From this issue the author draws some conclusions concerning the rôle of law in the relations between states. In his view the case affirmed the existence and meaning of international law.

South and Southeast Asia

ECONOMIC PROBLEMS OF UNDERDEVELOPED COUNTRIES IN ASIA. Edited by B. K. Madan. Bombay: Oxford University Press (for the Indian Council of World Affairs), 1953, 290 p. Rs. 12/8.

An international symposium of articles, chiefly by Asian specialists, on the problems of economic development and on the progress under way in a number of Middle Eastern and Southeast Asian countries.

THIS IS INDIA. By Santha Rama Rau. New York: Harper, 1954, 155 p. $2.50.

An essay which is a graceful travel guide but also a useful dispeller of misconceptions the Westerner is likely to form when first confronted by the face of India.

FOOD ADMINISTRATION IN INDIA, 1939–47. By Sir Henry Knight. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1954, 323 p. $7.50.

A study, by an experienced administrator, of India's record in feeling her population during a particularly difficult period of sporadic food shortages. A volume in the useful series put out by the Food Research Institute at Stanford University.

POST-WAR AGRICULTURAL PROBLEMS AND POLICIES IN INDIA. By S. Thirumalai. New York: Institute of Pacific Relations (in coöperation with the Indian Society of Agricultural Economics), 1954, 280 p. $3.50.

A monograph on India's agricultural problems and on the agrarian, technological and economic reforms required to overcome them.

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JAPAN'S ROLE IN SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONALIST MOVEMENTS, 1940 TO 1945. By Willard H. Elsbree. Cambridge: Harvard University Press (for the International Secretariat, Institute of Pacific Relations), 1953, 182 p. $3.25.

An illuminating inquiry into the reasons why Japan received the coöperation she did against the European Powers in her drive into Southeast Asia, and why, later, she was herself unable to maintain the support of the national movements.

BURMA UNDER THE JAPANESE. By Thakin Nu. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1954, 132 p. $3.00.

Originally written in 1945, this record by Burma's Prime Minister is instructive both as an account of the Japanese occupation and the Burmese response, and for the insights it provides into the outlook of Burma's leaders.

POLITICAL SYSTEMS OF HIGHLAND BURMA. By E. R. Leach. Cambridge: Harvard University Press (for the London School of Economics and Political Science), 1954, 324 p. $7.00.

This investigation of the social structure of the Kachin population of northeast Burma is primarily a contribution to anthropological theory but is also of interest as an analysis of a piece in the mosaic of Burma's population.

THE STRUGGLE FOR INDOCHINA. By Ellen J. Hammer. Stanford: Stanford University Press (for the Institute of Pacific Relations), 1954, 332 p. $5.00.

A detailed survey of recent Indo-Chinese history, chiefly since World War II. Less concerned with internal developments within the three Associated States than with the evolution of their relations with France, the Vietminh and the outside world, the book makes wide use of French, Vietnamese and Communist sources and constitutes, in its net effect, a strong condemnation of French policy.

HISTOIRE D'UNE PAIX MANQUÉE: INDOCHINE 1945–1947. By Jean Sainteny. Paris: Amiot-Dumont, 1953, 260 p. Fr. 850.

A personal account of the early postwar period in Indo-China by the former French Commissioner in Tonkin. In the author's view the confused and fluid situation at that time held many possibilities, and he seems still of the opinion that an effective understanding with Ho Chi Minh might have been achieved.

LE LAOS, SON ÉVOLUTION POLITIQUE, SA PLACE DANS L'UNION FRANÇAISE. By Katay D. Sasorith. Paris: Berger-Levrault, 1953, 155 p. Fr. 440.

A brief historical sketch.

The Far East and Pacific Ocean

CHINA HANDBOOK 1953–54. Taipei (Taiwan): China Publishing Co., 1953, 627 p. (New York: Pierce Book Co., 1954, $6.50.)

A reference work, giving information on Free China, the Communist régime, a chronology of events from 1911, a who's who, and selected documents and laws.

GOVERNMENT AND ADMINISTRATION IN COMMUNIST CHINA. By S. B. Thomas. New York: International Secretariat, Institute of Pacific Relations, 1953, 150 p. $2.50.

A brief, largely chronological, introduction to the political and administrative structure of the Chinese Communist régime.

CHINA'S RESPONSE TO THE WEST. By Ssu-yü Teng and John K. Fairbank. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1954, 296 p. $6.75.

By means of excerpts from essays, diaries, speeches, etc., this interesting book surveys the way in which the leaders of China, its scholar-official class, reacted to

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growing impingement of the West upon their society over the century from 1839 to 1923.

INTRODUCTION TO THE ECONOMIC HISTORY OF CHINA. By E. Stuart Kirby. London: Allen and Unwin, 1954, 202 p. (New York: Macmillan, $4.25.)

An introduction, but one demonstrating real and original scholarship, to the study of China's economic history over the centuries. In part a tracing of the different stages of economic development and change, it is of most interest in its discussion of the historiography of the subject and in its critical examination of a number of modern clichés, Marxist and other, concerning the course of Chinese history.

TYPHOON IN TOKYO. By Harry Emerson Wildes. New York: Macmillan, 1954, 356 p. $4.50.

A quite critical, not very restrained but frequently entertaining account of the American occupation of Japan by a onetime official in SCAP. His principal target is General MacArthur and the higher command for attempting too much in too many directions with too little care for the consequences, and for claiming too many achievements.

GENERAL DEAN'S STORY. By Major General William F. Dean. New York: Viking, 1954, 305 p. $5.00.

A modest but graphic account of General Dean's capture and his three years as a prisoner in North Korea.

SUBSTITUTE FOR VICTORY. By John Dille. Garden City: Doubleday, 1954, 219 p. $3.00.

In this *Life* correspondent's judgment, the conduct of the Korean War, and its termination, are, as the title suggests, to be approved rather than castigated.

DECISION IN KOREA. By Rutherford M. Poats. New York: McBride, 1954, 340 p. $4.75.

While the publisher's blurb calls this a definitive history, the author, head of the Japan bureau of the United Press, more modestly, and properly, disavows the claim. It is, as he says, "a reporter's survey" of the war from its beginning through the first half year of the armistice; a useful, unheated, tentative assessment.

ECONOMIC RE-EXAMINATION OF THE PHILIPPINES. By Salvador Araneta. Malabon, Rizal (Philippines): Araneta Institute of Agriculture, 1953, 369 p.

A collection of speeches and articles, prepared between 1947 and 1953, on Philippine economic problems and Philippine-American economic relations. The author is a professor of agricultural policy.

Africa

THE SOUTH AFRICAN WAY OF LIFE. Edited by G. H. Calpin. New York: Columbia University Press, 1954, 200 p. $3.50.

Ten essays, by specialists, on different aspects of South African society and its complex racial problems.

SUKUMALAND: AN AFRICAN PEOPLE AND THEIR COUNTRY. By D. W. Malcolm. New York: Oxford University Press (for the International African Institute), 1953, 224 p. $4.80.

A careful study, by a British colonial administrator and agricultural specialist, of land use in this region in Tanganyika. It is a technical subject but one of utmost importance to Sukuma society as a whole.

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COLONIAL SOCIAL ACCOUNTING. By Phyllis Deane. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1954, 360 p. $9.50.

An effort to apply the methods of national income accounting to a colonial economy. Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland are used as case studies.

FOUR GUINEAS. By Elspeth Huxley. London: Chatto and Windus, 1954, 303 p. 21/.

A well-written, perceptive and untechnical account of travels in Nigeria, the Gold Coast, Sierra Leone and the Gambia, with an intelligent discussion of the odd and frequently distorted products of the mingling of the new with the old, the European with the African.

ASPECTS DE L'INDUSTRIALISATION EN AFRIQUE CENTRALE. By Raymond Bertieaux. Brussels: Institut des Relations Internationales, 1953, 318 p.

A survey of present industries and the factors promoting or inhibiting further industrialization in the lands of the Congo basin and British East Africa.

ETHIOPIA AND ERITREA. By E. Sylvia Pankhurst and Richard K. P. Pankhurst. Woodford Green, Essex (Eng.): Lalibela House, 1953, 360 p. 18/.

Miss Pankhurst, long a passionate supporter of Ethiopia, here gives a lengthy but partisan account of the Eritrean issue in the decade after 1941. At the end of the book she is happy to announce that for the first time since 1527 the Ethiopian people enjoy full access to the sea.

OASIS KINGDOM: THE LIBYAN STORY. By Nina Epton. New York: Roy, 1953, 160 p. $3.75.

A travel book but also an effort to estimate the present situation and prospects of the new kingdom.

RÉVOLUTION AU MAROC. By Robert Montagne. Paris: Éditions France-Empire, 1953, 415 p. Fr. 690.

The author, with long experience in and sympathy for Morocco, attempts to discern the signs of the times in that land. He is sure that the "bon vieux temps," the days of Lyautey, are over.

Latin America and the West Indies

THIS NEW WORLD. By William Lytle Schurz. New York: Dutton, 1954, 429 p. $6.00.

An effort to bring together and describe the historical, ethnic and religious components which have come to form the civilization of Latin America. With the exception of a chapter on Brazil, the author's method tends to stress the elements of similarity rather than of individuality in the Latin American countries.

URUGUAY: PORTRAIT OF A DEMOCRACY. By Russell H. Fitzgibbon. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1954, 301 p. $5.75.

An able study, by a professor of political science of the University of California at Los Angeles, of the reasons why Uruguay has been so successful in avoiding, in the twentieth century, the political extremism and instability characterizing so many countries in Latin America, and elsewhere.

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SOURCE MATERIA

By Ruth Savord

I. DOCUMENTS

Documents may be procured from the following: *United States:* Gov't Printing Office, Superintendent of Documents, Washington 25, D. C. *Great Britain:* British Information Services, 30 Rockefeller Plaza, New York 20. *United Nations, International Court of Justice, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Org., Food and Agric. Org.:* Columbia University Press, Int. Documents Service, 2966 Broadway, New York 27. *Int. Labor Office:* 1262 New Hampshire Ave., Washington 6, D. C. Washington imprints are Government Printing Office, London imprints are Her Majesty's Stationery Office, and New York imprints are United Nations, unless otherwise noted.

Africa

Changing Africa; new developments in the British dependencies. New York, British Information Services, 1953. 23 p.

The New federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland. Salisbury, S. Rhodesia, Federal Information Services, 1954. 48 p.

Report by the resumed Conference on the Nigerian Constitution, held in Lagos in January and February 1954. London, 1954. (Cmd. 9059.)

Report of the Sudan Electoral Commission, Khartoum, December 13, 1953. London, 1954. 24 p. (Cmd. 9058.) 1s. 6d.

Commercial Policy and Trade

East-West trade. Hearing before the Committee on Foreign Relations, Senate, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., on the Mutual Defense Assistance Control Act of 1951, Apr. 9, 1954. Washington, 1954. 38 p.

Trade agreements extension. Report from the Committee on Ways and Means, House, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., to accompany H. R. 9474, Je. 10, 1954. Washington, 1954. 4 p. (H. Rept. 1777.)

—— Report, Committee on Finance, Senate, Je. 16, 1954. Washington, 1954, 4 p. (S. Rept. 1605.)

——. Act, approved July 1, 1954. Washington, 1954. 1 p. (Public 464, 83d Cong.—H. R. 9474.)

An International comparison of national products and the purchasing power of currencies; a study of the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Germany and Italy, by Milton Gilbert and I. B. Kravis. Paris, O.E.E.C., 1954. 203 p.

Communism

Communist action derogatory to the rights of free men. Report from the Committee on Foreign Relations, Senate, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., to accompany S. Con. Res. 58, Apr. 29, 1954. Washington, 1954. 3 p. (S. Rept. 1273.)

Strategy and tactics of world communism. Hearings before the Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act . . . of the Committee on the Judiciary, Senate, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., May 18–27, 1954. Washington, 1954. Pt. 1.

Strength of the International Communist Movement. Senate, Special Subcommittee on Security Affairs, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., May 1954. Washington, 1954. 78 p. (Com. Print no. 2.)

Customs Unions

Le Bénélux. Paris, Presses Universitaires (for Institut National de la Statistique . . .), 1953. 488 p. (Mémentos Economiques.) Fr. 1820.

European Federation

Five European conventions. Strasbourg, Council of Europe, 1954. 79 p. Bg.Fr. 100.

Comments on the Strasbourg plan. Paris, O.E.E.C., 1954. 37 p.

Documentation sur les problèmes du travail dans les industries de la communauté (Emploi et Salaires). Luxembourg, Communauté Européenne du Charbon et de l'Acier, 1954. 115 p.

At Work for Europe; an account of the activities of the Organisation for European Economic Cooperation. Paris, O.E.E.C., 1954. 87 p.

Summary of the first annual programme of action of the European Productivity Agency. Paris, O.E.E.C., n.d. 17 p.

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Financial Policy and Exchange

The Federal Reserve System; purposes and functions. Washington, Federal Reserve System, 1954. 208 p.

Study of Export-Import Bank and World Bank. Hearings before the Committee on Banking and Currency, Senate, 83d Cong., 2 Sess., on S. Res. 25, Jan. 25–Feb. 2, 1954. Washington, 1954. Pt. 1.

Export-Import Bank Act amendments of 1954. Report from the Committee on Banking and Currency, to accompany S. 3589, Je. 22, 1954. Washington, 1954. 8 p. (S. Rept. 1624.)

History of operations and policies of Export-Import Bank of Washington, by Hawthorne Arey. Washington, 1953. 175 p.

Outline of the financial system in Japan. Tokyo, Bank of Japan. 1953. 23 p.

Problems of international convertibility. Vienna, Creditanstalt-Bankverein, 1954. (Wirtschaftsberichte, v. 6, no. 21.)

Germany

Bundesministerium für gesamtdeutsche Fragen. Publications. Bonn, 1953–54.

Der Allgemeine und Spezielle Maschinenbau in der sowjetischen Besatzungszone. 39 p. (Materialien zur Wirtschaftslage in der sowjetischen Zone.) Sowjetische Auffassung zur Deutschlandfrage, 1945–1953. 36 p. Die Sowjetisierung des mitteldeutschen Handwerks, by Bartho Plönies and Otto Schönwalder. 134 p. (Bonner Berichte aus Mittel- und Ostdeutschland.) Der unabsehbare Strom, by Harald von Koenigswald. 79 p.

Great Britain

Britain's defense effort. New York, British Information Services, 1954. 35 p.

Britain's colonial policy and record. New York, British Information Services, 1954. 18 p.

Progress in the colonies; British policy in action. New York, British Information Services, 1954. 15 p.

Labor

Eighth report of the International Labour Organisation to the United Nations. Geneva, I.L.O., 1954. 332 p. $2.00.

Minimum wages in Latin America. Geneva, International Labour Office, 1954. 184 p. (Studies and Reports, New Series 34.) $1.00.

Indigenous peoples; living and working conditions of aboriginal populations in independent countries. Geneva, International Labour Office, 1953. 628 p. (Studies and Reports, New Series 35.)

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